year, when again several of the many bird-watchers who haunt the park would notify either the Linnaean or the Audubon Society that it had been observed during its annual stopover in New York. What made it almost a certainty that the patient would not see the Worm-eating Warbler if he prowled about the park on this day is that its annual visit had been observed and duly reported by several bird-watchers almost two weeks before. Never had it been known to make a second visit during the season.

Nevertheless the patient went to the park, despite these rational considerations, full of the certainty that had taken hold of him. And this feeling, marvellous to be told, proved entirely justified. After only ten or twelve minutes of seemingly aimless walking the patient came full upon his quarry, unmistakable in its form, colour and markings and flitting about entirely unconcerned with the miracle of its second visitation.

The patient was so excited by his discovery that he immediately set out in search of other bird-watchers, to whom he was eager to demonstrate his find. He came upon a few fellow birders some distance away, but when he led them back to the vicinity where he claimed to have witnessed the highly improbable second visitation of the Warbler the bird was nowhere to be seen. Naturally the other bird-watchers expressed doubt as to the accuracy of the patient's observation and concluded that he must have mistaken some more common bird for the Worm-eating Warbler.

The patient left his incredulous fellow bird-watchers and began to walk aimlessly in a general northerly direction. And again after a few minutes he spied the Warbler, at just as close range as before, i.e. at about ten feet. Once more he hurried in search of witnesses to confirm his discovery, but once more the bird had disappeared by the time he returned. Considerably crestfallen, the patient left the group and started in another direction with the purpose of heading out of the park. And within two minutes he came upon the bird a third time. (In cases of this sort, the patient assured me, it is always assumed that only one bird is being seen unless two are actually seen together.) But this time the bird remained on the spot until the patient brought up his witnesses to vindicate him and share in the wonder of the event. Viewed at close range through a half-dozen pairs of field glasses, the bird was unanimously judged to be really the Worm-eating Warbler.

When the patient told me of this he was excited both about the fact of the Warbler's unprecedented second visit and also, of course, by the uncanny fact of his having felt in advance the certainty that he would witness it. It struck me as curious, however, that he seemed completely to have forgotten that about a year before a very similar occurrence had taken place.

At that time he had been driving at a leisurely pace along an inland road on Long Island on the return from a day of bird-watching along the shore. Suddenly, while thinking of the fact that he had not seen one Kingfisher during the entire day, the thought came that he was shortly to see one, and this presented itself with a feeling of absolute conviction. This certainty of what was about to be, this preternatural expectancy, lasted about a minute. Then a Kingfisher flew right across the patient's advancing car and flitted into the woods at the side of the road. Noteworthy here was that the Kingfisher, while fairly common along the coastal marshes, is rarely seen in inland wooded regions such as the spot where the patient had seen it. Equally remarkable to the patient was the feeling of absolute ' fore-knowledge ' that had alerted him to the rather uncommon event about to occur.

This event too, at the time, had given the patient a wonderful sense of exhilaration as if a miracle had occurred, although it was of course impossible under the circumstances to discount the likelihood that he had either first seen the bird out of the corner of his eye (possibly as it was flying alongside the car) or had faintly heard its rattle. In either case he might have repressed the perception and then accomplished a ' double-take ' precisely in order to give himself the feeling of a premonition coming true. It was also possible that he had not seen a Kingfisher at all but had needfully distorted his perception of some similar-looking bird into the apparition that would fulfil his unconscious requirements of the moment.

In any case, whether or not what the patient described was in any way out of the ordinary, the determining psychodynamic forces were clear. At the time of the Kingfisher episode the patient had been at the lowest and most difficult point of his analysis. After a stormy course of treatment, he had begun to give up, one after another, a series of morbid symptomatic escapes, including a powerful alcohol and barbiturate addiction, and had finally faced squarely the panic of having to begin to make a living for

himself and his family. Just before the episode described, he had for the first time permitted himself to experience realistically the impact of a sad state of debt from which he had somehow to extricate himself. And for the first time the patient realized that he could not go on clinging to infantile fantasies of a bountiful breast that would somehow present itself magically to rescue him from his predicament, a fantasy that had dominated him unconsciously since his orally deprived, in fact marasmic infancy. All this the patient had worked through most painfully in his analysis, and on the day of the first episode, as he was returning from his solitary session of bird-watching, he was acutely aware of his ultimate motherlessness.

This, then, was the setting for the minor ' miracle ' which had occurred, a miracle that arose out of the patient's last agonal attempt to reassert the omnipotence of thought, to conjure up the mother by willing her to appear, as it were. For this is plainly the meaning of the sleight-of-mind which had taken place. The bird (even the nominally masculine Kingfisher) represented at once the mother and the breast, and the net result of the patient's manoeuvre, whether accomplished through a simple double-take of normal perception or through some other means, was to prove that all was not yet lost when one could think ' Mother, appear! ' and then have mother actually present herself. It was this, of course, that had given the patient his unusual sense of exhilaration and had saved him, momentarily at least, from the terrible depression into which the final loss of his unrealistic mother-breast substitutes had threatened to plunge him.

The episode with the Worm-eating Warbler occurred, as I have indicated, about a year after the one involving the Kingfisher. By this time the patient had come a long way and had reduced his analytic sessions to one a week. He was free of his alcohol and drug addiction, had begun to work again and was well on his way toward being rid of his debts. All this he had accomplished with great effort and courage, without backsliding and with a minimum of depressive symptomatology. All the more intriguing, thus, was this seeming repetition of a mechanism whose only purpose could be once more to prove to the patient—and to prove again and again, if the triple occurrence be held significant—that he could indeed recapture the mother by what unconsciously amounted to the act of willing her to appear.

With this in mind, and after reminding the patient of the Kingfisher episode of the year before, I asked him what had happened on the preceding day that made it necessary for him to revert once again to this kind of mechanism for fantasied control of the mother. Specifically I asked him how, on the day before, he had been abandoned by some mother figure. What he told me left little doubt as to the correctness of my surmise. To start with, his wife had been out of town for several days and he was alone in the apartment. Then on the day before the morning of the episode with the Worm-eating Warbler (that is on the preceding day) two things had happened whose significance cannot be missed. First, the part-time maid did not show up to prepare his breakfast and tidy up the apartment. Later she phoned that owing to her daughter's sudden illness she might not be in for several days. Second, when he arrived at his office he had found a telegram from his secretary, on whom he had become very dependent, stating that she had had to leave suddenly for another city where a family emergency had developed and could not see her way clear to returning at all to the job.

Here, then, we have the absence of one mother figure—the wife—and an abrupt abandonment by two others, the maid and the secretary. The patient suddenly found himself utterly bereft of everyone he had come to depend on in this role, and this at a time when he was especially vulnerable because of the imminent termination of his treatment. Small wonder that he had to fall back on the infantile illusion that one could conjure up the mother by sheer force of inner need, the last desperate device of the forlorn child.

In order to accomplish this the patient had to make use of an existing reality and in each instance to manoeuvre himself in such a way as to produce the effect of somehow having himself brought it about. It was precisely the seeming omnipotence that this conferred—the unconsciously remembered omnipotence, we might hazard, that even the child of the most unloving and most unresponsive mother might for some fleeting moment of its infancy have enjoyed—that was responsible for the sense of exhilaration experienced by the patient in both instances. But whereas in the first instance we have no particular need to drag in any unusual hypotheses in order to account for what had taken place, in the second it would appear extremely difficult to avoid such a step if we wish to under-

stand how the patient had achieved his presumptive unconscious knowledge of the Warbler's presence in the park. Several hypotheses based on normal perception were discussed with the patient in detail, and all appeared very roundabout and improbable. The patient assured me, for example, that it would have been most unlikely for him to have heard the call of the bird as it conceivably may have passed his house early in the morning on its flight to the park. First, no one had ever heard the call of the Worm-eating Warbler outside its nesting ground; secondly, the patient had never heard it at all and would have been hard put to it to identify the call if he had heard it at this time. Again, had he seen the bird in the park on the day before (only to repress this perception at the time) in all likelihood other bird-watchers would also have seen it by the end of the day. As it was, after he did see it on the day he reported it, it was seen and reported independently by several other observers. But even so, the slight probability that it would stay on a second day, had it actually been there on the day before, would leave the problem virtually unaltered as far as explaining what did take place. Other ' normal ' hypotheses, which we need not go through here, turn out to be still more tenuous and implausible, and one is left in the end with the feeling that what the patient described was an occurrence requiring something beyond the usual stock of causal hypotheses—unless one is willing to ascribe the correspondence between the patient's premonitory conviction of what he was about to see and the actual fact of his then having seen it to pure chance. In the latter case one would, of course, have to relinquish the hope of making much psycho-analytic sense out of what had happened, since it was not in the premonition alone that the patient stood to gain under the circumstances but in the fact of the premonition followed by its fulfilment.

Now the psi hypothesis applied in this situation amounts to nothing more than that under the circumstances, where a plausible explanation in terms of known sensory processes cannot easily be adduced, we still need not fall back upon chance if we can gain any advantage from assuming a deterministic relationship between the events described. On the cognitive side (to which we shall limit ourselves here) the psi hypothesis states simply that in the absence of any known means of gaining information through normal sensory channels it is nevertheless possible for a person to behave in non-chance correspondence with given events past, present, or future. This is tantamount to stating that the individual can in some way obtain information relating to such events, a formulation that transcends simple notions such as ' thought-transference ' and the like. *How* such information-getting happens no one to-day presumes to know, but the fact that it does happen has been demonstrated over and over again under the most stringent laboratory conditions during the past eighty years of organized research in this field. It is not, moreover, a phenomenon completely apart from the fabric of natural science; on the contrary, as I have pointed out elsewhere, it is in principle and fact no different from some of the most fundamental relationships on which our science rests.

At any rate, nothing stands in the way here of our being able to apply the psi hypothesis to the question of how the patient could have known of the Warbler's presence in the park and have been guided to it. True enough, when we do an experiment in the laboratory to demonstrate the phenomenon of psi, the rules of demonstration require conditions to be such that every conceivable counter-hypothesis be categorically ruled out. (The only meaningful definition of ' psi ', in fact, is the purely operational one which would be stated in these terms). This we obviously cannot manage here since we are dealing not with a controllable situation but with history. However, we must not confuse what is required in order to demonstrate psi in the laboratory and what is called for before we apply the hypothesis of a psi-conditioned relationship to particular events observed outside the laboratory. In the latter case no necessity exists to ' prove ' psi, any more than we are required to prove ' the unconscious ' every time we postulate it in order to make sense out of data that would otherwise lack meaning for us. Here, thus, when we have made a reasonably thorough search for ' normal ' explanatory factors, including the possibility that the patient was consciously or unconsciously falsifying his account of what took place, we must then realize that if there is such a thing as psi-functioning or, let us say, a ' psi-faculty ' (or whatever we please to call that which has to be postulated by exclusion in the laboratory) it does not wait to occur in actual life situations until it can be recognized unambiguously for what it is; and that it is clearly bound by no rule to hold itself in abeyance until potential observers have satisfied themselves that every conceivable alterna-

tive way of gaining information has been rendered categorically impossible. Thus while we need not fall back upon the psi-hypothesis when normal means of information-getting may be presumed with a fair probability, it would be a travesty of science, on the other hand, to demand that such means be excluded with the certainty of laboratory control before we do resort to it. Nor should every unlikely, implausible, or far-fetched counter-hypothesis be given greater consideration simply because it may involve a so-called ' normal ' process. If ' psi ' exists it is obviously as normal as any other process and to regard it as *a priori* the least valid hypothesis in a given situation (because it is unfamiliar and in this sense a ' big ' hypothesis) is plainly illogical.

In the present instance, therefore, where there seems to be a good deal to be gained from the psycho-analytic point of view in tying things up in a deterministic manner and where no plausible conventional explanatory hypothesis presents itself, the least complex assumption, to my mind, is that the patient utilized an always latent ' psi faculty ' to accomplish symbolically what, I suspect, he must repeatedly have failed as a marasmic infant to accomplish in reality when his mother, unresponsive to his desperate need (however communicated), remained ' gone.'

It may be pointed out that we still have not accounted for the occurrence of the primary phenomenon itself, that is, the decidedly extraordinary second visit of the Worm-eating Warbler. This, however, I feel we had better just accept as a given datum without attempting to hitch it up in some causal way with the patient's will. The fact that it happened just at the time of the patient's great need might simply have provided the fortuitous circumstance necessary to have enabled the patient to bring the postulated mechanism into play, exactly as if an untutored peasant were to have utilized, in a premonitory dream, say, an imminent eclipse of the sun for a similar psychological purpose. In each instance an extraordinary event, about to happen in any case, is utilized to provide the background for the personally necessary illusion of a miracle. Had this not been ready in all its symbolic specificity, it is likely that the patient would have patched his psychological fence in some other way. We all use what lies to hand or mind for these purposes.

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AN EGO-PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF HYPNOSIS

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Of the many functions of the ego (4), (2), (1) that relatively most recently discussed and least generally understood is the function of ' self-exclusion ' (5), (6), (7). Under certain circumstances, the ego is able to exclude or to decrease some or nearly all of its functions. The cognitive function needs to be excluded in the process of falling asleep. In hypnagogic phenomena, especially in Silberer's functional phenomenon (10), we deal with a self-observation of the process of falling asleep and, as it were, a self-observation of the decrease and exclusion of perception. Varendonck (11) has cited a number of interesting examples which occurred to him when he was struggling to stay awake. A patient of mine, following a small operation, was nightly given codeine as a sedative and experienced a vision of a window being closed as the last thing before falling asleep. I have myself experienced the image of a closet door closing and darkness ensuing. Such phenomena are easily recalled either if one trains oneself, as Varendonck did, to awaken again, or when circumstances bring about a chance noise that penetrates the perceptual field and reverses the process.

Not infrequently, people report a final awareness of muscular relaxation as the feeling of falling in going to sleep, only to awaken with a start if they happen to be anxious and the muscular relaxation is incomplete, and if passivity is a threat. Similarly, the process of awakening from a deep slumber frequently involves a temporary disorientation with only gradual perception of the entire field.

I suggest that the hypnotic state—in the past frequently described as a ' state of narrowed consciousness '—can be better understood as a state of partial self-exclusion of the ego similar to the process of falling asleep, but not identical with it. In enumerating the differences, I hope also to contribute to a clarification of the long-standing discussion of comparisons between sleep and hypnosis.

Consciousness, and therefore ego activity, is not an ' all-or-none ' proposition, but is a state ranging on a continuum from a hypothetical maximum to a hypothetical minimum. This is known both popularly and clinically, and finds its conceptual expression in psycho-analysis in the formulation of ' pre-consciousness ' (mental processes that are not conscious but can with minimal intent be made conscious) and in such clinical psychiatric terms as ' cloudy states ' (Dämmerzustand), depersonalization, etc.

For a variety of functions it is necessary that the ego be able to exclude itself. Kris (6) speaks of this necessity as ' regression in the service of the ego ' in connection with the artist who must be able to relax ego control in order to ' create ' and yet must maintain the degree of control which makes his art product socially acceptable (requiring the service of the ego).

I have referred to the need for self-exclusion and control in relation to such productions as Thematic Apperception Test stories (1). The subject must be able to let his fantasy go and yet maintain enough perceptual and conceptual control to adhere to the stimulus and to fulfil the task of telling a fairly structured story. In free association also the patient is asked to let his mind wander ' freely ', i.e. without exerting the usual ego control, and at the same time or successively to switch back to observing his own stream of thought in order to report to the analyst. One might speak of this ability to switch back and forth as the 'oscillating function' of the ego which, if good, allows for great 'flexibility' (and thus, sensitivity, creativity). On the negative side, one usually speaks of 'rigidity '. If the self-observation itself becomes a compulsive act, as in the obsessive or the psychotic, it is a phenomenon of ego weakness: the self-observing function has replaced the cognition of outside stimuli to a pathological extent.

In the struggle to remain awake, the oscillating function may also be involuntary. One may switch from external cognition to hypnagogic reveries.

It is postulated here that *hypnosis is a special case of self-exclusion of the ego.* In many tasks the ego-activity is voluntarily limited to *some*

functions. Problem solving is often not possible without complete repression of external stimuli other than those of the problem at hand (the typical ' absent-minded professor ').

In well-functioning sexual relations consciousness is limited to awareness of the sexual partner, and, in the orgasm, a state of clouded consciousness is achieved, in which there is awareness only of the orgastic process; the person who still hears the clock ticking or wonders about the pimple on the partner's cheek is disturbed.

In hypnosis some ego functions of reality testing are delegated to the hypnotist. This can probably still be best understood in the terms advanced by Ferenczi, namely, that the hypnotist is a parental figure. This need not be taken too literally as repetitive of the childhood situation wherein the child falls asleep to the sound of the mother's or father's soothing voice. It may be taken in a broader sense, i.e. we all constantly defer some actions to one parental figure or another, be it teacher or boss. Such a relationship is frequently compared to a transference relationship. It must not be overlooked that the wish to fall asleep or to be passive in relation to the hypnotist plays a decisive dynamic role in the child or the adult respectively. The sleepy child wants to be cuddled, held close, cared for, and wishes to relinquish control much as a passive adult may prefer to have someone else set a course of action for him. The relationship of this wish to sleep to oral wishes has been particularly elucidated by Lewin in connection with his oral triad (7).

In this sense it is of course not more correct to speak of an ego-psychological theory of hypnosis than it would be to speak of an id-psychological theory of phobias. As in any psycho-analytic hypothesis, the dynamic interplay of a wish or drive-demand with other constituents of the personality and reality must be an integral aspect of any consideration of hypnosis. The wish to fall asleep or to be hypnotized need not be conscious. The person struggling against falling asleep is in fact a much more frequent phenomenon than the one struggling against ' going under ' in hypnosis, and in either case the struggle involves a conflict between the passive wishes and the defences against them. In the case of the insomniac who wishes to fall asleep the fear of passivity and the fear of emergent phantasies of castration keep him awake. A tired sentry may struggle against he wish to sleep, possibly induced by still unknown physiological stimuli related to fatigue.

However, a person who uses sleeping as a form of withdrawal may fall asleep in undesired company also against his conscious wish and without any physiological need for sleep. Similarly, a person in an audience undergoing mass hypnosis may fall asleep against his conscious wish to stay awake, and a person consenting to lie down on a couch to be hypnotized may struggle against following instructions and yet become hypnotized, or may consciously struggle to submit, and like the insomniac, never become hypnotized because of unconscious fears.

The degree of self-exclusion of the ego varies with what are known as ' stages ' of hypnosis. Brenman, Gill and Knight (3) recently presented some excellent experimental evidence of varying levels of ego activity in hypnosis. Elsewhere I have discussed (1) how preconscious fantasies may have a certain autonomy of life: a preconscious fantasy may exist without one's being aware of it. Only suddenly, because of some interruption, may one ' snap out of it ', as the expression goes. Often such preconscious fantasy starts with some conscious thought which trails off into ' day dreams ' and sometimes actually into hypnagogic states or sleep.

A similar phenomenon obtains in the process of being hypnotized from the standpoint of decreased ego control (from conscious thought to preconscious thought to hypnagogic reverie to that special state wherein nearly all reality testing is relinquished except the sensory contact with the hypnotist). Some subjects interrupt the hypnotic process by ' snapping out of it ' as one does in reverie.

Two phenomena well known in hypnosis may also be easily explained by the ego theory. One has to do with the disturbing fact that sometimes subjects throw off the control of the hypnotist and act out a hypnotic trance of their own. This probably resembles those preconscious fantasies which become autonomous in a state of sleepiness or in more or less psychotic people who find these fantasies intruding and taking over consciousness against their will. Hypnotic subjects who demonstrate this phenomenon are probably people with a particular propensity for dissociation of ego functions, and are better not hypnotized.

In hypnosis the self-exclusion of the ego is probably not as complete as in sleep: cognition of the hypnotist is maintained. However, a similar phenomenon occurs in sleep when one is geared to awaken at specific noises. Such an instance is the case of a mental set to awaken at

a certain time, because some time-estimating function of the ego is maintained, or because of noises such as the arrival of the milkman, etc. A similar selective phenomenon occurs in the mother who may sleep through any number of louder noises, but awakens at the merest whimpering of her child. In other words, some selective perception occurs in every sleeping person. While one individual may be unable to sleep in the noises of a new environment, another may have become ' accustomed ' to them, i.e. have acquired a selective inattention to certain stimuli which occur while he is asleep.

The case in which the hypnotic fantasy becomes autonomous and the hypnotist's control is lost comes as close as possible to the normal state of sleeping and dreaming and to spontaneous somnambulistic experience. It must be concluded that psycho-dynamically there are no systematic differences between sleep and hypnosis except the quantitative one of degree of ego-exclusion. This ego-exclusion may, however, be of a relative minimum in light sleep, or in sleep geared to special noises: or it may be at its maximum in deep hypnosis with autonomy of hypnotic trance.

Toxic deliria are states of ego weakness induced by various agents, such as alcohol, infectious agents, etc.

Another factor has to do with the much-debated question of performance of extra-aggressive or intra-aggressive acts under the influence of hypnosis. This can probably be restated thus; in fairly healthy people, enough ego function (of reality testing, etc.) remains intact to avoid such acts if normally ego-alien to them. However, it is not inconceivable that individual persons with weak egos may be guided to harmful behaviour, in hypnosis as well as under the influence of other ego-weakening or ego-directive forces (e.g. of group psychological nature (viz. Redl's concept of resistance to ' group-contamination ' as a function of ego strength) (9)).

The process of ' going under ' again resembles the hypnagogic phenomenon. The feeling of many subjects that they were not ' really under ' and could have acted differently resembles the feeling accompanying all preconscious phenomena—namely, that one could gain complete control of them if one wanted to.

The ego-psychological theory of hypnosis can finally explain why some subjects are not hypnotizable: psychotics do not have an ego integrated enough for the selective regression involved in hypnosis. Similarly, anxious people—all those to whom being ' passive ' means ' being vulnerable to attack '—cannot relinquish ego control. The person suffering from insomnia suffers from inability of the ego to exclude itself, the ego remaining on guard against phallic attacks, usually of primal scene fantasy origin. It follows then that people with insomnia will usually not be able to be hypnotized.[1] In those that can be, we should keep in mind that for some the presence of a benevolent parent figure (the hypnotist) may well be the one condition under which they do dare to give up the control. (Many a child whose fantasies clearly reveal that fear of the father's aggression prevents him from falling asleep will be able to fall asleep when his fear is no longer of the *fantasy* father: as soon as the real father is in the room, he may fall asleep—possibly because he is reassured about his own destructive wishes.)

All the phenomena produced in hypnosis are under the control of the ego. Motility is as much an ego function as is perception or its lack. The increased recall under hypnosis, which has been put to psychotherapeutic use, is due to a decrease of ego control which can also be produced by such ego-solvents as barbiturates and alcohol. The carrying out of a post-hypnotic order does not differ from the ' mental set ' to carry out other tasks under the ego's control, while perception of pain and fatigue can be dissociated and excluded from perception by the ego.

The ' compelling ' aspects of hypnotic orders do not differ from other compulsive acts such as tics, hysterical anaesthesias, obsessions and the like, which have, to misuse Allport's terms, become functionally autonomous parts of the ego in that the path from the unconscious motivation to the executive muscular function has become a one-way street. Similarly, the hypnotist's post-hypnotic order artificially inserts an autonomous set of determining principles which

[1] In this context there may be an opportunity for an experimental verification of this hypothesis. A group of insomniacs should have a significantly greater number of people who are not hypnotizable than a group of people who habitually sleep soundly. The difference could be increased if the insomniac group were further selected by the results of the administration of a number of TAT cards, namely 12M and 18BM, then including only those subjects who seem to feel threatened by an attack from the rear and who exhibit a great deal of anxiety concerning passivity. (By the same token, any group exhibiting strong traits of oral passivity ought to be wonderful hypnotic subjects in contrast to the anal type of the other group.)

usually remain effective only as long as the amnesia for the giving of the order persists.

I believe that continued systematic conceptualization of the hypnotic process as a special function of self-exclusion of the ego will finally make hypnotism a fully understood phenomenon.

To summarize: in the past, id-psychological theories of hypnosis were outstanding, as Brenman *et al.* (3) point out: Freud, Ferenczi and others compared the relationship of the hypnotic subject to the hypnotist to that of child to parent, lover to beloved, patient (in transference) to analyst. I agree with Brenman *et al.* that such a theory does not encompass all the features of hypnosis.

Brenman *et al.* observed spontaneous fluctuations in the depth of hypnosis and concluded that these changes represent defensive manoeuvres on the part of the ego when an existing psychological equilibrium is threatened by drives of various natures or by the defences against them. They used the increase or decrease in depth of hypnosis as a means of studying regressive changes in ego functioning.

I would like to go further, to the elaboration of a framework of an ego-psychological theory of hypnosis: hypnosis is defined as a special case of the self-excluding function of the ego. A topological regression takes place from conscious perception to preconscious functioning similar to the performance of routine tasks. As in the routine task, a small aspect of cognitive function persists, in the case of hypnosis directed toward the hypnotist.

Further regressions similar to those in hypnagogic reveries are discussed, and the relationship to sleep and dream is mentioned. Various perceptual motor and other executive phenomena associated with hypnosis can also be understood in terms of ego functioning.

Hypnosis, as well as other behavioural functions, needs to be integrated with our more recently acquired knowledge of ego psychology. However, the libidinal factors should not be ignored; a complete theory of hypnosis must take into account the libidinal relationship between hypnotist and patient, as stated earlier, and in addition the aspects of ego functioning involved, and all these factors integrated with the total psychodynamics.

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ON SO-CALLED "DEPERSONALIZATION"[1]

By ANDREW PETO, Sydney

I

My very first analytical case was a latent schizophrenic, a man who suffered—among other symptoms—from depersonalization. In company or walking the streets at night he would pretend to be 'dead', when he would behave like a lifeless automaton. This meant absolute withdrawal and emptiness, but also scaring other people by his 'playing dead'. Once he pretended lifelessness so successfully and for so many hours that his girl-friend alarmed the whole block of flats.

Since then a number of my patients have displayed, as a minor transitory or as a major central symptom, depersonalization or derealization. Freud and the other authors fully agree that the two phenomena indicate the same process, the difference being only a matter of degree. *Déjà vu*, *déjà raconté*, *fausse reconnaissance* belong to the same group. There is general agreement also about its occurrence in normal individuals.

To begin, I give a clinical description, quoting from a published paper of mine, one on identical twins (19).

Case 1. 'Paul had depersonalization symptoms. On the slightest provocation he lost self-confidence, became restless and complained of internal tensions, then his anxiety grew steadily greater, he felt surrounded by a mist and could scarcely distinguish his own body from the rest of the world. He felt his own personality to be something strange, his various limbs behaved like independent bodies. The mist permeated his entire body and split parts of it off; the patient felt oppressed and at the same time relieved. Then the mist gradually began to clear, his body again seemed to be his own, his anxiety grew less and finally only his lack of self-confidence remained.'

The experience thus described explains why most authors, particularly Oberndorf (14–18), consider it a defence mechanism to ward off anxiety; other analysts interpret it as a more complicated phenomenon than a simple defence. Freud (6) and Searl (22) stress that it is a symptom as well, its origin leading back to definite infantile traumata, and thus bearing the typical characteristics of symptom formation.

The depersonalization symptom of the young man previously mentioned was distinctly rooted—as his transference neurosis proved—in two series of traumata. The more superficial was attached to the father who chased and beat him with his walking stick, the deeper referred to starvation experiences in babyhood (his mother died in puerperal sepsis, and the baby was practically starved in his grandparents' home).

The following clinical material enables us to attempt further theoretical conclusions.

Case 2. A woman patient, unmarried, age 32, came into analysis because of anxiety states and difficulties in her relations with men. She had suffered from depersonalization since her pre-adolescence. She felt it as emptiness, strangeness, being lost, not being herself, not being anybody, and these feelings were accompanied by panicky fears of annihilation.

At first her transference neurosis developed on heterosexual lines. This provoked anxieties of 'being found out' by her mother; and then on a deeper level revealed a fear of being destroyed by the analyst's penis. A previous extra-uterine pregnancy gave her grounds for rationalization.

We soon understood that during the sessions—under the cover of heterosexual transference—she indulged in homosexual phantasies with her mother. Her mother had kept her all her life under her thumb and had wished to know all her thoughts. She continually resented it, nevertheless had always played into her mother's hands with the intent that the mother *should* interfere with her, and should share her life. If the mother should find out about her heterosexual life, it would be the end.

In the transference situation the mother imago was projected on to the analyst; my keen desire to know everything, to 'penetrate' into her mind, my 'bashing' interpretations provoked giddiness, dullness, and emptiness. The words I uttered caused panic and feelings of estrangement in her. She regularly left the sessions after thorough interpreta-

[1] Read at the Annual Conference of the Australian Society of Psycho-Analysts, 1–4 December, 1953, held in Melbourne.

tions with the words: 'I know the words you have said but they do not mean anything to me.'

She had tried desperately to resist her mother's influence upon her, and subsequently my 'penetration' in the transference. This resistance against the mother imago provoked fear of retaliation and a sense of guilt. She expressed her desperate position—'I must not be a person—I must not be separate.'

The next step in warding off the fear of the superego, which did not tolerate any integrated existence of the ego, was depersonalization. The loss of the feeling of a living mental and body ego indicated the denial of the forbidden separate libidinal existence. This depersonalization represented a symptom as well, a compromise between id and ego-superego strivings which were rooted in infantile traumatic experiences.

The second half of her second year proved to be the critical one for this patient. The family had always been on the move, they had shifted from city to city, from one home to another. The mother, already pregnant with her second child, had to go to work. The patient had chaotic reminiscences of faces of numerous people she had met, of rattling noises connected with much travelling about together with dizziness, desperate loneliness and darkness. Memories of relief while falling asleep in her mother's arms contrasted with despair because of her disappearance each day. A significant event was the birth of a baby brother. These experiences undoubtedly formed the origin of her depersonalization. This symptom meant escape from the frustrations, by denial of the suffering; it also meant denial of her hate through fear of retaliation by the bad, frustrating, absent mother. At the same time depersonalization was loss of the self in complete surrender, through loving unification with the mother in sleep despite the dangerous rattling noises of a train.

A similar phantasied unification was made by a male patient who had the hallucination that he was both inside and outside a glassy egg carried in a vehicle. It meant protective unification as well as separation. (Case 3.)

In the transference situation of Case 2, the threatening mother-analyst penetrated her on the phallic level *per vaginam*, and on the oral level through the interpreting voices having been accepted as if they had been devoured. The analyst rumbled like a little baby in her tummy, giving her tummy-aches, bowel cramps and uterine bleeding. At the same time she felt that through her aggression and love she had got inside the analyst's body and mind. This phantasy that the analyst was inside her and she was inside him gave rise to a feeling that they were 'wrapped into each other' and that her visible, 'phoney' body was really her mother's, while she herself, her real self, was hidden and protected in her own tummy. This prevented her from feeling herself to be a separate individual; instead she felt stifled, though protected, by her internalized mother. As a result of this identification her oral, anal, and phallic phantasies of having killed her mother led to a feeling that she herself had become dead, unreal, and without identity.

The autosymbolic hallucination of a woman patient may help us to a better understanding of the process (Case 4). 'Somehow I am a melon and a slice which is neatly cut out and gradually removed from the whole. It is a desperate feeling of being in the nothingness, being meaningless and longing hopelessly to become a whole.'

M. Klein (1946) describes these phenomena as due to projective identification. She states that they mean regression to the paranoid position with splitting processes in the ego. She interprets it as the turning of the destructive impulses against the libido. This is felt by the patient as deadness.

II

Another field of observation is suggested by the fact that every author states that depersonalization can occur in normal individuals. For instance, Federn wrote: 'Light attacks are taken . . . as happenings in an otherwise healthy individual.' It is also generally agreed that depersonalization often precedes the onset of a neurosis or psychosis. I would go further and say that depersonalization occurs almost universally as a transitory phenomenon in latency or puberty. At such moments the child or adolescent looks at himself in the mirror and thinks 'Who am I? Is this me?' He feels uncertain about his identity, name, and sex and experiences at the same time mild disturbances of equilibrium.

Another fact connected with mirrors may help to understand depersonalization. People do not usually recognize their resemblance to parents, siblings, or to other relatives, even when this is obvious. Nevertheless if anyone sees his face unexpectedly at an unusual angle in a mirror, for instance while entering a room where he did not expect to see a mirror, or while walking beside shop windows, he may recognize in himself the features of some relative. Such an experience causes embarrassment due to a mixture of pleasure and depression which is tinged with a feeling of emptiness.

The unexpected confronting of self causes a loosening of ego controls and ego disintegration ensues. Split-off parts come back from repression. The integrated part of the ego observes them, and admits their existence. They

are imago-complexes that were split off as a result of libidinal and aggressive conflicts.

This explains the individual's mixed emotions. The return of the split-off complexes causes pleasure, partly because of the libidinal components, partly because it brings about greater integration of the oedipal and pre-oedipal imagos on all levels. On the other hand the return re-creates the original traumatic situation with all the anxieties that caused the original splitting. This manifests itself in sadness, emptiness, and depression. The re-appearance of the parental imagos revives the death wishes directed against them, and the fear of retaliation on their part.

Thus we encounter the same id and superego anxieties as in cases of pathological depersonalization. What is absent in these ' normal ' cases are obvious signs of regression and disturbances of the body scheme. The short duration of these symptoms is the reason why the normal individual is not concerned about them.

It goes without saying that the reconstruction of these complicated processes cannot be carried through in non-analytical observation or in a single case. Different individuals reveal different parts of these processes, parts that can be reconstructed in the analytical situation only.

I attempted to apply these theoretical considerations while in charge of a psychotherapeutic out-patient department in Budapest where I saw my patients twice a week for fifteen minutes. My aim was the stirring up of unconscious material and breaking through the resistances in order to achieve quick transference phenomena. Thus I requested the patients to sit daily in front of a mirror for about fifteen minutes, and to look at themselves without any purpose, just letting themselves go along with their thoughts and emotions. About 50 per cent promptly refused to follow my advice, they found it ' silly ', ' strange ', laughed with a mixture of embarrassment and aggression. Those who tried had to give it up after one or two attempts. They soon slipped into the throes of anxiety which was often accompanied by giddiness, slight confusion, extreme tenseness, breathing and swallowing difficulties. In the interview that followed this experiment the patients were ' blank '.

Thus the therapeutic gains were nil, but my theoretical expectations seemed to be confirmed.

The dynamic and economic implications of self-confrontation have been approached from two different angles by psycho-analytical research. G. Roheim writing about the ' Self ' (21) discusses, among other topics, the folklore of the mirror, its evil and good aspects and the magic significance of looking into a mirror. The material collected and his analysis of it, to a great extent confirm the above hypotheses.

J. Lacan (1936) also contributed to this problem. He introduced the concept of the ' Mirror Stage ' during development and returned repeatedly to the subject. He refers to the exuberant interest the infant over eight months shows at the sight of his own image in the mirror. He assumes that this pleasure is caused by the fact that the child becomes aware of the wholeness of his body image, thus passing beyond the stage of the ' image of the body in bits and pieces ', That being so his observations and theoretical conclusions are the counterpart of mine. He describes the phase of integration —the infantile ego's realization of its integrative functioning. I describe in my cases of depersonalization a phase of ' falling to pieces ' with ensuing anxiety, a process which is the reverse of Lacan's ' Mirror stage '.

III

The authors agree upon splitting as the main mechanism that operates in the process of depersonalization. Freud and M. Klein assume that the splitting occurs in the ego, while Oberndorf stresses the splitting in the superego, admitting, after a correspondence with Freud on the subject, that such a process could not occur as an isolated one. Those ego parts that are repudiated and threatened by the superego suffer a decathecting of libido which is felt by the patient as strangeness or emptiness. In every case the libido is withdrawn from some part of the external world as well, and if it becomes overwhelming then this narcissistic regression is felt as derealization.

In my opinion the clinical phenomenon of depersonalization is in itself neither a defence nor a symptom, but is rather the product and manifestation of the operation of a defence or of the formation and maintenance of a symptom. It marks the phase of mental activity which occurs whenever the libidinal and death instincts become defused and occurs, therefore, in the course of every psychic activity apart from direct libidinal gratification, since every type of secondary process and many of the primary processes allow only indirect gratification of Eros.

Thus depersonalization is inherent in any kind of ego activity.

I note in my cases some typical archaic situations that occur in the early life of every infant though in varying degrees. An attempt is made to interpret them using depersonalization as the common denominator underlying these processes.

Ferenczi already assumed in 1932 that ' there is neither shock nor fright without some trace of splitting of personality '. He went even further and made the following note: ' Only in earliest childhood, or before the original splitting (primal repression), was anyone " one with himself ".' I think this consideration about the earliest and basic mental activities points to the very same assumption—only on a level that is nearer to clinical observation—that was expressed by Freud in the following way:

' The transformation of erotic libido into ego libido (neutral displaceable energy—displaceable libido) of course involves an abandonment of sexual aims, a desexualization. In any case this throws light upon an important function of the ego in its relation to Eros. By thus obtaining possession of the libido from the object cathexes, setting itself up as sole love object, and desexualizing or sublimating the libido of the id, the ego is working in opposition to the purposes of Eros and placing itself at the service of the opposing instinctual trends.' (7)

What Freud describes here as desexualization is—in my opinion—the same process that he calls defusion when he discusses the phenomenon of regression:

' As regards a metapsychological explanation of regression I am inclined to find it in a " defusion of instincts ", in detachment of the erotic components which at the beginning of the genital stage had become joined to the destructive cathexes belonging to the sadistic phase.' (9)

All cases provide evidence that there is deep regression to the most archaic ego stages, that the boundaries of the body ego are largely disturbed, that differentiation between the self and non-self (be it the mother or be it an external inanimate object) becomes impossible, and that a physical and psychic confluence is experienced.

Case 1 showed grave disturbance of the ego boundaries and of the body scheme as a consequence of separation, with splitting as a defence.

He regressed in some phases of his transference neurosis into states which seemed to recapitulate the stages of earliest regression. He seemed to have lost every contact with the analyst and frantic outbursts of fear and anger followed. Inarticulate screaming and shouting appeared associated with the hallucination of lying on big white breasts and kicking helplessly. These anxiety states were warded off partly by splitting off parts of his body (the bad ones) in further hallucinations, partly by uniting himself with the external and internal objects while ' surrounded by mist '. Whenever he succeeded in the transference in re-establishing his relations to the analyst as a love object the mist lifted and the strangeness of the self and of the world disappeared. He regained the feeling of reality in reference to himself and to the world, they appeared as clearly separated and there was no further need for a desperate assessment of their goodness or badness.

Freud's remarks point to instinctual defusion occurring in negation:

' Affirmation, as being a substitute of union, belongs to Eros; while negation, the derivation of expulsion, belongs to the instinct of destruction. The passion for universal negation, the " negativism " displayed by many psychotics, is probably to be regarded as a sign of defusion of instincts due to the withdrawal of libidinal components.' (8)

Case 2 showed fear of the loss of the object and its negation. The trauma of the absent mother repeatedly forced the young child to give up this object cathexis. The withdrawn libido (as the transference neurosis showed) could be turned only to a minor extent into helpful identification. The aggression that was freed in the course of the enforced withdrawal of object cathexis (defusional phase) led to the establishment of dangerous imagos. The weakened ego oscillated between unification with these imagos and negation of them which amounted—as the transference showed—to negation of the self. The former process led to a feeling of confusion and the latter to a feeling of deadness and emptiness.

Cases 1 and 2 especially show that depersonalization is preceded by archaic attempts to combine identifications with projections and attempts to comply with the superego (mother in Case 2 and father and mother in Case 1), or to escape from it through negation of the self by giving up a separate existence.

Freud's formulations leave no doubt about his theoretical assumptions as to the background of these defence mechanisms:

' The superego arises, as we know, from an identification with the father regarded as a

model. Every such identification is in the nature of a desexualization or even of a sublimation. It now seems as though when a transformation of this kind takes place there occurs at the same time an instinctual defusion. After sublimation the erotic component no longer has the power to bind the whole of the destructive elements that were previously combined with it, and these are released in the form of inclinations to aggression and destruction. This defusion would be the source of the general character of harshness and cruelty exhibited by the ideal—its dictatorial ' Thou shalt '. (7)

Case 4 went through a state of depersonalization every morning. This developed in the course of her oscillation between the wish to hold and to pass her faeces. In the transference she blamed the analyst for her quandary; he should have told her which one of her wishes was the correct and helpful one. The analyst represented both aspects of the mother imago on the anal level: the good one which she wanted to keep in herself, and the bad one which she wanted to expel from her inside. She could not separate them in some phases of her transference neurosis and so she became confused. The bad, aggressive imago then prevailed and produced attacks of depersonalization during the sessions. This conflict about the loving and threatening imagos involved an ill-balanced sequence of faulty identifications and projections. Defusion and consequently freed aggression prevailed and thus depersonalization appeared.

IV

The case histories discussed here seem to prove that depersonalization is the revival of situations in earliest infancy when everything was vague, ambiguous and anxiety-provoking. At the same time they definitely point to difficulties in primary child-mother relations. Such expressions as ' his various limbs behaved like independent bodies ', ' mist permeated his entire body and split parts of it off (Case 1)—' a feeling of being wrapped into each other ' (Case 2)—' she was a melon and a slice which is neatly cut out and gradually removed from the whole ' (Case 4)—indicate archaic feelings about the internal and external world.

In addition to these transference observations I would like to refer to direct observations on breast-fed infants that were published by me in 1937 and reprinted in 1949. Permanent or transitory refusal of the breast was observed in cases where the mother's hostility was somehow realized by the baby. I assumed then that disturbances of object cathexis effected the operation of the self-preservative drive. I referred to Ferenczi who assumed that the unwelcome child is exposed to the operation of the death instinct.

These observations and the systematic studies of R. Spitz (23, 24) can be interpreted in the way proposed in the present paper. Withdrawal of object cathexis, freeing of aggression, failure of helpful early identifications may lead under adverse circumstances to narcissistic regressions that can be understood in the light of the transference experiences I refer to. I assume that the precariously balanced body scheme of the baby and the uncertainty of his maternal relations imply great difficulties in development even under optimal conditions. The mother's prolonged absence or inconsistencies in feeding may lead—as clinical experiences show—to withdrawal of the libido and to ensuing states of anaclitic depression (Spitz). Transference phenomena prove that this depression is bound up with the operation of aggression, with preponderance of destructive imagos.

M. Balint refers to the same basic phenomena when he formulates his latest views on the subject of archaic object relations: ' In my opinion hate is the last remnant, the denial of, and the defence against, the primitive object love (or the dependent archaic love).' (2) He denies the equal status of love and hate, and thus the necessity of a defusional phase as it was conceived by Freud. Nevertheless the second half of his definition conforms to the assumption of the integrative role of hate (freed aggression). As a matter of fact he considers hate as a ' good institution ' in the service of the ego against archaic attitudes.

V

Depersonalization is a state through which the psyche has to go whenever energies are defused and displaced. The defused death instinct's threat to the ego has to be immediately counteracted in order to avoid the alienation of the involved ego parts. If not, the ego's object relations are fatally interfered with, as clinical experience shows. Thus a constant balance of defusion in the interest of enrichment of the ego and a libidinal recathexis for the maintenance of this enrichment through identifications and sublimations has to be established. These precarious dynamics were recognized and appreciated by Freud:

' Towards the two classes of instincts the ego's attitude is not impartial. Its work of identification and sublimation gives the death instincts in the id assistance in mastering the libido, but in so doing it incurs the risk of itself becoming the object of the death instincts and of perishing. In order to be able to help in this way it has to become flooded with libido itself; it thus becomes the representative of Eros and thenceforward desires to love and to be loved.' (7)

Depersonalization is the first phase of these two integrative but opposing functions. If the first phase cannot be discarded (overwhelming anxiety, too much released aggression, etc.) and the recathecting fails, it is felt by the ego as emptiness and strangeness of both the internal and external world. On the other hand if the second phase of the integration process, the libidinization, gains the upper hand, it interferes with sublimation. Erotization of thought and subsequent defences and symptoms may follow. Among other things, as a defence against it, the process may be reversed and renewed defusion occur to ward off anxiety. (Oberndorf found that erotization of thought is an important aetiological factor in depersonalization.) (14)

I suggest that the biological pattern as well as the traumatic experience which promotes defusion and creates all the above phenomena simultaneously, interact at the moment when the baby loses the nipple or its substitute from his mouth, either at the end of a satisfactory meal or by an unwelcome interruption.

The loss of this object, the awareness of a bad internal object (the missed nipple), frustration of all oral drives, cause anxiety that has to be dealt with. The disappearance of tactile, olfactory and other stimuli causes disturbances of the body scheme which have to be coped with. Any one of these phenomena is apt to provoke defusion as a step towards introjections and projections. The greater the trauma (the less satisfied the baby, the less satisfactory the breasts), the greater the probability that the defusion is followed by a delayed re-cathexis with libido and the greater the danger that a chain of anxiety states and defusional processes will postpone the necessary integration even at this very early stage. The longer the duration of the defusional phase the less opportunity there is for the ego to swing into the second phase, Freud's ' flooding with libido ', which ensures a successful defence against the aroused anxieties.

I assume that even the healthiest and best fed baby who falls asleep towards the end of his breast feeding, must become aware of the physical and psychic loss of the breasts and nipple. Furthermore, even introjection of the good breasts, even dealing with good internal objects implies this defusion phase of Freud's which secures ego stabilization through introjections and projections.

Clinical observations as well as theoretical assumptions seem to indicate that this suggested phase of ego integration is one of the most archaic phenomena of the human psyche. The material presented points to Freud's ' defusion ' which occurs whenever frustration has to be dealt with. If it is a basic and universal human phenomenon we may expect that so-called depersonalization will occur in many typical stages of the transference situation.

VI

Freud himself pointed to negation as a phenomenon which is very probably preceded by this defusion (8). He stressed its importance in intellectual development, and its utilization as a defence against interpretations in the analytical situation. These interpretations reveal an unconscious repressed trend in the patient and so force him—as a first reaction—to renounce its gratification and to cope with the aroused anxiety. The presumed result is defusion which is followed—in a relatively well integrated ego—by negation which allows the repressed trends or objects subsequent re-integration into the ego by means of various sublimatory processes.

After interpretations that ' click ' the patient always remains silent for a considerable period. I consider this silence as an attempt at detachment from the intruding dangerous analyst who is represented by the interpretation. The patient's attitude represents the giving up—for a moment—of the analyst, and then introjection of the given interpretation that previously had a traumatic effect. I assume that every interpretation is a traumatic experience and represents an archaic object relation that is forced upon the patient in the course of the transference both from his unconscious and from the analyst. The interpretation simultaneously forces the ego into giving up the original archaic object relations.

If this is valid then the adequate and universal reaction must be defusion before the processes of identification and projection follow. This is marked by silence before the subsequent ' flooding with libido ' (Freud, 7) when re-

cathecting with libido brings about the final introjection or projection of the trauma which has been previously negated.

Another transference phenomenon is the fact that the patient sometimes complains of giddiness while he is getting up from the couch. It shows that experiences during the session—even if the manifest material shows no proof of it—have roused archaic ego layers, as the function of equilibrium—the 'vestibular-ego' of Hermann (11)—is very probably one of the earliest ego functions. We may assume that equilibrium belongs within the category of the autonomous ego sphere (Hartmann, 10). Severe cases of depersonalization always suffer from disturbances of the body ego. I assume that in these instances the transference phenomena that were forced upon the patient and the subsequent dynamic and economic processes—massive identifications and projections and their disintegrating, defusing first phase—are the non-specific causative factors.

Another example of a minor depersonalization process in the transference is that patients often show the following form of resistance against a series of interpretations. 'I know and remember what you said, doctor, but it has no meaning for me, I am sure it won't work.' They describe their mental attitude very similarly—though on a minor scale—to that of patients suffering from depersonalization. They show a mixture of strangeness, embarrassment, insecurity, and defiance. It is often voiced while they leave the analyst's room.

I assume that these isolated transference phenomena are closely related to those that were described by M. Balint as symptoms of his 'new beginning' (1, 2). They have in common the decisive trauma of the loss of the object, subsequent negation, and the attempt at establishing mature object relations. Denial as shown by Balint's previous quotation gains a special significance in these dynamics. His theory supports my stressing of negation in these depersonalization phenomena within the transference situation.

VII

Finally, I suggest that the depersonalizations that occur almost universally during latency are closely interrelated with the passing of the Oedipus complex, the establishment of a strict superego-organization, and a strong wave of important sublimations in the ethical, religious and social spheres. These processes imply a great deal of integration and re-organization within the ego, which are inevitably accompanied by transitory defusion phenomena.

Freud's reference is quite clear:

'We are dealing with the beginning of the latency period . . . a period which is characterized by the passing away of the Oedipus complex, the creation or consolidation of the superego and the erection of ethical and aesthetic barriers in the ego. In order to effect the destruction of the Oedipus complex a regressive degraduation of the libido takes place as well.' (9) A passage in the same work (already quoted) stated that the metapsychological explanation of regression is to be found in 'defusion of instincts'.

Summary

I assume that depersonalization phenomena, in clinical experience, in the transference neurosis, in the course of normal development and as illustrated in folklore, all refer to a common basic process. This is a phase of defusion of the two basic instincts—as postulated by Freud—that always occurs during mental activity that is not in the service of immediate drive gratification. I suggest that this is a repetition of a universal human experience; that of the baby who loses the nipple from his mouth. I suggest that this experience represents the inevitable transitory phase between the trauma of losing the object and the defensive stage of coping with this loss through integrating the lost object into the ego with the help of some archaic defence mechanism.

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LINKAGE FANTASIES AND REPRESENTATIONS[1]

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Certain images may enter consciousness and in psychic productions can replace other images which may not enter consciousness. I have recently proposed the notion that the necessary relation between a substitute representation and its referent is that they be interchangeable in the fantasies in which they appear without changing either the instinctual tendency or the specific technique of execution specified in the fantasy. For example, I suggested (5) that a boat in the water may be a substitute for a toilet seat because the small child who is concerned with falling into the toilet as a result of the operation of an instinctual wish (e.g. to be born, to die, to be incorporated, to penetrate anal orifices, to be discarded) can express the same wish in another situation which presents the same danger of falling from a height into a body of water in which he can drown. In other words, before the substitute comes the fantasy—in the sense that an element in a fantasy which must be repressed, can be replaced by another image which permits the same specific procedure or technique to be executed. I need not mention that to state that this is a necessary condition does not minimize the importance of other criteria for suitability to substitute, such as association with a real significant childhood experience or with some recent experience. Some substitutes seem to be fairly universal: that is, they are current in many individuals, in many societies, in different historical eras. Such universal substitutes are called symbols.

Among the most primitive fantasies encountered in psycho-analysis are those in which two people become one person, that is, become physically united so as to form a single individual. ' To start with,' says Freud (1), ' the child certainly makes no distinction between the breast and his own body.' The psychic differentiation of the self from the instinctual object is a task which the infant can achieve only after the first few months of life, Therefore, the fantasies of somatic union may be considered an attempt to undo this differentiation or separation; and on the other hand fantasies of separation and differentiation may be considered repetitions of this psychic achievement.

Fantasies of somatic union and its converse, separation, are expressed in many familiar ways. For example, the concepts of birth and death are often utilized for the expression of these wishes. Nunberg (3) points out that separation is an important element of circumcision fantasies and compares Biblical and Platonic myths of creation of man and woman by a section of one creature into two, a section which is immediately cancelled by the reunion of man with woman, or child with mother, under the influence of longing. Many individuals are prone to conceptualize the union geometrically and for this purpose they use fantasies of inclusion. In such fantasies the subject is seen either in a container which represents the object or the subject himself is seen to contain the object. These claustrum fantasies lend themselves readily to genital, anal, and oral wishes. The result of the incorporation, by whatever apparatus, is physical union.

Identification, which, strictly speaking, is the process by which the subject becomes the object, is another technique for gratifying the wish to unite physically. More specifically, Nunberg (4) considers identification to be ' a tendency to reunite with the mother, a kind of instinct to form a unity with her '. The fact that people who identify are prone to use inclusion fantasies does not necessarily mean, in my opinion, that these latter are indispensable prerequisites for the process of identification. I consider it not particularly helpful to speak of identification when subject and object change places in two complementary fantasies. For example, a man may entertain the fantasy of being attacked sexually by his father, and at another time, of attacking the latter sexually. While in a literal sense the subject and his father are mutually exchanging identities, and while the subject may

[1] Read at the mid-winter meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association, December, 1954.

on other levels and other occasions be concerned with identification, I believe that clarity is best served by reserving the term identification for a technique for achieving the instinctual wish of uniting with the object, whether under the influence of libidinal or destructive tendencies.

Immersion and its converse, emergence, are another pair of techniques employed for the expression of wishes to unite and to separate respectively. The fluid matrix which surrounds, supports, drowns, suffocates, cleans, infuses, and receives excrement, represents, in all these ways, the mother with whom the subject wishes to be reunited.

Let me illustrate the concept of achieving organic unity by means of fluid contact with two analogies. When aquatic animals, in the course of their evolutionary development, emerged from the sea, they replaced the external fluid environment with an internal one. In other words they took a container of sea water with them so that although physically they left the sea, they really never left the water. Another isolation device is employed in electrochemistry. Two physically isolated fluid systems are brought into fluid and ionic contact despite their physical and partial chemical isolation, by the employment of a U-shaped tube filled with salt solution, each leg of which is immersed in one of the two fluid systems respectively. These devices for retaining fluid contact despite physical isolation are suitable techniques for fantasies expressing the wish for physical union and at the same time the opposite wish for physical separation. In other words they express wish and defence by means of a static compromise rather than by alternating action.

The following is a dream of a young woman who is trying to work out at this point of her analysis her complementary wishes to unite with and to separate from mother. ' I had a bowl of fish. I put the bowl into the sink. Both the bowl and the sink had water, so that the fish kept going out of the bowl. I started to lift the bowl of fish out. One fish slipped out. There was no longer any water in the sink and so it died. It slipped to the drain. I tried to scoop it up with the bowl. I crushed it with the bowl. It looked darkish. There was blood on one part. I awoke.' Her associations (obtained several months after the dream was presented) were to the problems of birth and death. The blood spot she associated with eggs and fertilization. She had been thinking of dying and had toyed with the idea of committing suicide by jumping off a bridge. The dream evoked the specific childhood memory of watching her mother change the water in the goldfish bowl and fearing that the fish would be killed in the process. In other words the removal of the fish (the patient) from the enveloping matrix—i.e. separation from mother—is tantamount to death, so that, paradoxically, jumping from a bridge into water is rebirth. Note that an attempt is made to isolate a small portion of the main body in the sink into a bowl, which is then to be removed. One can leave the matrix only by taking a portion of the matrix along. But the fish is still afraid to leave. For refusing to be born, it must die.

The fluid bridge described above, is an example of a type of link by which two bodies are joined and at the same time separated. The link is not only a mode of physical attachment, but also a mechanism for the exchange of fluids, both nourishing and excretory, for communicating information and for maintaining turgidity. There is a structure of this nature which links the human mother and child during gestation and even for a few seconds after the birth of the child, namely, the umbilical cord. The following material illustrates linkage or umbilical cord fantasies and symbols:

A woman who had been in analysis for several years for treatment of moderately severe but recurrent depression, had another depression in anticipation of the analyst's vacation. A few days before he was to leave she had the following dream: ' An operator called me on the telephone. She was from Eastern Airlines. She gave me a message to call my mother in California. Someone transmitted the message to me. I didn't call Eastern Airlines because I couldn't make the trip. She called me again reproachfully. My mother was waiting to hear from me. I didn't see the point in calling until I knew what to say. " Mother is waiting," she said. . . .' The patient's mother had died some fifteen years previously, and the patient had left home several years before her mother's death. She was reminded by the dream of a framed illustration which hung on a wall in her home during childhood. It was a picture of a baby talking into a telephone, the wire of which trailed up into the clouds. Under the illustration was the remark, ' Hello, Central, I want to talk to mommy '. The patient, in anticipation of being separated from her analyst, wished for reunion with her mother (although she projected the wish upon the mother). The link with the mother is represented in the screen memory by the telephone wire, and in the dream, by the telephone connection as well as the airline connection.

On the following night the patient dreamed again: ' I was to have an operation for the lump on my side, but the doctor himself was to give me the anaesthetic. He picked up a syringe full

of dark red fluid for injection. It was the anaesthetic. A long tube was attached to the end. He began to give it to me. I don't recall where he injected it. He talked to me and I asked questions. Then I began to think, " If I talk, then the anaesthetic won't work." I said, " What if you cut me and there's nothing there? " He replied, " Oh, there'll be something all right." I thought that it was surely the proper time to go to sleep. I didn't. I feared he would cut me open before I became numb.'

It had become evident in preceding months that for proper completion of the analysis it was necessary for the patient to permit her body to be cut and entered by the analyst and an introject discovered and recognized. However, in preparation for this procedure she permits the analyst to perform an injection. A red fluid is to be injected via the syringe and attached tube. The patient's association was a blood transfusion. The result of the analyst's penetration of the patient's body was that the two were connected together by a channel through which blood flowed.

Approximately three months later, a date was set for termination of analysis. The patient had a dream following the discussion of termination.

' I was on a train going underground. We came to a transfer spot. There was a sign saying Long Island Railroad. I stepped onto the platform. There was a large crowd. The space was narrow so I walked back to the centre of the platform past some steps. I turned around to avoid further obstacles including freight elevators. A man stepped back to let me pass. He took my hand. At the edge of the platform he gave me a slight shove as if to help me across at the point where I had to jump. First I thought there was some danger. No, with a slight push I could land one foot on the track and jump onto the next platform.' The patient interpreted the dream to mean that the termination of the analysis, which she had so dreaded, might not be such a fearful experience after all. The narrow passages and the dangerous track crossing indicate that the dream actually was a birth fantasy in which the analyst played the role of midwife by taking her hand and pushing her. On the same night she had a dream about a birthday (n.b.) and then the following dream: ' I cleaned an electric grill. I tried to clean the top of the flat pan but couldn't do such a good job because the connecting wire was on the top. So I cleaned around it as well as I could. It was so messy I couldn't keep from getting some on the cord.' The patient had been given such a grill as a birthday (n.b.) present. It was defective when she received it. She had recently had some difficulty in cleaning it. The cord is the device which connects the appliance with its source of power. At first, in the dream, it interferes with the perfect cleaning of the apparatus. Later the cord itself becomes soiled.

In this patient, threats of separation from the analyst resulted in the production of fantasies of separation, birth, and attachment. Among these fantasies the concept of attachment was represented at times by a link which was symbolized variously as a telephone wire, a blood transfusion apparatus, clasped hands and an electric appliance cord.

Another woman in analysis over a period of several years for treatment of schizophrenia, had since childhood enjoyed masturbation fantasies of being given an enema by an older woman. (This is the patient who was responsible for the fish-bowl dream, quoted above.) During the course of the analysis, the phallic, anal, oedipal, and homosexual sources of this fantasy had been elucidated and interpreted and a good clinical result was obtained. However, the enema fantasies persisted during masturbation and occasionally even during sexual intercourse, in which an *a tergo* position was preferred. One night she had the following dream:

' I was driving a car. I was trying to park it. There were two cars parked along the kerb and I tried to park in the space between but at right angles with the other cars because the space was too small for my car. I thought I would never be able to get out so I drove elsewhere but could find no place to park. I backed up to some petrol pumps. That wouldn't do. I went somewhere else. I saw some towels on a stand. They were blue. The word " mother " was embroidered on them together with some flowers. There was a canopy on the petrol station.'

The patient was depressed and tearful during the session at which the dream was recited. She felt that she wasn't loved by anybody and didn't belong any place. The car was her father's black car which reminded her of a hearse. The backing in reminded her of an act of intercourse *a tergo*. Backing up to a petrol pump reminded her of her enema fantasies. The embroidered blue towels were an allusion to gifts for her mother. The enema fantasy had actually accompanied the last act of intercourse. I surmise that the depression was due to separation from the mother, and the wish to belong

expressed the wish for reunion with the mother. The reunion was not to be accomplished only by meeting the mother or even by ' backing in ', but by means of a hose which would feed a fluid into her body. The instinctual wish to be structually linked with mother was conceptualized by the experience of early childhood of having an enema administered by mother.

A man dreamt:

' I had a sensation of not making a train, of being late and rushing. It was a trolley. I just made it at the last minute. I had a package, a garden hose. As I jumped on the side of the trolley, I realized it was trailing behind and unwound as the trolley travelled.' On the same night the patient dreamt again:

' On the corner of a block I saw two small houses adjacent but not connected. The corner house was the house of a doctor, a psychiatrist. On this house there was the name Odin. I had come out of this house.' This man had a travelling phobia for many years. The unwinding of the hose in the dream symbolized the wish to remain attached to his home base although he was travelling away from it. The houses in the second dream were not very elegant and seemed to him to represent his parent's home. Note that the patient makes a point of observing that they are attached but do not communicate. Since childhood he had striven to leave his parents' home and rise above them in social and economic status. In this dream the analyst is identified with the humble parent from whose house he had come. Recurrently, and particularly at the time at which this dream appeared, the patient had the wish to renounce his elegant surroundings and friends and re-establish his place with his parents. Both dreams therefore express the wish to be attached to the parents and in the first dream the attachment is symbolized by the garden hose. It is interesting that this man's first attack of anxiety appeared during nasal insufflation with a nozzle at the end of a long hose, for the treatment of a cold. During the analysis many inflation and infusion fantasies were encountered. Although the analysis has not yet progressed to that point it is my impression that the obvious phallic referents to these symbols and fantasies do not exhaust their significance, and that ultimately the linkage significance will require interpretation. It is of some interest to note, too, that this man entertained many fantasies in which he himself formed the connecting link between two people. For example, he would wish to introduce strangers to one another; he made strenuous efforts to keep on good terms with diverse and mutually incompatible people in an attempt to constitute himself an unbreakable link.

Discussion

It will not have escaped the notice of the reader that much of the material could be interpreted in terms of genital, phallic, anal, or oral apparatus. This fact alone does not exclude its interpretation as linkage fantasies. Moreover it should not be regarded as a coincidence that similar representations are used for the wish for somatic union and for the wish for instinctual gratification by the specific apparatus of less primitive fantasies. On the contrary, that a single technique may be used in the service of fantasies concerning all of the genital and pregenital apparatus is an example of the tendency of the psyche to make the maximum use of all resources available to it. In other words, as much as possible, the psyche attempts to use every technique for instinctual gratification available to it, for as many different fantasies as possible. For this reason the appearance of a symbol or other representation in any psychic production betrays merely the technique employed, but usually not the role of the subject (in terms of active or passive), the instinctual tendency or even the specific instinctual apparatus. These latter pieces of information must be obtained from the associations and from the other data of the analysis. Therefore, although the representations to which I have drawn attention appear at all phases in the analysis, the specific significance as a means for physical union of two bodies into one, presents itself in the analysis only after the more superficial material has been worked through, when the most primitive and deeply repressed fantasies are under scrutiny. In a sense the nutritive, excretory, and phallic elements clearly evident in this material may perhaps be considered differentiations serving on the one hand to repress the more primitive material and at the same time to express it. Therefore the less primitive differentiations require interpretation before the more primitive, less differentiated form of union can be exposed.

I should like, at this point, to add the observation that the unnatural communication of information or force without visible means, in other words the notion of influence from a distance, which is extremely common in schizophrenic fantasies, may be an instance of physical

linkage of subject with object but without visible link. The wish for union with the object is expressed by the wish to be influenced, while the defence against this wish, and also the wish to be isolated, are expressed not only by the repudiation of the influence but also by the elimination from the fantasy of any visible device by which the influence can be exerted. Perhaps this is the reason why the wireless, the concealed recorder, the hidden speaking-tube, and before the scientific era, the magical charms and methods of influence from a distance are favourite subjects for schizophrenic elaboration. The schizophrenic patient whose dreams are cited above once dreamed that she was being given an enema with a device consisting of the usual enema tube attached to a wooden plaque with buttons on it. To this plaque she associated the control panel of a real intercommunication system which she had once thought was used to eavesdrop on her private conversations. In other words, the enema apparatus connected the patient to a communication system which was operated by an unseen persecutor.

A link, as mentioned briefly above, is essentially a bridging device. In fact the bridge which links two bodies of land by crossing a body of water may be considered a differentiated and distorted symbol of the umbilical cord link which unites two bodies of fluid through a non-fluid medium. In that case all the meanings of the bridge as a device and of crossing the bridge as a process, which were so beautifully elucidated by Paul Friedman (2), may be considered to be maturational differentiations of the linkage method of becoming united and separating. ' There is indication that the same ambivalence which we observe in the neurotic's attitude toward the bridge and his fear of the other shore must have existed in the human mind since the dawn of civilization. It might be said that this ambivalence reflects nothing else but the longing to reunite what had been divided by the act of creation, the longing to re-establish a *unio mystica*, and at the same time the fear of defying the very act of creation.'

Since it is accepted practice in psycho-analytic literature to speak of fantasies which have as their prototype the employment of a specific apparatus as genital, phallic, anal or oral fantasies, it may be wondered why I refer to these fantasies under discussion as linkage fantasies rather than umbilical cord fantasies. I think there is a distinct difference between fantasies of linkage of which the paradigm is the umbilical cord fantasy and fantasies dealing with these other types of sexual apparatus. The infant becomes aware of the function of the breast and the existence of the breast at the same time. The same is true of the anal and genital apparatus. However, uniting and separating fantasies, and I believe even linkage fantasies, may exist long before the individual has any knowledge of the umbilical cord. Therefore to speak of linkage fantasies as being derivatives of wishes dealing with the umbilical cord in the same way that one speaks of anal fantasies as being derivatives of wishes dealing with the anus, is to assume that every infant who employs a linkage fantasy knows about the existence and the function of the umbilical cord. A similar anachronism is employed in the term ' uterine fantasy ' unless it is assumed that every infant who enjoys the fantasy of being inside the mother knows about the existence of a specific reproductive organ called the uterus.

This problem disappears if we take advantage of my suggestion that techniques for instinctual gratification are provided constitutionally through brain structure to the psyche. Specifically, in this case, it seems to me quite reasonable to assume that the neural basis for what is conceptualized as the notion of linkage of two separated bodies is constitutionally provided. The neural groundwork becomes conceptualized by being ' loaded ' with actual infantile experience and thereby becomes available for use in psychic work. It is not surprising that techniques for operation of the anal, oral, and genital apparatus should become ' loaded ' and conceptualized with direct relation to an actual experience with the apparatus. It is equally clear that experimental loading and conceptualization of the technique of linkage occur long before there is any possibility of psychic exposure to the fact of the existence of an umbilical cord. Similarly, loading and conceptualization of the technique of enclosure occur long before psychic familiarity with the fact of the existence of a uterus. The experiences which load the technique of linkage may actually be the feeding, excretory, and coital processes themselves (as conceived by infants). The use of tubes and injection syringes and needles, and especially the administration of an enema by a long tube connected to a reservoir of fluid, often provide the strong early experiences which become prototypic. Hence, while the umbilical cord is a paradigm of these fantasies, it is not psychically a prototype even though it may be a biological prototype.

The specific nature of the fantasied link should not be overlooked as a clue to the basic unconscious wish. Thus, hoses and tubes imply attachment for nutrition purposes; an electric cord implies attachment for the purpose of invigorating; a telephone wire implies attachment for the purpose of retaining communication; and clasped hands imply attachment for the purposes of physical support.

Summary

The instinctual need to be united first with mother and later with a substitute object may be expressed by fantasies of linkage with the object. For these fantasies the notion of linkage of the child with its mother by the umbilical cord is paradigmatic. Representations of such linkage include pipelike carriers of fluid, electric cords, hoses, tubes, and clasped hands. It is not necessary to make the incredible assumption that there is infantile knowledge of the umbilical cord. It is more reasonable to assume that when the knowledge of the umbilical cord is acquired in later years, it is used as a paradigm to label (and screen) linkage fantasies which existed much earlier. They themselves come into being when actual experiences of such linkage in infancy act upon the neural constitutional basis for learning and employing the technique of linkage.

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NAIL BITING AND THE INTEGRATIVE PROCESS[1]

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Nail biting has been a subject of great interest to students of human behaviour. This symptom and tremulousness have been regarded as universal yardsticks in the overt display of emotional tension. This brief presentation will be limited to a discussion of the psycho-dynamics of nail biting, particularly as it is related to the integrative process of the ego.

In the development of the infant, the mouth-hand relationship is established very early. The hand touches the breast or the bottle and later reaches for things which are brought to the mouth. Thus grasping and sucking become correlated in the acquisitive 'getting' or 'taking' process. With the onset of the impulse to bite (both before and after the emergence of the teeth) the hand function develops the quality of scratching and clawing. The infant both bites at the nipple and claws at the breast (or its equivalent) in later stages of nursing. Thus the oral sadistic impulse is shared by both the mouth and the hand as a further development of the impulse to devour. In carnivorous animals, of course, this clawing-biting co-ordination is superbly manifest both in capturing the prey and consuming the carcass. Our theme will concern itself with the biting-clawing impulse and will show its relation to the symptom of nail biting.

Emotional tension or anxiety results when the organism is beset by two or more conflicting motivations. The specific symptoms which develop from the conflict situation depend upon the age period in which the individual is traumatized and upon the previous history of mastery or frustration of the basic motivations. Nail biting as such does not occur in infancy. Finger sucking is the usual form of gratification which is used by the infant to relieve tension. Nail biting seems to occur during the oedipal phase of development, often as a successor to finger (thumb) sucking. The thumb sucking seems to be the phase to which most children regress as a fixation point of previous gratification. The nail biting follows, just as nipple biting followed the nipple sucking. The phenomenology of the biting process itself seems to contain the element of gross aggressions which are seeking discharge through the oral-sadistic channel. For the symptom of nail biting to develop, another element is necessary, and that is that there must also be present a strong need to deny the aggressive impulses. The symptom occurs when the child attempts to integrate these two diametrically opposed motivations.

If a child finds himself strongly motivated by hostile or competitive impulses to a parent but also finds that in carrying out his wishes he will destroy the object upon which he is as yet strongly dependent, he becomes a candidate for nail biting. In a somewhat different way a tension situation can be set up when a child feels frustrated in his oral, anal, or genital demands when they are associated with fear or guilt because of real or fancied threats. The child who is beset by the conflict situation, particularly in the oedipal phase of his ego development, attempts to reach a homeostatic equilibrium through any means available. Inasmuch as at that period some form of motor action is a more likely method of release of tension than the more highly conceptualized defences that occur later, a symptom such as nail biting furnishes a convenient ego-integrative healing device.

The integrative aspect of the symptom consists of the release of oral-sadistic impulses by *biting at the claws*. Thus the release of hostile aggression is accomplished in the biting at the nails which wish to claw. At the same time the external object is spared by engaging the claws. In this way both the need to bite and the need to inhibit the infliction of damage to the external object are satisfied. Furthermore, a guilt-expiating device is afforded the organism by the infliction of pain upon the self. Thus a closed circuit is formed which satisfies not only the aggression through a motor discharge but also the need to deny its direction, as well as to pun-

[1] Read before the meeting of the West Coast Psycho-analytic Societies, Coronado, California, 23 October, 1954.

ish the self. This closed circuit discharges tension in a manner similar to the closed circuit of thumb sucking which expressed a need for sucking gratification without depending upon the mother to furnish the nipple.

Although the wish to claw or to scratch as an extension of oral sadistic impulses has not been emphasized in psycho-analytic literature, the relationship is frequently brought out in patients in analysis. Animals in dreams may not only be represented as biting creatures but are frequently described as being terrifying by virtue of their claws. The animals, of course, are projections of the individual's own biting-clawing impulses. As a matter of fact, many children who exhibit the symptom of nail biting also suffer from terrifying dreams. The red lipsticked mouth and the long fingernails with blood-red nail polish of women may have more than coincidental significance. It would take us far afield to discuss this concept further, but suffice it to say that clawing is a phenomenon of almost equal importance to biting. In addition, it may be noted that the act of pinching, at which toddlers are quite proficient, is a derivative of the clawing and biting impulse.

An obsessive-compulsive individual with a history of nail biting reported the following dream fragment: 'There was a U-shaped portion missing from my tooth, or it might have been from my finger nail . . .' Although the main theme here is the castration phenomenon, the interchangeability of tooth and fingernail symbolism is of interest. In this person sexuality was represented as an aggressive act and was equated with an oral-sadistic attack. The denial of his biting and clawing impulses condensed with genital libido was shown in the dream by rendering the tooth-claw weapon less powerful.

Another adult nail biter reported the following dream: 'I ripped off my uncle's badge (it was the symbol of his authority), and then I scratched his face.' This same patient had many fantasies of biting and clawing at his mother's breast. One of these fantasies followed the overt cessation of his nail biting, which occurred spontaneously during therapy. It was as follows: 'I was sucking on my mother's big nipple. I bit it off. It looked as big as a golf ball. I hit it with a golf club. I sewed it back on. I then started to suck on it again. I next ripped it off with my hands.'

The characteristic features of both of these cases were the strong aggressive (oral-sadistic) impulses against the mother and the equally strong need to deny these wishes and punish the self. When these motivations are expressed at the same time, they can be integrated in the single compulsive act of nail biting. As such it constitutes a sado-masochistic expression resulting from conflict in the oedipal situation.

The symptom of nail biting can later be translated by the organism into the social situation. In such an instance the sado-masochistic pattern still prevails. A young man in therapy had lost an eye, as a child of five, while playing with other children. He was at the height of his oedipal strivings with strong manifest rivalry with a younger brother. The parents were very firm, especially about displays of aggression by the boys. Our youngster was particularly regaled with admonitions not to be rough for fear that he might lose his other eye. The symptom of nail biting developed shortly thereafter. Although the symptom of nail biting subsided under the influence of parental admonition and encouragement, he later became a distinct social problem. At the age of 16 he was constantly in difficulties. He unleashed unprovoked attacks upon teachers, classmates and his parents. When people retaliated, he was wounded, regretful, and ashamed. He managed to sabotage all relationships, especially with girls. He reacted favourably to the interpretation that he acted with all people now as he did by himself with his nail biting. Instead of biting his nails, he bit people. When he felt the effects of their retaliation, his feeling was akin to the raw, sore fingers he formerly had from indulging his symptom.

Another case which showed clearly both the physiological and the social aspects of sado-masochism was that of a nine-year-old boy who was brought to me for therapy. Although he was a severe nail biter, the real problem was his social behaviour. He was extremely demanding, impertinent, disobedient, and destructive. Although he was quite cruel at times, he suffered terribly from remorse. There were many factors which led up to his difficulties, but we will not discuss them here. His actions were so disturbing to his mother and step-father that consulting-room therapy was not acceptable to them as they could not put up with him even for the duration of treatment. As a result, he was placed in a special home for residential therapy. While at this home he showed all his symptoms. He frequently woke at night with terrifying dreams. One recurrent dream was that he thought he was developing lockjaw. He also

reported a repetitive dream of a huge lizard with long, sharp claws. The imagery of the lockjaw contained in essence the total personality picture, namely an attempt at integration of his wish or need to bite and the strong need to deny this motivation. All his symptoms finally subsided when his behaviour was clarified and worked through in the therapeutic atmosphere. He learned to react with reasonable resentment when the situation called for it and to accept his frustrations in realistic proportions. For a while during his therapy he referred to himself as ' Mr. Claw '.

An understanding of the dynamics of nail biting is not only helpful in the treatment of this symptom, especially in children, but gives us added clues for the interpretation of adult human behaviour. There are many adult patients in analysis who give a history of nail biting in earlier years, but who do not evidence this symptom any longer. A knowledge of the mechanism of their former performance is of decided importance in evaluating the total picture of their personality structure. The foregoing cases are illustrative. There is demonstrated alteration of the motor discharge of the physiological sado-masochism represented by the nail biting into the phenomenon of social sado-masochism. In other words, the integration of the ego was first shown on a physiological basis and later the ego became secondarily integrated by a transfer to the social scene. An appreciation of the aggression-denial-self-punishment circuit as an integrative process may lead to greater therapeutic efficacy. This understanding gives greater meaning to the nature of the symptom than looking upon it merely as a libidinal exercise for the relief of tension. Moreover, we might even go so far as to say that the motor manifestation of nail biting can have a direct relationship to the complicated social or ego-integrative aspects of sado-masochism just as occurs in such other physical expressions such as ' biting the hand that feeds ' or by reaction formation, ' kissing the hand that beats '.

The theme of this presentation is ' biting the nails which wish to claw '. As an integrated act it can of itself serve as an ego-defensive device. It is as though the integrated act of nail biting, which had been a source of comfort, becomes a method in itself for the relief of all forms of tension. In this way it helps to put the individual in a temporary position for the discharge of excitation while the process of secondary integration attempts a reparative mastery of the existing anxiety.

Nail biting as such serves no function useful to the organism, and hence it cannot be considered as part of the executive function of the ego. Nevertheless because of its homeostatic quality, it serves as a means of striking a balance when the organism is disturbed or threatened. It is a useful indicator of the individual who is struggling for ' self-containment '. After the cessation of thumb-sucking, nail biting represents an early form of security operation by the very young child.[2]

There is one other factor in nail biting which may be worthy of mention, and that is the factor of restitution. In addition to the discharge of tension from the act itself, there seems to be an element of reversibility in the nail biting process because, unlike other mutilations, *the nails grow back*.

In conclusion, the process of nail biting can be looked upon as an integrated act of release of aggression, denial and self-punishment by biting at the claws and can serve as a medium for containment or assistance in establishing other integrative masteries in the face of conflictual or tension-provoking situations.

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[2] Condensed from discussions by Rangell, Szurek and Sylvester.

OBITUARY

AUGUST STÄRKE
(1880–1954)

On 16 September, 1954, August Stärke died after a prolonged illness. In him the Dutch Psycho-Analytical Society lost one of its founders and one of its most original members. A few years before his death the Society showed its appreciation of his work by granting him Honorary Membership.

In looking through Stärke's works on psychoanalysis one is struck by the valiant and heroic quality of his penetrating mind and by his determination to understand the fundamental laws of human psychology. They contain thoughts of unmistakable genius which are only marred—as he himself admitted—by a too lapidary style and by a speculative trend which is sometimes hard to follow. All his work shows the signs of a strong revolutionary tendency. Freud's writings, of which *On Dreams* (1901) was the first to reach him, made a profound impression on him as here at last he found the hypocrisy of the traditional psychology of the conscious mind unmasked. From then on he became a fervent supporter of psycho-analytical theory which to him was often a vehicle for his revolt against the ethical and aesthetic prejudices that dominate science.

Stärke had no less than 146 publications to his name, his early papers being neurological and psychiatrical, the latter mainly psycho-analytical. From 1926 on he wrote a great number of papers on myrmecology; this change of subject may be explained by the sociological content of many of his papers.

Stärke was not a psycho-analyst in the usual sense; he spent his life as a psychiatrist in a mental hospital and one has the impression that psycho-analysis as a therapeutic technique was not the central point of his interest. His most important contributions to psycho-analysis concern the psychoses: ' Comments on Paranoia ' (1919 and 1935), in which he located the real persecutor in the scybalum, and *Psycho-Analysis and Psychiatry* (1921), for which he received the Freud Prize. In the latter he made profound observations on the differences between psychotic and so-called normal or neurotic individuals. The normal person has his delusions too, but they are well integrated; the psychotic differs from him only insofar as the regression of his ' ego instinct ' makes it impossible for him to postpone satisfaction of his impulses until their expression becomes socially acceptable or gives secondary gain. The regression of the ' ego instinct ' is more important than that of the libido which also occurs in the normal and neurotic individuals. Stärke formulated a number of stages of ego impulses which are an extension of Ferenczi's views on the development of the sense of reality but which are formulated with greater reference to biology and the concept of repetition compulsion.

In 1921 he was the first to suggest that the earliest antecedents of the castration complex were in the oral phase. The phenomenon of repetition played a great part in his thought; not only did he reduce the function of conscience to a specific form of repetition (see Bibliography, No. 23), but he saw such normal but very primitive and magic forms of expression as ' Tanzen, Schlagen und Küssen usw.' (No. 18) as manifestations of the repetition compulsion.

As it is quite impossible to do justice to the abundance of Stärke's ideas in a short summary we must confine ourselves to mentioning a few that were very dear to him and which it is known he wished recorded for posterity. According to his ' Law of Retrogenesis ', development is not a product of evolution but of revolution, always finding its origin in an earlier and more primitive stage of development (e.g. No. 23). His socio-biological law, ' The Law of Reduction of Procreation ', states that the formation of a new biological unit by the fusion of two pre-existing units always leads to a reduction of procreation. He made the remarkable discovery that within any one group the size of the egg varies inversely with that of the mother while the vital intensity is in inverse ratio to the cube root of the body weight (vital factor). His biological explorations convinced

him that an already established individual development may be lost through a social development, an idea which made him anxious about the social tendencies of to-day. He believed that the functions of the individual intellect would be increasingly taken over by social organization. Lastly, an idea which may be of special interest to psycho-analysts is the idea that the conception of personality is a fiction. What we call personality can only be compared to the entirely fortuitous intersection of numerous and ever-varying lines in which no unity is to be found. A conception like this last testifies to Stärke's significance as a man who was ready and able to use his great gifts in unmasking and fighting any settled opinion in which he found the slightest vestige of a concession to prejudice.

Stärke's nature doomed him to isolation; he spent his life in the small village where the hospital was situated, surrounded by his family, his patients and his books, and in the midst of nature. Only a few people outside knew him and were privileged to undergo his stimulating influence. His great ambition was certainly never fulfilled and his last publication ' There will never be Peace in Nomenclature ' (No. 32) which appeared in an entomological magazine thereby acquires a certain tragic sense. He may have realized that his name would be forever connected with some psycho-analytic and myrmecological discoveries, but the awareness of approaching death did not blind him to the knowledge that even in the world of science there is no survival, for: ' There will never be peace in Nomenclature, because every generation has the secret wish to destroy all that the preceding generation has left behind, names included, and to baptize all things anew.'

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J. Spanjaard, Haarlem.

BOOK REVIEWS

Konversion und Reversion klinischer Neurosen. By Hans Rehder. (Köln: Artze Verlag, 1953. Pp. 232.)

This book has made it its task to demonstrate that behind all neuroses the primary driving force is 'fear'. In many very interesting case-histories which all testify to the very suggestive personality and excellent healing capacities of the author, there has been constructed a new theory of neuroses which, compared to the tenets of psycho-analysis, reveals itself as superficial and most incomprehensible, particularly by a very peculiar nomenclature.

The writer has expanded the original conception of conversion and has attempted to define the different forms of neuroses as always induced by 'conversion'. According to him there are various sorts of 'conversion'; he distinguishes a total, a partial, an inverting, a passive, an active sort of conversion and at last a 'Konversionsahnliche Disharmonie'. According to these assumptions there are various forms of neuroses which are viewed as simple conversion-acts of 'fear'. But the 'fear' has many grades, as for instance, exaltation, pavor, terror, horror, etc. The task of the therapy is to induce a 'reversion'. Now there is presented a theoretical approach to his really remarkable results which is hardly understandable by the reader. Why the author's mystic theory should give better directives for seeing the proper structure of the neuroses than the concepts of psycho-analysis, remains a sheer puzzle for us. The jargon of his theoretical explanations is a word-salad indeed.

All in all, this book is again striking evidence for the old fact that in the science and art of medicine there are many wide, often unbridgeable gaps between theory and practice. One can be a very excellent physician, a very efficient gastro-intestinal specialist, but fail totally as a theoretical surveyor of one's own successful practical experiences.

Lajos Levy.

Studies in Scientific Hypnosis. By Jerome M. Schneck, M.D. Nervous and Mental Disease Monographs. No. 84. (New York: Coolidge Foundation, 1954. Pp. xvi + 333. $6.50.)

This volume is mainly made up of papers previously published elsewhere. Nearly all the hypnotic techniques described, in current use by the author and others, are known and do not need separate review. The exploration by hypnosis of particular problems (audiometry, vocational guidance), and the combination with psychological test material, is of interest.

Further application is demonstrated in the method of hypno-analysis, in which hypnotic suggestions are given with a broad psycho-analytic orientation. This newer approach claims wider goals; it aims at insight as well as at direct symptom relief. While it is only to be expected that with this procedure the hypnotist should encounter resistances and transference, the divergence between the psycho-analytic and the hypno-analytic methods becomes obvious at this point: the hypnotist uses his technique to undercut resistances and transference and to analyse them only if necessary, the analyst uncovers deeper layers by constant analysis of resistance and transference; the hypnotist aims predominantly at remembering, the analyst at operating Freud's classical triad: remembering, repeating, and working through.

These points emerge on reading the presented case material which covers a wide variety of symptomatology, perhaps with some preponderance of hysterical conditions: phobias, conversions, fugues, anxiety states, amnesias. Owing to the fragmentary nature of the case reports it cannot always be ascertained to what extent the author's hypno-analytic method results in wider insight on the part of the hypnotist or on that of the patient or both. Perhaps the eclectic adoption of psycho-analytic findings is also responsible for a lack of clarity on this issue. It is indeed to be regretted that the author has not used his evidently wide experience with hypnosis for a metapsychological study of the changes brought about in the patient's mental economy by this form of treatment. The self-hypnotic dreams, for instance, illuminate well the introjection of the hypnotist by the patient and the rôle of the introjected hypnotist in the patient's mental economy. Critical research of this kind might have lent more weighty support to the author's sanguine plea for the wider application of hypnosis in general and of hypno-analysis in particular.

E. Gostynski.

Memoirs of my Nervous Illness. By Daniel Paul Schreber. Translated, edited, with introduction, notes and discussion, by Ida Macalpine and Richard A. Hunter. (London: Wm. Dawson & Sons, 1955. Pp. 416. 35*s*.)

Macalpine and Hunter have rendered a valuable service in furnishing a competent and carefully edited translation of Schreber's famous memoirs which played such an important part in the history of psycho-analysis. They are critical of some of Freud's interpretations and do not share his views on the etiological significance of the conflict over

homosexuality. They stress the importance of pregenital factors in the origin of the psychosis. They do not accept the concept of transference as evolved by Freud. They interpret Schreber's psychosis as 'a reactivation of unconscious archaic procreation fantasies concerning life, death, immortality, rebirth, creation including self-impregnation, and accompanied by absolute ambisexuality expressed in doubts and uncertainty about his sex'. In their view homosexual anxieties were secondary to the fantasy of having to be transformed into a woman. They believe Schreber's psychosis to have been precipitated by his wife's childlessness which reactivated his unconscious procreation fantasies.

Whatever we may think about the translators' views, we shall agree with them that Freud's interpretation should not be taken as the last word on the origin of paranoid illness.

E. Stengel.

Studies in Schizophrenia. A Multidisciplinary Approach to Mind-Brain Relationships. By the Tulane Department of Psychiatry and Neurology. Reported by Robert G. Heath. (Cambridge, Mass.: For the Commonwealth Fund by Harvard University Press; London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, 1954, Pp. 619. $8.50 or 68*s*.)

This is an ambitious work which attempts to attack the problem of schizophrenia and its treatment *in toto* by physiological means. All medical disciplines, from surgery to psycho-analysis, combine to pool their resources.

The authors were led to believe that the septal region of the forebrain was the influencing area in schizophrenia and severe emotional disease. The book contains a thorough documentation based on electrode stimulation, with extensive studies on animal and human subjects, complete with laboratory data. Briefly, they think that certain pathways constitute a hypothetical circuit that facilitates mental and bodily processes, while others suppress activity. It must be remembered that the report is a preliminary one.

The authors at first accept psycho-analytic psychology as the psychology of mental processes, and then ignore it, especially in evaluating their results. In a series of twenty patients, eleven were described as improved where a control series would only produce four. In the case histories offered, there seems to have been a remission in libidinal regression, the more normal part of the ego seems to have a tenuous hold, but the modified psychotic ego is in evidence. The improved patients live a marginal existence.

Psycho-analytic literature has described the modified, deformed ego of the psychotic. Although 'social cures' are very important, it would have been of inestimable value if the authors had described the superiority of their method over others in terms of structural change that had occurred.

Robert J. Corday.

Psychotherapy of Psychosis. By Gustav Bychowski. (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1952. Pp. 328.)

It is sometimes assumed among psycho-analysts that extensive hospital experience in clinical psychiatry is not an advantage in the psycho-analytical understanding of the psychoses. This book proves that any such generalization would be mistaken. The author is both a clinical psychiatrist and a psycho-analyst of great experience and erudition. His views on the origin of the psychoses and their treatment are catholic, and he does not adhere to a strictly psychogenic theory. He regards physical treatments as beneficial in certain psychotic states. He is nevertheless firmly convinced of the value of psycho-analytical psychotherapy in the psychoses. The author has a distinguished record as a student of schizophrenia, especially of its regressive features, about which he wrote an excellent monograph in 1923. In his therapeutic approach he stands nearer to Federn than to any other writer. Therapeutic failures in schizophrenia are in his view often due to the indiscriminate use of the method of free association on the one hand, and to the disregard of narcissistic defences on the other hand. Fromm-Reichmann's and Rosen's methods are critically reviewed and Sechehaye's observations are fully and sympathetically discussed. The author believes that in the majority of depressive states we must assume a combination of psychological and biological, i.e. exogenous and endogenous factors. He does not accept Klein's views on mental mechanisms in early infancy. He expects progress in therapy from a combination of biological and psychological methods. This is an unusually well balanced presentation of the state of psycho-analytical psychotherapy of the psychoses. The book can be highly recommended to everybody working in this difficult field.

E. Stengel.

Female Homosexuality. A Psychodynamic Study of Lesbianism. By Frank S. Caprio. (New York: Citadel Press, 1954. Pp. xvii + 334. $5.00.)

The sub-title of this book is misleading, in spite of sections headed 'The psychogenesis of lesbianism', and 'The psychopathology of female homosexuality'. It consists almost entirely of snippets—extracts from case material, 'autobiographical confessions', information obtained by the 'direct interview' method from prostitutes, quotations from other writers, and abstracts of books such as *The Well of Loneliness*. It is difficult to know for whom it is written.

The author's interest in the subject is very wide. He has travelled to many countries in pursuit of his study, and has compiled an extensive bibliography which would be valuable but for inaccuracies such as the following item: 'Brierley, Marjorie, "Specific Determinants in Feminine Development." *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, London, pp. 163–180.'

He expresses the view that 'Lesbians can be cured if they are earnest in their desire to be cured. Adequate self-knowledge via psycho-analysis is essential to effect a permanent cure'. But the 'psycho-analysis' he recommends is not 'orthodox Freudian' but that of Stekel—'shortening the period of analysis and taking a more active rôle in helping the patient understand herself and arrive at her own conclusions relative to the psychodynamics of her inversion.'

Margaret Little.

The Integration of Behavior. Vol. I. *Basic Postulates;* Vol. II. *The Integrative Process in Dreams.* By Thomas M. French, M.D. (University of Chicago Press, 1952 and 1954. Pp. xi + 272; xi + 367. 37*s.* 6*d.* and 49*s.*)

These books can be read independently, but they are the first two in a projected series of five volumes, whose aim is to study the 'process of integration of behaviour by a detailed analysis of the thoughts and acts of one person during two years of psychoanalytic treatment'. The patient was analysed by a colleague. Anticipating the query 'Can anything be proved by one case?' the author writes, 'Our aim, really, is not to prove anything. We intend, rather, to illustrate a method by which anyone may check our conclusions on as many cases as he cares to study in this way' (p. 40).

In his Acknowledgements the author says that he owes most to Freud but has also been much influenced by long collaboration with Franz Alexander and by the work of Kurt Lewin, Pavlov, Kohler, and Tolman. Some of his views have already been published in papers, but here we have the systematic presentation of what is essentially a revised metapsychology, reformulated in terms largely derived from, and consonant with, modern experimental physiology, and 'field' and Gestalt concepts. One of the aims of the re-phrasing is to render some of the findings of psycho-analysis more amenable to experimental investigation and validation, though in these books theory is formulated in close and intimate relation with clinical material and illustrated by simple tables and diagrams.

Basic Postulates. It is not feasible in a review to give a detailed account of the author's thesis and the arguments for it, but an attempt will be made to indicate the kind of approach and a few of the correspondences and differences between some of the suggested hypotheses and our more customary formulations. The method used, 'analysis by comparison', mainly of dream with dream, affords 'a strictly empirical method for reconstructing the pattern of a patient's personality. . . . As our working hypothesis, we assume that rational behaviour, neuroses and dreams can be analysed into component factors that are in part common to all three' (p. 5). There is nothing to question in this hypothesis since it is a re-statement of something that psycho-analysts take for granted. Leaving aside the value of 'analysis by comparison' as a therapeutic, as distinct from a research, technique, the method enables the author to bring out very clearly relationships and differences between normal and abnormal behaviour, the sequence of the patient's dreams and their recurring patterns, and the effects of intercurrent events between sessions on the transference situation.

The author bases his interpretations not on theoretical preconceptions, 'formulated verbal knowledge', but on 'the common sense understanding that we all share'. 'Common sense' tells him that behaviour has two components, motivation and insight, whose interaction produces 'patterns of motivation' that may be 'functional' (rational goal-directed, or reality-adapted) or 'conflict'. Basic patterns tend to recur (repetition compulsion), e.g. as reliving in the transference that interrupts the learning process of re-adaptation until the repressed memories are 'worked through'. The term 'motivating pressure' corresponds to the more familiar strength or intensity of drive with its resulting intra-psychic tension. The motivating pressure of a 'need' is directed away from a negative goal (the discomforts of lack of satisfaction); experience of satisfaction gives rise to positive goals inspired by hope of further satisfaction. Insight, which permits 'planning' and the direction of pressure through channels suited to the attainment of main, via subsidiary, goals, is the result of learning by experience, though the insight need not be conscious. Thus it is hope of satisfaction that tends to activate planning and stimulate the integrative mechanism: behaviour is polarized between need and hope. We are used to thinking of the integrative functions of the ego as essential to reality adaptation. The term 'integrative mechanism' is here used in place of 'ego' to avoid personification, though this rather ignores the fact that, however often Freud may have personified the ego, he defined it as an organization of mental processes.

A plan is an 'integrative field'. Such an integrative, or cognitive, field has a 'span' and its guiding influence or 'integrative effect' is the measure of its 'integrative capacity'. Phenomena of mutual induction and resonance occur between fields. 'Perhaps the integrative capacity of an integrative field corresponds to the functional readiness of its physiological mechanism' (p. 232). Processes of tension reduction that we usually think of as intrapsychic manoeuvres are described as modes of physiological absorption, e.g., the temporary neutralization of pressure by phantasy, that cooperates in dreams with absorption by sleep.

These slender indications of the nature of *Basic Postulates* may be enough to show the author's attunement to modern physiology and to the intellectual climate of Chicago. Some readers may be tempted to dismiss the whole theory as physiology rather than psycho-analysis. But since metapsychology is bound, in course of time, to correlate

ever more intimately with the findings of physiology, a rendering that is consonant with clinical experience and with physiological conceptions deserves to be taken seriously. In spite of its high degree of abstraction, this theory does translate clinical happenings and explain subjective events. It does allow for the intricacies of what we are accustomed to call intrapsychic organization, though it does not deal with these in quite the usual way and may appear to short-circuit them by the use of such terms as ' physiological absorption '.

The Integrative Process in Dreams. Vol. II is devoted to a more intensive study of the integrative process in dreams and of the way ' the integrative patterns of different dreams of the same person are related to one another and to the structure of the patient's personality.' It is stressed that dreams are not merely ' wish-fulfilments ' but attempted solutions of conflict, that reveal not only the dreamer's motives but also his typical methods of dealing with his conflicts.

In addition to Bibliography and Indexes, each volume has an Appendix: Vol. I. ' Life-History of Patient ' and Vol. II. ' Case Report and Interpretive Comment '. The author could not have done more to make it possible for readers to check his conclusions by the material he used, or by their own.

M. Brierley.

A Synthesis of Human Behavior: an Integration of Thought Processes and Ego Growth. By Joseph C. Solomon. (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1954. Pp. xii + 265. $5.50 or 38*s*.)

This book, by Dr. Solomon, Assistant Clinical Professor of Psychiatry in the University of California, attempts a synthesis of human thinking from birth to old age. For the author ' the ego is a development of the " meaning of things ", or in short, conceptual thinking' (p. 4). Perception being defined as sensation plus memory, perceptual thinking corresponds to non-verbal thinking and ego development depends upon the transition, via the acquisition of language, from non-verbal to conceptual thinking.

Many readers will question the adequacy of such an exclusively cognitive key to the many-sided problems of human behaviour, but, for the author, it is a clue that has led him to codify his views in a Table of Ego Organization (pp. 8–9). This table lists nine Maturation Phases from Infancy to Senescence; the typical characteristics of each phase are given in five columns: Psychosexual Stage, Principal External Objects, Mature Ego, Superego Reactions, Neurotic Ego Traits. The Psychosexual Stages of Infancy and Toddlerhood, Early- and Late-Perceptual and Early- and Late-Conceptual, here replace the old libidinal oral and anal stage classification. Unfortunately an undetected printer's error in the table gives the first Toddler phase, which should obviously be ' early-conceptual ' as a second ' early-perceptual '. Since the table is intended for constant reference, it is rather a pity this mistake escaped notice in the proofs.

The most useful part of the book is probably not the table or the theory but the wealth of descriptive material and the sensible discussions of human problems at different age periods which are ' mainly an outgrowth of my own twenty-seven years of training and experience, not only in psycho-analysis but also in pediatrics, child guidance, and hospital psychiatry '. This should be useful to students in any profession directly concerned with human welfare.

The author has been considerably influenced by Hartmann, but is one of the few American psychoanalysts who seems to have made a serious study of the work of Melanie Klein, though he differs from her on many points. Thus, while he endorses the idea of preverbal superego development he does not think ' an elaborate system of phantasies that exist almost from birth ' (p. x.) necessary to account for infantile anxiety, which he regards as perceptual in origin. For him, such phantasies are probably regressive and he suggests the term ' secondary perceptual thinking ' for such re-clothing of primary sensations in later ' meaning' .

Following Hartmann the author uses the term ' autonomous ego ' but in the sense of psychologically independent or ' mature ' ego, a usage that does not seem synonymous with Hartmann's.

The Bibliography lists 124 items, mainly but not exclusively psycho-analytic, and there is a useful Index.

M. Brierley.

Human Development. By John P. Zubek and Patricia Anne Solberg. (New York, Toronto, London: McGraw-Hill, 1954. Pp. vii + 476. 48*s*.)

This is both a summary and a critical review of experimental research on human development from conception to old age. As the Preface states, ' The general orientation of this book is physiological ', but it covers a great deal of relevant work in experimental psychology and sociology. The arrangement of material is by subject and each chapter provides a longitudinal section of a particular aspect of behaviour, which makes for ease of reference. Recent work on old age is most fully reported because much of this is still only accessible in monograph form. The extensive Bibliography is mainly American and Canadian with a few English references, e.g., to early work of Burt's. Some omissions, e.g. of Lewin and ' field theory ', are presumably due to the fact that their approach is cross-sectional rather than genetic. Psycho-analysis does not appear in the Index and is mentioned only in passing, e.g. as a method of personality appraisal (p. 407). However, any psycho-analyst who wishes to inform himself rapidly of the ' present state ' of experimental knowledge of human behaviour in North America would be well advised to consult this book.

M. Brierley.

Adrenal Cortex. Transactions of the Fifth Conference, No. 4, 5 and 6, 1953. Edited by Elaine P. Ralli. (New York: Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation, 1954. Pp. 187. $3.75.)

This record of the fifth and final conference on the adrenal cortex completes a series of informal discussions by a limited group of investigators and guests. All five volumes are published at cost, and are designed for the advanced technical reader.

The recent brilliant discovery of Electrocortin (now known as Aldosterone) by Reichenstein and his associates is discussed by Dr. H. L. Mason who had, interestingly enough, crystallized the same compound. Electrocortin is a mineralo-corticoid found in the human adrenal cortex which has an activity of from 50 to 100 times that of desoxycorticosterone and its discovery is an important advance in adrenal physiology.

There are discussions on the salt and water factor of the adrenal cortex, the metabolism of adrenal steroids, and on whether ACTH is a single substance or a mixture of hormones.

There are references to psychologically disturbed patients. On p. 60 Dr. Thorn describes an alteration in the normal diurnal variation of steroid secretion in severe psychological stress. On pp. 61 and 62, Dr. Pincus describes work on psychoneurotics who show no diurnal variations, even though they sleep well, and states ' the psychiatrists suggest that these are people who have rather interesting dreams.'

On p. 63, Dr. Dorfman describes increases in steroids following electroshock treatment in a 24-hour period.

No psychiatric data are given in these cases and this could not be expected at a conference of this kind. The psycho-analyst would certainly be very interested in further informal discussions which had as their aim the correlation of psychological data with physiological findings and comparative studies of such cases.

S. H. Lucas.

Trends of Life. By F. Wood Jones, F.R.S. (London: Edward Arnold, 1953. Pp. 191. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

In as short a compass as 180 excellently written pages the author has set out to convey ' in the plain language of everyday use . . . a summary of the conclusions derived from many years spent in the quest of the problems of life and the baffling manifestations of its activities in the sequence of living creatures.' Professor Wood-Jones, F.R.C.S., F.R.S., was latterly, until his recent demise, the Sir William Collins Professor of Human and Comparative Anatomy, and Conservator of the Anatomical Museum of the Royal College of Surgeons. He was also the author of a number of highly interesting and valuable publications of which some of the best known are especially concerned with examples of the indivisibility of function and of anatomical structure, e.g. on the curious pseudo-thumb of the giant Panda that in a bamboo-eating animal has been evolved from a modified sesamoid bone and a displaced muscle attachment in a hand that has been already highly specialized in a different direction. (*Proc. Zool. Soc. Lond.* B. 109; 113.) Wood-Jones has also elsewhere given original examples of the various structural adaptations of the teeth, claws, beaks, etc., in various animals to the function, highly important for survival, of fur and feather toilet. His assertion that the rough tongue of the cat tribe is an adaptation to toilet habits has been accepted by Julian Huxley. His argument that the very early appearance of the peculiar squatting facets on the os astragalus and tibia of the infant Australian aborigine constitutes a self-evident demonstration of Lamarckian inheritance is probably well known. In the present volume he has illustrated his arguments with a number of impressive examples of the more highly adaptive features of living organisms. For any reader (e.g. a simple-minded mechanist) who still needs to be impressed in this respect, this and all other popular works of this author are to be recommended. A more sophisticated reader might however regard these same examples as so much bait to the hook of the late Professor's ' conclusions ', which to this reviewer appear to be not so much conclusions as examples of anthropomorphic thinking, made possible by a disregard of current views of the nature and function both of scientific theory and of its concepts. The conclusions in question are expressed throughout the book, which is a special plea for Vitalist, Lamarckist, and teleological explanations of the nature of life and of the evolutionary process. The second, third and fourth chapter headings read as follows: ' The concept of vitalism ', ' The history of thought on vitalism ', ' The concept of teleology '. In the course of his Lamarckist observations Wood-Jones frequently had occasion to refer to Charles Darwin; but it is interesting to note that in this (albeit brief and popular and partisan) book, there is not a single reference to Haldane, Julian Huxley, or Fisher; and it is even more interesting to note that although the word ' marvellous ' is employed on no less than four separate occasions, the word ' mutation ' is not used even once. As a vitalist, the Professor is certainly to be numbered among a distinguished company that has in the past included Buffon, the anatomist Hunter, Erasmus Darwin, Lamarck, and even Von Uexkull: to say nothing of a literary personage, Samuel Butler, whom he quotes more than once, as well as various religious persons, whom he does not: and the philosopher Bergson. However, the employment of the anthropomorphic concept of ' force ' or of ' power ' is usually nowadays admitted to be permissible only as an operational concept and is as an explanation usually agreed to be unsatisfactory. This type of explanation, like the teleological and the Lamarckist theory of evolution, is furthermore not only open to the objection of being of a non-empirical character and

of being completely unsupported by any concrete evidence: but there is also the objection as put by (among others) Lorenz, that it explains 'too much' and tends therefore to closure issues that more properly ought to be matters for research. D. N. Pirie, in a logical analysis of the usage of the concept of Life, has pointed out that this usage, even in scientific circles, bears no more constant meaning than some particular attitude of mind on the part of the observer towards the phenomena in question. The definition offered by Wood-Jones is of just this character. And finally, in the nineteen-fifties, there really seems to be something rather *démodé* about the late Professor's preoccupation with the obsolete vitalist-mechanist controversy. However, all this is perhaps not so serious, and the Professor was certainly not altogether unaware of what he was doing. He freely admits (perhaps as a result of criticism) that the theories he adumbrates are essentially a 'way of looking at things . . . a mental bias'. Now scientific theory, governed by the principle of limited but increasing certainty, shows over a period of time a progress in which, wise after the event, the student may discern a kind of evolution. To a student of the evolution of theoretical biology the theories of Wood-Jones appear to be not so much 'unorthodox' and 'schismatic' (as was among other favourable comments suggested in the *Lancet*) but rather, archaic and anachronistic, similar indeed to one of those rare and fascinating living creatures that like Ornithorhynchus or Latimeria, point to the byways of the long distant past. In this review (which deals with a particular book) it has been unfortunately necessary to criticize Wood-Jones adversely in the rôle in which he there appears as a popularizing theoretical biologist. Elsewhere in his various excellent writings he has shown himself to have been a distinguished anatomist and a campaigner against the descriptive anatomy of the 'formalin school', a learned man and a contributor to the sum of human knowledge.

John Pratt.

The Emotional Problems of Childhood. By H. Joseph and G. Zern. (New York: Crown Publishers, 1954. Pp. ix + 310. $3.75.)

The enormous success enjoyed by Spock's little pocket-book in America has reminded the publishers of a vast public eagerly waiting to be told just how to bring up their children. A spate of parent guides must be expected to reach us within the next few years.

The Joseph-Zern guide to normal and abnormal development has a psycho-analytic background which, compared with Spock, is less smoothly incorporated into the popular style and text, the consequence being at times a curious juxtaposition of the superficial and the dry, the platitudinous and the profound. However, the information and advice given is usually sober and sensible and reflects current mental hygiene views. There are no delightful drawings, as in Spock, to enliven the text, and some of the examples chosen to illustrate the themes have a cultural loading which may confuse the non-American.

E. J. Anthony.

Children's Humor. A Psychological Analysis. By Martha Wolfenstein. (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954. Pp. 224. $3.75.)

Psycho-analysts long ago realized that the explanation of much adult behaviour, both normal and pathological, can most hopefully be sought in the study of the child. It is perhaps strange that in the half century which has now elapsed since Freud first showed the connexion between wit and other psycho-analytic findings so few studies from the psycho-analytic point of view have been made on the development of humour in children. In this book the omission is made good. At the same time, however, a valuable contribution has been made to the whole problem of the psychological function of humour, which in turn reveals itself as a useful field in which many of the mental mechanisms revealed by psycho-analysis can be profitably studied in a restricted and 'normal' area of mental functioning.

In agreement with Freud (especially in his article on 'humour') the author holds that the underlying motive of all joking is 'to transform painful and frustrating experiences and to extract pleasure from them'; but the painful experiences concerned and the technique of joke-making employed may be very various, according to the situation involved and the degree of sophistication of the joke-maker. By a series of excellent examples it is shown how 'increasingly intricate devices are used to circumvent growing inhibitions, to make possible the continued enjoyment of the forbidden without being disturbed by guilt' (p. 166).

Among these devices is one which has already been independently noticed by Reik, and more recently by Ehrenzweig, in its relation to art, viz. the displacement of affect from content to form, which in jokes may be attained through an increasing emphasis on rhyming, puns, or other verbal condensations (pp. 142, 182). In this way personal responsibility is transferred to the technique of the joke (or work of art), while at the same time the participation of others can be ensured in an innocent and harmless way. Indeed, in considering the development of humour we are made to realize how great is the influence of language in the process of sublimation.

In the first years of life much joking is of the 'sour grapes' variety. The child envies the powers and privileges of the adult, but in his jokes he turns these desirable privileges into something 'silly' or disagreeable, thus diminishing at once both envy and temptation. The immense rôle of infantile sexual preoccupations is amply testified by jokes which, under thin disguise, show anxiety about castration

or curiosity about sexual acts or sex differences, the puzzlement about sex differences often finding expression in double meanings or exchange of names.

A little later (with 'striking punctuality', the author finds, at the age of six) a store of 'joking riddles' begins to be acquired, reliance on a socially transmitted repertoire largely replacing the previous indulgence in spontaneous invention. In this latency period the earlier sexual interests are to a large extent repressed and anxiety centres about 'inferiority' in the widest sense, the child allaying his anxiety by riddles or stories concerned with the absurd behaviour of stupid persons (who are often made to take double-meaning words or phrases in the wrong sense). The 'legend of the moron', with which the longest chapter of this book is concerned, may be to some extent a phenomenon of contemporary American society, in which education has stressed the element of 'making good' and of competition; but underneath it the old perennial themes can still be seen at work. An interesting problem, which the author only touches on, is why the 'moron' is nearly always a man rather than a woman. Her tentative answers, however, are suggestive: (1) 'What is funny about a woman is that she lacks an anatomical part,' this often being compensated by an idealization of the feminine figure; (2) 'What is funny in a man is the unpredictable behaviour of the penis'; this may be generalized into unpredictable ('silly') behaviour generally; (3) 'The child has access to the mother's body in a way which presages later sexual intimacies. The father is more remote and alien to such feelings'; hence his 'crazy nocturnal sexuality' appears more incongruous, suggesting comic possibilities (pp. 136–7).

The 'concealing and then revealing' which is a characteristic of so much humour deals ultimately with the problems of aggressively toned scopophilia and exhibitionism. In the course of development words are substituted for acts, and 'others' for the self. The author here enlarges on a theme first stated in *Der Witz* (p. 80), but largely neglected by subsequent investigators.

Enough has perhaps been said to indicate the rich and thought-provoking contents of this book, which in many respects can be regarded as a sequel, or at least as an appendix, to Freud's own pioneer psycho-analytic work in this direction. After an interval of fifty years his main conclusions have been corroborated in a field from which he himself would surely have found supporting evidence most welcome. The data which are used for illustrative purposes and on which the author's conclusions are based were obtained for the most part from 'interviews' with 145 children in New York City private schools. The author's treatment certainly affords a striking example of the value of psycho-analytic insight for the interpretation of material gathered in this way. Not all readers, of course, will agree with all the interpretations, and even analysts may question their justifiability or adequacy here and there. But on the whole they seem to the present reviewer to be remarkably convincing. Indeed, the book might perhaps profitably be used as a first 'easy reader' for those approaching the study of psycho-analysis, since such mental processes as repression, displacement, condensation, symbolization, overdetermination and projection are often easier to appreciate in the relatively simple setting of humour than when they have to be observed in the usually more complex conditions of dreams, symptoms, works of art, myths or rituals.

J. C. Flugel.

Problems of Infancy and Childhood. Transactions of the Sixth Conference, 1952, edited by Milton J. E. Senn. (New York: Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation, 1953. Pp. 160. $2.50.)

The multi-disciplined approach sponsored by the Foundation is expressly designed 'to promote effective communication across departmental walls'. With this laudable aim in view, a representative group of scientific workers is invited to meet around a particular topic and exchange their ideas. The proceedings are informal and the language conversational. This makes for easy reading, but at its less edited and more banal moments, the intention can be quite exasperating.

On the whole this volume is much more to the point than some of its predecessors, and good chairmanship keeps the red herring from trailing too blatantly across its pages. Escalona gives a balanced account of the phenomenology of babyhood as she feels it. Her eclectic approach contrives to bring in and interrelate a mass of developmental data. She refers to her method as 'phenomenology by inference' which attempts to scale the dimensions of infantile experience, and find a frame of reference which would make it possible to understand each child's idiosyncratic habit of perceiving the world and responding to it. The unconscious dimension is necessarily omitted.

Wolf reports on a research project at the Child Study Centre at Yale dealing with the longitudinal investigation of infants from the period of pregnancy onwards. With psycho-analytic theory as a basis, the project aims at testing the capacity to predict the course of development; for example (a successful prediction) that specific fears with toys would develop with a certain child.

Steward describes excessive crying in infants taking into account the mother-child relationship at one pole and such investigations as barium meals, nasal smears, eosinophil counts and skin reactions at the other pole. It is worth noting that a span of this size is almost a commonplace to-day. Also worth noting, as a refreshing change, is the fact that the father and his feelings are given a prominent part in the production and prevention of a syndrome occurring in the first three months of life.

These three different approaches to infant development—the phenomenological, the psycho-analytic, and the psychosomatic—make one appreciate the importance of scrutinizing data from all reputable sources before setting to work on one's own theorizing. The multi-professional report is a safeguard against the too-parochial attitude.

E. J. Anthony.

The Abilities of Babies. By Ruth Griffiths. (London: University of London Press, 1954. Pp. 229. 20*s*.)

Many psychiatric and psychological workers either express scepticism at the possibility of measuring the infant's abilities reliably or doubt as to its usefulness in any field outside the developmental study. Reading Dr. Griffith's book will convince them of its wider applicability especially in the diagnostic sphere. The author's indebtedness to Gesell is everywhere apparent, but this in no way detracts from the individuality of her approach. The publication is an important event since it is the first British Baby Test, standardized on British babies, and providing developmental profiles that take many aspects of the child into account—but not the ' total child ' as many of the organismic writers claim. Cultural loading is not a big factor in baby tests, and it will be the intrinsic merits of the Griffiths test that will lead to its replacing the American versions.

E. J. Anthony.

The Construction of Reality in the Child. By Jean Piaget. Translated by Margaret Cook. (New York: Basic Books, 1954. Pp. xiii + 386. $6.00.) *The Child's Construction of Reality.* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955. Pp. xiii + 389. 25*s*.)

The world outside our minds (said William James) is chaotic. Every moment threatens to submerge us beneath a welter of sensory experiences that compete for our attention and concentration. As a pre-condition for sanity, we must become selectively imperceptive, and suppress or inhibit a large part of this perceptual bombardment. The immature brain of the infant and the damaged brain lack the capacity to do this, responding in a distracted way to every passing stimulus. Their experience is of a ' booming, buzzing confusion '. To bring law and order into such chaos is one aspect of what Eddington has called ' world making '.

Another aspect is the creation of permanent objects. This implies that a certain genetic point of view postulates an ' objectless ' phase in early infantile development that precedes the establishment of a substantial object organized in time and space. This so-called empirical belief considers that the object is gradually created through the warp and woof of maturation and experience. The nativists on the other hand conceive of an object apprehensible from birth. The pre-eminent and most cogent representative of the empirical viewpoint is Piaget and it is with his object concept that this work deals. It is his *eleventh* book to be translated into English, so that the developmental psychologist (academic or psycho-analytic) has now less excuse for overlooking this formidable system on the grounds of a language barrier. At this ' darkest of all ages ' as Miss Freud has termed it, before the concept of a repressed unconscious begins to dichotomize the psychologies, data gleaned from the experimental-observational approach of the non-analyst may find an important niche in psycho-analytical formulations. It may also serve to temper the over-fanciful interpretation. Even the most encapsulated theorist will find it difficult to restrain his interest in this methodical description of the earliest relation to ' things ' when the infant is apparently engaged in creating a world of external objects—no doubt as important for him as the postulated world of internal objects.

For Piaget the earliest months are objectless. The baby experiences fleeting images that may be recognizable after a time but have no continuity, permanence, substance, or time-space organization. The mind observing these images has an ' adualistic ' protoplasmic consciousness, limited to a dim appreciation of its own activity. The impermanent image is gradually endowed with primary perceptual qualities and begins to consolidate. For all *practical* purposes, object-making is completed by the eighteenth month. It is not, however, until late childhood that the secondary qualities (the conservation of matter, weight, and volume) are added, and the object as the adult knows it is perceived.

What are the implications of such a theory? In the last analysis every object, however concrete, is an image dressed up in certain primary and secondary qualities. The concreteness is in the mind. One is therefore forming a relationship with an image in the first place—a fleeting two-dimensional image—and later with an image that is solid, three-dimensional, and permanent. It would not, on this reckoning, prove too much of a surprise to learn that these basic relationships differ in the type of response they call forth in the subject. For Piaget *the first relationship is to the act and not to the image*, and he demonstrates this experimentally. The infant is concerned with what he is doing and his own sensations. The response is to the situation.

> ' When the infant seeks and finds the breast, it is not necessary for him to regard it as an object; the conditions of sucking and posture are sufficient to account for his behaviour.'

It is interesting to compare such a statement with Miss Freud's recent pronouncements on the phase of need satisfaction prior to the development of object relations, when the subject is concerned with his needs and not primarily with the object that meets or frustrates his needs.

But why does the infant progress from the act to the object (Piaget) or from the need to the object

(A. Freud)? Why does he pass from the impermanent to the permanent? Why does he create a world of permanent objects, only to learn what it is to lose them? According to Eddington, it is the human mind's 'innate hunger for permanence'. Piaget is interested in the 'how' and not the 'why' of permanence, and attributes its development to the use of foresight, the co-ordination of perspectives, and the making of simple sensori-motor deductions (all cognitive processes). For the psycho-analyst 'world making' has always been a 'combined operation' involving mother and child, and he is only now beginning to learn how interference with this primary combination interferes also with the construction of reality and the creation of enduring and endearing objects.

E. J. Anthony.

Understanding the Japanese Mind. By James Clark Moloney. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. Pp. 252. $3.50.)

A description is given of the social pressures to which every home-bred Japanese is subjected during his development. The author attributes the low incidence of schizophrenia among Japanese to the secure and satisfying breast-feeding, mother-child relationship which is the lot of nearly all Japanese. Also, the vantage point of a child, slung securely on the mother's back, looking over her left shoulder, gives intimacy of bodily contact, and a moving panoramic world full of variation and interest. From then on the period of training in cleanliness is quite different, being both harsh and rigorous. Thereafter social pressures upon the child are relentless, and all the rewards are for conformity, social sanctions being brought to bear against deviants from the prescribed pattern of behaviour. Because the social disciplines are so formalized and rigid, so authoritarian and so all-embracing, individuality is restricted. The price of this conformity at the expense of individuality is paid by the Japanese in their tendency to develop psychosomatic illnesses and to some extent in the peculiar socially sanctioned ritual cruelties to the self or to others.

With the Emperor at the apex, the hierarchical stratified structure of Japanese society is tightly knit and definite. The author states that the lack of aggressive behaviour, in other words the tendency to conformity even in Japanese psychotics, is remarkable. Not unexpectedly in view of this type of society, the Japanese tend to identify themselves with the enemy (the aggressor). The Japanese look for a precedent for any of their actions and the author suggests, rather gloomily, that the precedent of dropping atomic bombs on Japan may well have an unpleasant sequel in the future.

Regarding psycho-analysis and the Japanese, the author brings evidence to show that Japanese do not accept or practise psycho-analysis in the Western sense of the term. He considers the dilemma which confronts Japanese psycho-analysts, namely whether to regard the freeing of the individual as the desirable goal, or to regard the rendering of the person more able to conform to the restrictions of society as a more desirable one. That these aims are incompatible is beyond doubt. That there should be a dilemma for Japanese analysts is inevitable in view of their own social conditioning, and in view of the fact that very few of them have been analysed by Western analysts. Even so, as a result of their early conditioning, Japanese psycho-analysts tend to adopt the camouflage of conformity with psycho-analysis as we know it, in their writings for external consumption, while in their writings for internal consumption they conform to the demands of their own social milieu and adapt and modify psycho-analysis to fit those demands. The author discusses their modification of psycho-analytic concepts to suit their own socio-political ideology, and calls the process by which they do it, Syncretization.

This book will arouse a good deal of hostility among Japanese psycho-analysts, but in so far as it is a contribution to the truth, and in so far as it has brought into the open a situation which might long have remained under the cover of camouflage, after the initial reaction, it will tend to help Japanese psycho-analysts to face their own dilemma, and possibly, in time, will reduce the extent to which Japanese psycho-analysts practise something in which the name is preserved intact but the substance modified almost beyond recognition.

A. Hyatt Williams.

Psychology and Worship. By R. S. Lee. (London: S.C.M. Press, 1955. Pp. 110. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

This book consists of six lectures, the Burroughs Memorial lectures for 1953. The author is the Vicar of the University Church of St. Mary's in Oxford. As he showed a few years ago in his excellent book *Freud and Christianity*, he has a thorough knowledge and understanding of psycho-analysis, the findings of which he fully accepts. Here, as in his former book, he is concerned to reconcile those findings with the teachings of Christianity, and, moreover, to ascertain what modifications of the latter may be desirable.

Starting from the premise that the idea of God first develops out of three elements—the super-ego, the ego-ideal, and the infantile father-image (p. 65)—he admits that many of the various attitudes towards God later are still influenced by those childhood sources, and his aim is to purify them in the adult conception of God. It is as if the child on growing up discovers that there really is a God, thus confirming his early expectations, needs, and desires, but he now has to adopt a more mature attitude towards the Deity. The same thesis holds good for other religious beliefs and rituals. There are deep motives urging towards the belief in immortality, but its objective truth is demonstrated by the historical fact of Christ's resurrection from the dead. The ritual of the Holy Communion itself has, as he

admits, an ancestral background of totemism and even cannibalism, but it receives a new meaning through the historical event of Christ's Last Supper.

It will be interesting to observe what influence this courageous divine's endeavours will have among his professional brethren.

Ernest Jones.

Science in History. By J. D. Bernal. (London: Watts, 1954. Pp. xxiv + 967. 42*s*.)

This is a remarkable book but, unfortunately, its value is impaired by tendentious writing due to the author's strong ideological bias. This is amply illustrated by the account of Sigmund Freud and the social implications of psycho-analysis (pp. 815–17) from which the following are excerpts: 'Though Freud himself was always striving to express his findings in terms of objective realities, the actual entities he constructed were far more like the spirits, virtues, and faculties of a medieval morality play than the material entities of the physicist and chemist. . . . Just because these constructs had no possibility of material existence susceptible to any other form of demonstration, they tended to take on . . . an absolute character, and created a fixed and almost mythological inferno of evil influences. . . .' 'Because it stressed the hidden importance of the irrational and primitive aspects of the human mind, the new psychology provided an explanation, indeed practically an excuse, for man's inability to deal with the problems of society. The upshot of Freudian psychology was that man was effectively ruled by his own unconscious instincts, implanted before birth and carefully nurtured for evil in the early upbringing of children.' . . . 'The search for inner truth is a well-worn way to passive acceptance of outward evil.'

M. Brierley.

The Need to Believe. The Psychology of Religion. By Mortimer Ostow and Ben-Ami Scharfstein. (New York: International Universities Press, 1954. Pp. 162. $3.00.)

This short book is popular in the sense that it could be read without any previous knowledge of psycho-analysis, but it gives a lucid account of some of the more important aspects of the psychology of religion. The authors wish to present facts rather than to defend a special point of view, but they have definite views to offer. In their opinion, religion has positive psychic and society-protective functions. These include the gratification of otherwise unacceptable passive wishes, the dissipation of unconscious guilt, and the maintenance of the social conscience without which no society could remain stable. The similarity between ritual and compulsive behaviour can be over-emphasized because ritual 'is a practical instrument of ethics. When effective it not only curbs, but also helps to create the desire to serve the community . . .' (p. 101). While admitting that psychiatry cannot prove or disprove many religious claims, good and bad religions are distinguished mainly on the ground of their social usefulness. Moreover 'Believing is almost as necessary to humans as eating'. 'The particular metaphors in which we define our experience always change, but there is never any change in the need of society to enlist the conscience of its members, or of the individual to believe more than he can prove.' (p. 155)

M. Brierley.

Handwriting: A Key to Personality. By Klara G. Roman. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954. Pp. xi + 382. 25*s*.)

It seems reasonable to assume that handwriting is self-expressive. The difficulty is to establish 'scientifically' the correlation between specific writing habits and specific character traits. This book summarizes the history of the subject, discusses the developmental stages of handwriting and then reviews the techniques and methods used in its analysis and interpretation. The author gives a table of the 'graphic indicators' and their corresponding personality factors that she herself employs. She has had much experience and, as used by her, this method can produce results that have value for vocational guidance and even for diagnosis between serious and minor mental disorder. The 'Sample Analyses with the Use of Work Sheets' are of considerable interest and lend support to the view that graphology merits further research and is not a parlour game.

M. Brierley.

Olive Schreiner. A Study in Latent Meanings. By Marion V. Friedmann. (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1954. Pp. 68. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

To those still alive who were young (or youngish) men and women in 1883, when *The Story of an African Farm* was first published, the impact of that remarkable book will probably never fade from memory. It opened up an entirely new vista in regard to background, types of character presented, and its passionate atmosphere.

Some of those early readers will be glad, I think, that the centenary of her birth (24 March, 1854) has been celebrated by the B.B.C. and by a crowded and successful meeting of the literary club, P.E.N., and by a new book published 24 March, 1954, by Daisy Hobman, containing much research and new light on the strange and tragic character of Olive Schreiner.

The small book here reviewed is written with insight, much sympathy and restraint. The author, obviously, has made some study of psycho-analytic theory, and in her section entitled 'Latent Meanings', after a sketch of Olive Schreiner's childhood and girlhood and the beginning of her writing career, she goes on to apply some of her psycho-analytical knowledge. One of the important things

she points out is that Olive Schreiner never depicted her characters objectively; of course, many authors put themselves into their characters, but Olive Schreiner seems to have drawn no character that is not herself and was compelled to force these characters, often with unreality, to share her own sufferings, her frustrations, her feeling that the world was against her.

In *The Story of an African Farm*, Lyndell, Emmy, and the boy Waldo are made to be destroyed by their sufferings and the good, often foolish characters must also suffer disasters.

Marion Friedmann modestly writes, 'Whatever we learn about a writer will be suggestive rather than conclusive. It is for critics to decide whether such investigation is part of criticism. In her three important books, *The Story of an African Farm*, *Trooper Peter Halket*, and the work she was never able to finish, *From Man to Man*, the central theme was always suffering. Most psycho-analysts would agree with Marion Friedmann's conclusion: that Olive Schreiner's suffering in childhood was largely due to her feeling of, as she herself wrote, 'being cut off, different, unloved'. She wrote in a letter, 'I have never had a mother'. And again, 'Let us never again suffer as we suffered when we were children'. That the atmosphere of her childhood years was one of a harsh and cruel God, translated by a harsh mother, probably accounts for her rejection in terror and hate of the God she was supposed to worship. One may attribute to this the terrible sense of sinfulness which never left her. The father of Olive Schreiner, as Marion Friedmann writes, 'was a gentle, loving old man, always submissive to the will of his beloved Saviour' and he adored his managing wife Rebecca. Probably jealousy and disappointment contributed to Olive Schreiner's attitude to her mother.

Throughout her life her attitude to women was extremely ambivalent; she loved intensely and desired the love of other women. At the same time she wrote that she was much persecuted by others and had violent encounters with them. Whether Olive Schreiner's mother was as harsh as Olive herself felt, has been disputed. All the children depicted in her books are neglected, unloved, and many of them motherless. Yet the hatred which she felt towards that mother and the other women who represented the mother filled her throughout her life with a searing sense of guilt. This is very well understood by Marion Friedmann. She also treats with sympathy and discretion the deep attachment between Havelock Ellis the scientist and Olive Schreiner, and quotes from many of the letters which passed between them. It would seem that Olive Schreiner had a fear of marriage, or at any rate the sexual side of it. Nothing permanent came of the close relationship with Havelock Ellis. In one letter she wrote to him, 'Harry, how can I write hardly in my books when I know how important love and sympathy are. My feeling is that there is nothing in life but refraining from hurting others and comforting those that are sad.'

It would seem that for a while, when she came in contact with Cecil Rhodes, she fell under the influence of his powerful personality, but her passionate partisanship for the Boers and her hatred of England's attitude asserted itself . . . she seemed to feel guilt in making any friendly contact with the enemies of her own people, the Boers, and she reacted by writing her book, *Trooper Peter Halket*, a violent and to some extent biased account of Rhodes and his work.

Olive Schreiner was always on the side of those she felt were oppressed victims; this is shown in her championship of the Boers, and in her pioneer work for the emancipation of women (she was one of the first to introduce the Women's Suffrage Movement), and her passionate plea for women to have equal rights and equal opportunities in the world of labour and in the social world. (She wrote a big book full of research, full of interest, entitled *Women and Labour*.)

In the section entitled 'Latent Meanings', Marion Friedmann would find, I think, much agreement with most psycho-analysts. In pages 42–49 she demonstrates very clearly and convincingly Olive Schreiner's frustrations, her self-aggression (transferred so devastatingly onto the external world of people and events). And she writes (p. 5) in reference to Olive Schreiner's attitude to sex: 'It will be suggested that the explanation of this was the repression of some early sexual impulse of her stern super-ego, and that may be. The truth must, I think, elude us.'

One feels glad that she realizes the difficulties and doubts one ought to experience (as even Freud himself often did) in passing judgement on such complex matters. Olive Schreiner's marriage failed, and she and her husband separated for several years. She died after her return from her second visit to England, to her beloved South Africa, in a hotel, alone and deeply distressed. Marion Friedmann concludes her short but most suggestive survey of Olive Schreiner and her work with these words: 'Whatever we learn will be suggestive rather than conclusive. It is for critics to decide whether such investigation is part of the business of criticism.'

The psycho-analyst will decide: certainly it *is* the business of criticism.

Barbara Low.

Colour and the Human Soul. By Gladys Mayer. (London: New Knowledge Books, 1954. Pp. 33. 2*s.* 6*d.*)

This little book is one of a series called 'New Knowledge Books'. It contains an elaboration and interpretation of Rudolf Steiner's teachings and doctrines. A nomenclature is applied which is taken neither from everyday language nor from any other coherent terminology. The words 'soul' and 'spirit' seem to be code terms for emotions

and intelligence and consciousness respectively. The reader is presented with a dithyrambic adoration of colour, with symbolic comparisons, i.e. 'body breathes air, soul breathes colour', with semi-scientific thinking, with allegorical and animistic thoughts. With a crescendo of emotions the author describes an inner experience resembling that of an ecstasy in a spiritual seance. All ideas, feelings, and sensations merge into one; soul and colour then give way to Light and Darkness, and the little book ends with words from the Gospel of St. John.

M. Dale.

Isaac and Oedipus. A Study in Biblical Psychology of the Sacrifice of Isaac, the Akedah. By Erich Wellisch. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954. Pp. 131. 15*s*.)

The author, who is well equipped with historical and biblical material, stipulates infanticide as the primal crime of humanity, of greater importance and of more historical significance than either parricide or fratricide. (This view has also been recently expressed by psycho-analytic writers, who have, however, not confined their attention to the crime of the father against the son.) He then proceeds to discuss the Oedipus myth in the light of his re-evaluation of the primal crime of humanity. He concludes that ideas about oedipal guilt feelings and unconscious conflicts should be replaced by the concept of 'moral masochism'. (Glover, 1949.)

Finally, the author turns to the biblical story of the 'Akedah', the binding of Isaac for sacrifice. He suggests that a change of heart in Abraham followed the binding of his son, which led to 'the creation of new heavens and a new earth'. Thus he looks on Isaac as the precursor of Christ, and upon Abraham's internal change from aggression to love as the birth of a new religion. A new phase in the evolution of civilization is, therefore, reached at the moment when the child is spared and the animal sacrificed instead.

Consequently, the author feels that the story of Isaac and Abraham is a more successful resolution of the problem posed in the *full* story of Oedipus, and is, therefore, of greater use as an analogy in clinical work.

Most psycho-analysts and anthropologists would agree with the stress the author lays on the importance of this step in the process of development of both civilizations and individuals. Analysts, however, would probably express it differently by saying that a new phase of human civilization is reached when the father turns from identification with the aggressor (God's voice commanding the slaughter of Isaac) to identification with the victim (the divine voice commanding him to spare the child).

A very fine selection of illustrations accompanies the book. We learn with much regret that the author died shortly before this work appeared.

Eva M. Rosenfeld.

The Psychology of the Criminal Act and Punishment. By Gregory Zilboorg, M.D. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1954. Pp. 141. $3.50.)

In writing this book the author had two main objectives: (1) To emphasize that in matters of law and psychiatry it is not enough to be correct or accurate, it is mandatory to fuse our legal and psychiatric functions with a morality that is practised and not merely given recognition; (2) to make the reader aware of the immensity of the problems involved in the conflict that exists between law and psychiatry. He contends that this conflict prevails because of the existence of an eternal struggle between the striving to punish and the yearning to understand and forgive within the same community of men, and more often than not, within the same person. The book largely deals with this theme as it operates in the framing of the law, in the dispensation of justice in court and in the implementation of punishment. He considers that the true and effective aim of punishment is to awaken, not stifle, the will to resocialization or reintegration or the reincorporation of social standards in the criminal. Using interesting case material he illustrates the discrepancy between this aim and the purpose punitive law achieves in its present form. The book presents an eloquent appeal for the greater utilization of psychological insight in the future, in order to create a rational penological system.

Dr. Zillboorg has a vast knowledge of his subject and has put a great deal of thought and moral indignation into the writing of this book. If one is to be critical at all, it would be about the fact that although he implicitly makes use of structural concepts, he tends to neglect them in his final assessment of the phenomena he describes. An illustrative example of this can be found in the chapter entitled 'Suggestions about Psychiatry and Psychiatrists' where he cogently and critically demonstrates that the court room procedure creates an atmosphere conducive to the generation of hostility between judge and psychiatric witness, prosecutor and defending counsel, one psychiatric witness and another—an atmosphere which does not permit objective psychiatric testimony. He then says, 'I hope no one will be misled by the apparent harshness of my critical attitude. It is not that the judge, the lawyers, the psychiatrists, erring and non-erring, are guilty of not doing the right thing. Rather, we are dealing here with a stubborn psychology of human reactions against the evildoers of one's own tribe. The stubbornness of this psychology is deeply rooted in the primitive layers of our poorly domesticated primitive instincts, and it is difficult for us to be different.'

It is not easy to understand why Dr. Zilboorg attributes this stubbornness immediately and entirely to the primitive instincts. I feel that if structural concepts were weighted more heavily in the interpretation of the complex and intricate court room situation, it could be concluded that the stub-

bornness of the psychology is rooted as much in the tenacity with which we guard ourselves against any circumstances threatening our respective work efficiencies as in our primitive aggressive and sexual drives. Indeed, Dr. Zilboorg himself deals with the matter on this level in the proposals he makes to increase the efficacy of psychiatric testimony. Fundamentally these proposals amount to the creation in court of better work conditions for properly trained expert witnesses.

W. G. Joffe.

The Psycho-Analyst and the Artist. By Daniel E. Schneider. (New York: International Universities Press. 1950. Pp. 303. $4.00.)

In a book of popular orientation the author sets out to tackle the question of the essential nature of the artistic gift, of what makes great art. This is a bold enterprise, and if he succeeds in adding some original views of his own to an adequate and relevant summary of existing views on the psychology of the artist and of art he is to be congratulated. Dr. Schneider does both of these.

His main theme is that the artist's work is the precursor and equivalent of that of the psycho-analyst. The artist is also the interpreter of unconscious themes. With this he formulates something more explicit than has been implied by the phrase 'The artist is in touch with his unconscious'. He shows—notably in a study of Oedipus Rex—how the artist consciously or unconsciously provides specific interpretations of the unconscious material he presents. He continues by developing the thesis that the relationship of the public to the artist is analogous to a transference-relationship. In a drama, for instance, by means of identification with the protagonists, the members of the audience submit their fantasies to the dramatist for interpretation, and are thereby made more aware of the contrast between these fantasies and reality. Some of this may have been implicit in views generally held; Dr. Schneider has certainly elaborated it.

If the artist is primarily an interpreter, it is his style, or the form he gives to the basic contents, which becomes the hallmark of artistic achievement. Dr. Schneider attacks the problem from an original angle. Taking a clue from Freud's remarks in his book on *Wit* on the relationship between physical motions and their quantitative psychic reflection, Dr. Schneider links the problem of artistic form with the ablity to capture physical motion and reflect it in the operations of the psychic economy. It is this power which gives a work of art its quality of aliveness. It is through this capacity that the artist unites motion with emotion. This is a valuable suggestion. It might well be that there is a special type of employment of the perceptual apparatus and organization in its memory-traces which is specific for the genesis of artistic talent. A bridge might here be found between psycho-analytic and Gestalt psychology. Such a special organization might also relate, not only to the ability of the great artist to innovate technically, but also to the relationship of this ability to the achievement of a new view of nature. It also links with the question of the different use made of their interest in nature by the artist and the scientist, a problem mentioned by Dr. Schneider but not explored.

The deficiency of the book is that structural problems are in general under-stressed. The artist's Oedipus Complex and its attendant fantasies is his continual *point d'appui* in his individual studies. But it is on the whole a good introduction to be commended for several original viewpoints.

John Klauber.

Fundamentals of Psychoanalytic Technique. By Trygve Braatøy. (London: Chapman & Hall Ltd., 1954. Pp. xii + 404.)

The title of this book suggests that it could be an important theoretical contribution to psychoanalysis, and just what students have been wanting. Unfortunately it is not. It has many merits, but as a whole it proves disappointing. It is unquestionably Braatøy's testament and most certainly reveals his personality, but it is hardly fundamentals of psycho-analytic technique. Many valuable personal experiences are imparted, and his enthusiasm is infectious, but his discursiveness makes the book difficult to follow, especially for a student. Fresh ideas and comments continually crowd in one upon another. The book needs pruning and shaping severely, but in fact the editing is poor and a number of errors get by.

The first rubric is 'Love the basis for personal psychotherapy'. Love can be sentimentalized so easily and used to justify wild or uncritical treatment, that the unconscious determinant of a therapist's attitude, the counter transference, needs to be well understood to handle it properly. On the first page he suggests that the term 'counter transference' should really be used for a patient's response to his therapist's love, but as this is not argued cogently it tends to leave a confusing impression rather than to suggest a new principle. The understanding and analysis of transference phenomena, especially in its negative aspects, is one of the weakest aspects of the book. The amount of reassurance which creeps into his treatment is quite blatantly not psychoanalytic. The sub-title, 'A Fresh Appraisal of the Methods of Psychotherapy', which appears only on the dust jacket, is a much truer title.

It is only too easy to pick up small points in criticism, but a book so titled should manifest a much greater critical faculty in discussing technique. Here are some examples: P. 103, 'If the patient blocks some words or expressions connected with his feelings one may say, "Why do you do that? You are fond of me, aren't you?" or "You are angry with me, aren't you?" It is not wise to say such things before you are sure that they are so.' In spite of the caveat at the end, why it is not wise is

not adequately discussed, and the effect of such a comment on the patient's phantasies receives no mention whatever. Page 239, a dream is described in which a patient clinging to a stone in the middle of a river wants to get to another stone closer to the bank: ' to this the analyst—a training candidate—replied by asking, " Why not learn to swim? " This comment was clearly resented by the patient.' This could be a perfect object lesson, why for example it was resented, and for the fact that it is not an interpretation at all but a real rejection and breakdown of the analytic rôle; but this is not discussed. Page 11, a dream is described in which a psychiatrist dreamed that instead of his usual analytic hour the analyst took him to a nearby church and administered Holy Communion to several colleagues beside the patient, and that he was irritated by the analyst's misuse of his session. In what seemed to be the associations which follow, memories of sexual excitement and sexual play with his mother appeared, together with the fact that some days after these events she died within twenty-four hours of falling ill with convulsions. It is possible to feel cynical in the face of almost any material, and to feel that, to misquote, ' of the making of interpretations there is no end '. It is at least arguable here that the guilt feelings and the anxiety which were aroused in the patient through his mother's death so soon after such behaviour ought to have been discussed as possible interpretations. So, perhaps, ought the patient's anger, expressed in the dream, at his therapist for failing to understand what he was really wanting to say. Braatøy speaks of making positive comments regarding the moral equivalents of religious attitudes, and suggests that these should be sympathetically and dynamically understood. This is rightly so, but not at the expense of the primary analytic task of understanding a patient's real communication within the transference. His weakness in discussing the negative transference may be partly due to the fact that in one place he suggests that ' attacking critical attitudes ' in a patient suppresses spontaneity. It almost certainly must, but does the interpretation of manifestations of negative transference imply attack by the analyst? On page 135 there seems to be a serious misunderstanding of resistance. Braatøy questions Freud's paper ' Remarks upon the Theory and Practice of Dream-Interpretation ' (1923). He questions whether a patient's compliance with producing dream material, for example, should be thought of as resistance, but he speaks only of a patient being told that he resists. This brings up again the same question about interpretation. An interpretation of resistance is only an interpretation when a patient is not told that he resists, but is told what is arousing his resistance.

The last rubric is ' The Science of Interpretation ', but this proves a disappointing subject in the book. It can only be repeated that the title of the book suggests a concentrate, a refined product, which certainly does not appear. He is dominated by views of psycho-analysis as a distinctively medical art, and questions why lay analysts avoid a medical training. His comments on the somatic happenings in analysis are stimulating and worth reading. He does leave the impression, however, that by paying so much attention to these phenomena, and even by directly trying to influence or bring out somatic reactions, the patient's phantasies, which he may be communicating as much somatically as verbally, are again and again overlooked.

R. E. D. Markillie.

Psychologie der Arbeitswahl und der Arbeitsstörungen. By Ulrich Moser. (Bern: Verlag Hans Huber, 1953. Pp. 183. Sw. Fr. 21.50.)

This book deals with a great variety of aspects of ' Work ' and the disturbances in the individual which lead to inhibition of his working capacity and to his failure in life. An attempt is made to demonstrate attitudes towards ' work ' from various angles: the sociological, sociopsychological, psychological, and clinical, on the basis of depth psychology. The author starts with a philosophical treatise about the concept of work and ends with a discussion of the ' Schicksal ' psychological problems underlying the failure and success in the life of the individual.

In the Western culture, work in everyday life is all-important and the culture is based on the work of the individual and of social groups. Work is a wide field for the individual's general gratification and with this aspect in mind the author shows its psychodiagnostic, psycho-hygienic and psychotherapeutic value. His ideas and postulates have grown out of his practical work and he substantiates them with case histories. In a book of this size a great deal is attempted in a small space; some restriction in approach would have added to its unity without detracting from its value. Analytic terminology is used freely and S. Freud, Anna Freud, Abraham, Fenichel, and some other psychoanalytic authors are frequently quoted and mentioned.

M. Dale.

Five Copybooks. By Marie Bonaparte. (Four volumes of commentaries and a facsimile of the original copybooks.) (London: Imago Publishing Company, Ltd., 1951. Each volume pp. 300 approx. Per set £16.)

The history of these five copybooks is told in the introduction. The author found them after the death of her father in the spring of 1924. She was then 42 years of age, and although it was she who between the ages of seven and a half and ten had filled the books with stories and fantasies in her ' secret ' language of English, she had lost all memory of their contents. Even after reading them she could not remember having written a single line, although she at once recognized the author as being herself.

Soon after this event, in the autumn of 1925, she

started her analysis with Professor Freud, and these copybooks played a considerable part in it.

Many years after finishing her analysis, when nearing the proverbial threescore years and ten, she undertook to publish the contents of these copybooks in full and to comment on them, making full use both of the results of her own analysis and of the experience of her long and active analytical career.

Thus this work is really an almost inexhaustible source of information. First we find in it a sincere and intimate description of a French aristocratic household as seen by a little girl in her latency period: a most important source for any social historian interested in the private lives of people towards the end of the nineteenth century.

Then we get a fairly close picture of Freud and his way of analysing in the twenties. As our literature includes no cases described by him from this epoch—his last case history of the Wolf-man was closed in 1914 and the paper written on him published in 1919—this case history is a most valuable addition. It is true that it is described, not by the analyst, but by the patient, but this in a way enhances its value, as in our whole literature we have hardly any reports of this kind.

Further, it represents also the mature views of a well-trained and fully experienced analyst who had her personal analysis with Freud himself. From this angle, too, the book is of immense historical value, as we can follow in its pages how an analyst trained by Freud tries to understand the various problems, how her sincerity enables us to see her limitations, but also, on the other hand, how deep she can probe. As the subjects raised by the various contents of the copybooks branch out into practically every corner of our theory and practice, the picture we get is fairly comprehensive.

When reading the commentaries it becomes quite obvious that in the author's opinion one of the main problems, perhaps even *the* main problem, that every woman has to solve is the mastery of her own biological fear for the integrity of her own body, which she feels to be threatened by the male demanding coitus. Thus the basic conflict is between the biological erotic desire leading her in the direction of femininity and the just mentioned fear forcing her towards secondary virility.

Throughout the four volumes the author interprets the stories and fantasies contained in the five copybooks almost exclusively on the oedipal-phallic level, although there is a good deal of intriguing material pointing to pre-oedipal times. Still the author sticks to the course she has chosen, and as far as I can see practically all the pre-oedipal material is, so to speak, oedipalized.

Perhaps the most important, the crucial experience dealt with by the little girl who is writing down her stories and fantasies is centred around a series of primal scenes starting when she was a few months old and lasting till the age of about three. Madame Bonaparte quotes Freud's opinion, according to which any traumatic events happening in early pre-oedipal times usually remain unconscious and emerge into the conscious, i.e. are expressed in words, only after considerable distortion and secondary elaboration later in the latency period. The five copybooks are a very interesting and convincing proof of this view.

Moreover, it is a most intriguing experience to follow the unravelling of the fantasies, the re-emerging of detail after detail of the original experience under the impact of the analytic work. It is equally thrilling to follow Madame Bonaparte in her rôle as a detective and witness her triumph when she obtains the corroborative evidence for every detail of Freud's interpretative work.

On the other hand, it must be stressed once more that throughout the whole book the author is concerned only with the re-emergence during the latency period in fantastic forms of the original experience, and does not even attempt to make any conjectures as to what might have happened in the child's mind during the years between the original experience and its expression in latency years.

This raises a number of problems, especially about analytic technique. To put it in a nutshell, one ought to ask: Is it therapeutically necessary or even only advisable to go beyond these secondary expressions and to probe into the mental processes belonging to the pre-oedipal years? If the answer is a qualified ' Yes ', one has to ask further in what kind of cases has the analytic work—in addition to the reconstruction of the traumatic events—to attempt the much more difficult task of expressing the mental reactions to these events in a language adequate to pre-oedipal times and in which it is advisable to stop at the oedipal level? Whatever the answer to these fundamental questions, this work will be a most important source of material for their study.

And finally, as can be expected from Madame Bonaparte, the book is a charming one, written in her inimitable, vivid, and extremely French style, which remains highly enjoyable even when the problems discussed are most knotty and thorny. However hard we must work to follow the author in her train of thought, we follow her willingly and gratefully, as she somehow always manages to make even the hard passages pleasing, interesting, and rewarding.

Unfortunately this important work has no index. This is a serious shortcoming, as, because of the nature of the material, practically every topic comes up for discussion on several occasions. Without an index it is almost impossible to follow the development of the various ideas and problems or the fate of the various fantasy figures throughout the volumes, still less to compare the interpretations of the same problem given at different times and at different levels.

The original French has been translated partly by Miss Nancy Procter-Gregg and partly by Mr. Eric

Mosbacher, which is tantamount to saying that the English text is highly readable without losing in any way the freshness and individual charm of the French original. The work is published by the Imago Publishing Company, London, and as might be expected it is a real pleasure to look at, to handle, and, of course, to read the volumes.

Michael Balint.

The Analysis of an Obsessional. By R. W. Pickford. (London: Hogarth Press, 1954. Pp. 223. 21*s*.)

In his book Mr. Pickford has set himself a two-fold task, namely ' to present a full account of the treatment of a single patient ', and ' to reveal fully the mental processes and functions involved in an individual's development from the earliest stages of infancy '. By all requirements it is a laudable undertaking, the fulfilment of which would have earned everyone's gratitude. But it is only fair to state that so far, within the analytic literature, no one except Freud has ever succeeded in doing justice to case histories, and unfortunately Mr. Pickford is no exception.

Mr. Pickford has succeeded in giving us a very succint and dynamic report of the phantasies and symptoms, dreams and behaviour patterns of a young man of 20 who had sought treatment mainly for obsessional symptoms and phobias. This report, however, is bound to be more helpful to those who are not engaged in daily practice and somewhat obvious to those who are.

The second part of the undertaking, namely the technique of handling the case, was what one had hoped to see more of in such a full report. Here, although Mr. Pickford's sympathy and understanding of the patient are always in evidence, the clarity of his own therapeutic handling is rather dubious. The treatment is conducted largely in terms of dream analysis, though transference and its interpretetion are allowed a fair share. But one begins to have doubt about Mr. Pickford's real understanding of the transference when one reads the following:

' The technique of dream analysis was adopted forthwith, and in the second interview the patient was invited to sit in a chair, facing the fire with the analyst, and to recount his dreams. This position is less usual than that in which the patient lies on a couch, but it was preferred at the start in this case, because the patient showed some resistance against any formalities which suggested medical treatment, and was afraid of lying on a couch or bed because that was the position in which he had been examined and had received injections which had much disturbed him. At later interviews he lay on the couch, with a large table placed between him and the analyst to reduce any impression of personal interference by the latter. In the first interviews, during which the patient was sitting, the analyst took advantage of a square column supporting the ceiling, and placed the chairs with it between them.'

The chief value of this book is in its emphasis on unconscious phantasy and its rôle in the etiology of the neuroses and mental disorders.

M. Masud R. Khan.

Clinical Psychiatry. By William Mayer-Gross, Eliot Slater and Martin Roth. (London: Cassell, 1954. Pp. 652. 50*s*.)

There is an urgent need for an up-to-date text-book of psychiatry. The authors of this impressive volume have attempted to fill this gap. They aim at a multidimensional approach which would give each factor contributing to mental illness its due place. They are very critical of the psycho-dynamic orientation of American and part of British psychiatry and have set their minds on stemming this trend. Of American psychiatry they present an incomplete picture. They quote extensively from a short and provocative article by Lidz written for German psychiatrists. (A book such as *Dynamic Psychiatry*, edited by Alexander and Ross, gives a much truer picture of the American psychiatry scene.) In discussing psycho-analysis they lean too heavily on critics who do not think much of its contribution to psychiatry. With all due respect for Jaspers, the *Allgemeine Psychopathologie* is not a reliable guide for those who want to make up their own minds on this issue. Nevertheless, the psychiatric reader will get good value from this book, provided he realizes that the time has gone by when one could expect any single writer, or team of writers sharing the same orientation, to present all the main currents in psychiatry fairly and authoritatively. It would be a pity if, as the result of its strong bias, the considerable merits of *Clinical Psychiatry* should not be appreciated by those readers who do not share the authors' views about recent trends in Western psychiatry. This reviewer has often emphasized that the descriptive-phenomenological, genetic, and psycho-dynamic approaches are not only compatible but complementary. It is to be hoped that this book will not be quoted in refutation of this opinion. Apart from the weaknesses inherent in a presentation such as this, the standard of the book is high, but the level of excellence is highest in the sections dealing with the subjects on which the authors are experts, and these are many. There is a useful list of references covering 35 pages.

E. Stengel.

The Six Schizophrenias. Reaction Patterns in Children and Adults. By Samuel J. Beck, Ph.D. (New York: American Orthopsychiatric Association Inc., 1954. Pp. xii + 238. $5.00.)

This book is Research Monograph No. 6 of the American Orthopsychiatric Association; and it describes the nature and results of a joint study of schizophrenia in terms of the three disciplines of psychology, psychiatry, and social study. The actual material studied was that provided by two groups of patients referred to the Michael Reese

Hospital, Chicago, and considered on clinical grounds to display evidence of schizophrenic involvement—viz. a group of children and one of adults. The contribution of the psychiatrists was to supply, in the case of each patient, numerical ratings on a scale of 1–11 for 120 selected traits regarded as constituting ' a trait universe '. These traits were selected on the basis of clinical observation interpreted psycho-analytically in terms of (*a*) defences, (*b*) ego-functions, (*c*) emotions, and (*d*) restitutive forces. The contribution of the psychologists was to provide a Rorschach assessment for each patient in terms of clusters of significant traits and significant combinations of such clusters; and it is interesting to note that among the clusters isolated were (1) preoccupation with genitality and bodily functions, (2) perceptual inaccuracy with low mental drive, (3) withdrawal from the outer world, (4) indifference to familiar and conventional stimuli, and (5) emotional indifference. The data obtained by the psychiatric (clinical) and psychological (experimental) investigations were then correlated—a task rendered easier by the fact that the psychiatric approach pivoted upon an ego-psychology and the Rorschach approach upon the theory of an ego-affect balance. Attention was thus primarily concentrated upon the functioning of the ego. The statistical analysis to which the Rorschach results were subjected was effected by means of Stevenson's Q-technique, which possesses the advantage that it does not depend upon the establishment of norms derived from the study of large samples of the population, but is capable of yielding valid inferences from the study of individual cases. Indeed it is characteristic of the whole investigation that, in spite of its statistical nature, it is focused essentially upon the study of the individual. As a result of the investigation six types of schizophrenia were delineated. Three of these were identified by the Rorschach tests alone and could not be discriminated clinically. Two types occurred only in children and were interpreted as representing transitional states; and two others were found to represent advanced states with a poor prognosis. No attempt was made to relate the six types isolated to the fourfold Kraepelinian classification. Nor was any attempt made to determine the essential nature of schizophrenia; for, since the concept of schizophrenia adopted was purely ' transactional ', it was considered sufficient to describe the schizophrenic person by ' operational trait data ', and to submit hypotheses regarding the dynamic organization of traits into behaviour identifiable as ' schizophrenic '. Nor yet was any attempt made to establish any broad aetiological generalizations. At the same time, the contribution of social study to the investigation (based, like the psychiatric contribution, upon the assessment of selected traits in a ' trait universe ') was to isolate such environmental patterns as appeared to have aetiological significance. Four such patterns were found to emerge—patterns characterized respectively by (1) rejection on the part of parents, (2) parental inconsistency, both spatial and relational, (3) parental indifference and inadequacy, and (4) parental over-protectiveness. Apart from the delineation of schizophrenic types, with which the investigation was primarily concerned, some observations of interest are recorded. Thus, whilst the presence of a schizophrenic pattern in childhood is not regarded as necessarily a cause for pessimism, the formulation ' once schizophrenic, always schizophrenic ' is considered justified; and among other such general formulations are—' Schizophrenia is never an all or none condition ', and ' We are all capable of some schizophrenia. Our dreams so show.' So far as clinical psychiatry is concerned, it seems doubtful whether the classification of types of schizophrenia resulting from the investigation described in this book will be regarded as an adequate substitute for the Kraepelinian classification. However, the aim of the investigation was not a clinical classification, but one orientated towards prognosis and the therapeutic possibilities. In general, psychopathological studies conducted on a statistical basis find little favour among psycho-analysts; but the present investigation can hardly fail to be of interest to psycho-analysts in that it describes a method, mediated by the Q-technique, whereby valid theoretical conclusions may be drawn from the intensive study of individual cases. It thus describes a method which offers some prospect of being satisfactorily applied to the testing of the validity of psycho-analytical concepts on a statistical basis.

W. Ronald D. Fairbairn.

Progress in Neurology and Psychiatry: an Annual Review. Vol. VIII. Ed. by E. A. Spiegel. (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1953. Pp. 591. $10.00.)

The fields covered by this review increase and some (e.g. electro-physiology and psychology) are now reviewed every second year. The brief review of psycho-analysis by R. L. Frank and collaborators (pp. 502–16) summarizes 46 articles and refers the reader to 11 others. Such a sketch will be of some use to non-analysts. The review as a whole continues to be of great value to analysts in being a very easily read summary of the fields of neurology and general psychiatry. A detailed index is included.

W. Clifford M. Scott.

A History of Psychoanalysis in America. By C. P. Oberndorf. (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1953. Pp. 280. $5.00.)

The late Dr. Oberndorf did many services for psycho-analysis. One of his last was this valuable personal summary of the development of psycho-analysis in the U.S.A. It will stimulate older analysts to remember their development and it will do much to help younger analysts and students to see the problems of the present in prospective. Psycho-analysis itself and the relationship of psycho-

analysis to medicine, psychiatry, neurology, psychology, and sociology are well covered, but many readers will notice minor inaccuracies and gaps. It is to be hoped that Dr. Oberndorf's literary executors will ask for and be able to make use of corrections and additions before a second edition is published. Every analyst and student should be unsatisfied until he has read this book. It is an excellent basis for a definitive history. The index is detailed.

W. Clifford M. Scott.

The Third Revolution: A Study of Psychiatry and Religion. By Karl Stern. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1954. Pp. 306. $4.75.)

Dr. Stern went to Canada from Germany just before the war. He published his biography *The Pillar of Fire* in 1951. In it he vividly described his conversion to Roman Catholicism. Dr. Stern is now Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Ottawa. In *The Third Revolution* he criticizes some modern trends in psychology and psychiatry which neglect the essential individuality of patients' lives and states that psycho-analytic theory and practice hold out most hope for a future to psychiatry in which religion is accepted and utilized. He closely argues his belief that science and Christianity must be integrated so that man may feel 'humbled, instead of humiliated'.

W. Clifford M. Scott.

Symbolic Wounds: Puberty Rites and the Envious Male. By Bruno Bettelheim. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1954. Pp. 286. $4.75. London: Thames and Hudson. 25*s.*)

Dr. Bettelheim has made a very determined attempt to review afresh the initiation rites and the phenomenon of circumcision in the light of the recent advances in psycho-analytic metapsychology and clinic. It is his contention that the analytic bias of interpretating circumcision and initiation in terms of the castration complex, though it provided an elegant and plausible explanation, did not do justice to the complexity of the material. He feels it has discouraged later analytic developments of theory into the understanding of the significance of pre-oedipal attachment of the child and infant to the mother from being applied to these phenomena of primitive cultures.

Dr. Bettelheim's point of departure is a simple one: namely to see circumcision in its cultural setting. Thus viewed it emerges almost always as part of the initiation rites which establish the new identity and rôle of the adolescents in the culture as adults. The stress on the anxiety and domination (castration) by the father, Dr. Bettelheim considers, has been over-emphasized by analytic research workers; the rites are a positive integrative cultural experience for those who participate in them.

What had stimulated Dr. Bettelheim's interest on these lines was repeated observations in the Sonia Shankman Orthogenic School of the University of Chicago, of behaviour patterns among adolescents who, while struggling with the confusions of puberty and adolescence, spontaneously created 'ritual' games that were uncannily like the initiation rites of the primitive cultures. One such clinical example is detailed at length.

Viewed in this light, and using the new insights offered by ego-psychology into the importance of the child's relation to his mother, Dr. Bettelheim explains the dynamics of circumcision and initiation rites as follows:

'There is much evidence that it is imposed or desired by women; but there is also much reason to believe that it is desired by men because (1) it makes them more male by freeing the glans, (2) it provides them with a sign of sexual maturity and with potent blood from the genital, and (3) it adds to their power by giving them symbolically the capabilities of women.'

The initiation rites interpreted in this way are seen as 'efforts at self-realization; through them, man seeks to express and then free himself of his anxieties about his own sex and his wishes for experiences, organs, and functions which are available only to persons of the other sex.' Pursuing this line, Dr. Bettelheim concludes: 'On a more human level, if we could satisfy through ritual, or through more civilized, less magic, and more satisfying institutions, the desires of both men and women to participate in the activities and enjoyments normally belonging to the other sex, each sex could gain greater inner autonomy, could better accept its own rôle and that of the other; the two could live with one another more satisfactorily. In preliterate society, it seems, men tried to solve this problem through ritual. We should be equally serious in our own efforts, searching, however, for solutions that are more rational, more effective socially and more satisfying privately.'

This is a bare synopsis of a book rich in clinical insight, sound in metapsychological thinking, and intensely stimulating and fertile in its application of these ideas to social phenomena, both primitive and modern. It also sets a very good example of creative research in applied psycho-analysis. Dr. Bettelheim is one who admits that he has raised more questions than he has answered, and that is surely in itself a virtue. It is hoped that this book will receive the attention it deserves from both analytic clinicians and anthropologists.

M. Masud R. Khan.

The Study of Culture at a Distance. Edited by Margaret Mead and Rhoda Metraux. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press; London: Cambridge University Press, 1954. Pp. x + 480. 37*s.* 6*d.*)

This is a manual whose purpose is to outline methods that have been developed during the last decade for analysing societies which are inaccessible to direct observation, in terms of the cultural regularities in the characters of their members. These methods have been used and developed in

researches which were inaugurated by the late Professor Ruth Benedict, under the title of Columbia University Research in Contemporary Cultures. The book is intended primarily for students.

Various authors illustrate a number of working hypotheses, including, for example, the swaddling hypothesis, and then go on to illustrate the use of various techniques. These techniques include work with informants, analysis of written and oral literature, film analysis, projective tests, and analysis of imagery.

Of most interest to psycho-analytic readers is some of the illustrative material given. The difficulty, however, is that, since the material is given mainly to illustrate methods, it cannot be expected to be wholly satisfactory from the point of view of the clinician.

For those interested, however, in techniques of social analysis, this book will be found useful. The methods are described clearly and well illustrated.

Elliott Jaques.

Hungarian and Vogul Mythology. By Géza Róheim. (Monographs of the American Ethnological Society, No. XXII, edited by Esther S. Goldfrank.) (New York: J. J. Augustin, 1954. Pp. x + 86. $2.75.)

This monograph is introduced by a foreword by Róheim's literary executor, Warner Muensterberger. Esther S. Goldfrank undertook the editing and bibliography of the work, completed before Róheim's death in June 1953, with the help of some eminent specialists in Hungarian, Russian, Latin, and anthropological sources.

The short work seems an excellent memorial to Róheim's painstaking method of research and his amazing erudition. This latter makes it difficult for a reviewer who is no anthropologist to do justice to his work. It makes fascinating reading, but if there is anything to criticize, it is that its pages contain so many intricate variations of the myths Róheim uses for analysis, and so many names of different tribes in exemplification of his theme, that the psychoanalyst needs a good deal of determination in order to read it right through and reach the conclusions which are of main interest to him.

Róheim begins with the question whether there is a Hungarian mythology to rescue. There are only the Hungarian Chronicles dating back mainly to the eleventh and twelfth centuries as set out in an Appendix by Prof. Dr. J. Lodz. Róheim proves that once there must have been much more, because the Hungarians are identical in origin with the Mansi or Vogul in Western Siberia who had an abundant and elaborate mythology. This fell into oblivion under the ruthless persecution of Hungarian kings newly converted to Christianity. Hungarian, Turkic, and Vogul singers used to relate their epic songs in the first person, and this custom ' projects back to the heroes of ancient times '. Róheim wonders whether the historical personages mentioned in the Chronicles were superimposed on mythical prototypes and thus could pass the censorship of Christianity; that is to say, real happenings may have been told in mythological style.

The first myth discussed is that of the Seven Magyars. They were originally the seven chiefs of the seven united tribes forming the Magyar nation. The seven Magyars also designate seven men left over from a defeated army sent back with their ears cut off and thereafter ostracized. This story may later have been confused with the fact that the Christian king treated heathen survivors as pariahs. To the question why just this myth among many should have survived the answer is that the Sky-God of the Vogul had seven sons.

Then follows the myth of the falcon or eagle impregnating the daughter of a great leader. From her womb a torrent or waterfall came forth, designating offspring of great strength. Certain tribes adopted the eagle or falcon as their crest or symbol, and it also figures in Attila's coat of arms, a crest being the medieval version of the totem. We have here an origin myth of a nation or clan. Thus Hungarian royalty seems to be of magical origin. The eagle is the foremost of the protecting animals and birds which receive sacrifices. It may be considered a phallic symbol. Another totem animal of Khazars and Moravians is the stallion or bull, standing for strength and fertility. A king on Lake Baikal is said to have turned into a bull in the daytime, wrestling with another bull, whilst at night he became human and impregnated his, the king's, daughter.

The next chapter goes into the details and ramifications of the Hungarian origin myth. One version is that two brothers hunted a doe and were thus led to a country in which they settled. The idea that Huns and Hungarians are connected is called fictitious. This is the southern version, whilst in the northern version an elk is hunted on skis. The ski path becomes the Milky Way; the elk in Vogul stands for the Great Bear. The hunting of the doe or elk by the sons has been previously shown by Róheim to represent incest. Variations of this myth are to be found in Turkic, Finno-Ugric, and Lappic, and among other peoples.

Róheim expounds the principle that history may be a veil for mythology. He describes the Buryat myth of the three beautiful swans, the daughters of the Sky-God. One of these daughters is the ancestor of all the Trans-Baikal Buryat, and hence swan's flesh was strictly tabooed. According to the Northern Vogul this bird was human, but even in its bird form it menstruates. According to some versions the southern migration of birds is led by World-Surveyor-Man himself in the shape of a swan or crane. Another figure of Vogul mythology is Gander-Prince or World-Surveyor-Man.

Very interesting are the so-called moiety myths, some of which contain clear versions of the brother-sister incest myth.

In the next chapter Róheim discusses the figure of World-Surveyor-Man, which he links with Gander Chief or World-Inspector-Man, the patron god of the Mos moiety. He calls him a solar deity, since ' there can be no doubt that a god who goes about inspecting the earth in shining raiment on a golden horse, bringing happiness to all, and who is the favourite son of Sky-Father and the younger brother of Dawn-Woman must be a solar deity '. He quotes songs saying of World-Surveyor-Man that ' due to the power of his hair we have summer, we have winter '. Further examples are quoted which show him to be the Sun God with golden hair, but the author does not draw the obvious comparison with the Bible story of Samson, which Abraham makes in his *Dreams and Myths*.

The Ostyak have a curious custom that all girls possess representatives of two animals for their braided hair. These animals vary from village to village and symbolize both children and continued allegiance of the woman to her clan, for they are made by the girl's father or elder brother.

Róheim differentiates between a driving force behind the body-destruction phantasy, the destrudo, and another behind the restitution-phantasy, the libido.

In the fourth chapter Róheim continues with examples of the sun-hero myth, comparing it with similar myths in American culture. The Phaethon and fall-from-heaven motifs are seen as ' proof of the diffusion of folkloristic motives from Siberia to America '. The Surveyor who sees all and watches all, the animals who are punished by being reduced in size or transformed—a theme reminding the reviewer of the serpent in Genesis—are common to Vogul and American myths. So are myths about the fall from the sky. It is a woman who falls and who in falling gives birth to a child. The obvious meaning of falling is not mentioned by the author. The American parallel to the Siberian doe-, stag-, or elk-hunt is the bear hunt in the sky.

In the following chapter the World-Surveyor-Man is shown to have had the function of shaman, that is to say, mediator, between Sky-God and human beings. Several myths are quoted which show the shaman or World-Surveyor-Man as the son-hero in an Oedipus situation. The relations between totemism and shamanism are discussed. In the Ural-Altaic areas the clans, and sometimes even the tents, each had a miniature world-tree with a bird on top. The bird would be different for each clan. It is made clear how closely totem-animal and shaman are linked. The shaman's raiment and paraphernalia are described, and it is interesting to note that they are decorated with symbols of the phallus and of the fertilized vulva—never with that of the virginal vulva, as this would bring bad luck.

In his last chapter Róheim assumes that ' Magyar himself, the hero of the hunt on the Milky Way, is the God of the Hungarians '. He goes on to say that the spirit of a nation is nothing but a self-idealization based on its dreams. The double as seen in the double-eagle is an extension of the individual. He concludes that ' a national god is (*a*) the idealized image of the self as it appears in the dream, and (*b*) this image is extended to become the tutelary genius of a family, clan, moiety, or nation. Hence we can understand how strong is the drive even now to idealize the nation, that is, our own nation, and to de-idealize other human groups'. The god of the Magyars then was Magyar the hunter and warrior who captures girls on the Milky Way, and if we assume the Vogul myths to be pre-Magyar, then he was also the rebelling son in the oedipal context.

Finally Róheim shows that the nucleus of all these myths is the primal scene. ' The quiet path over the sky at night is violent movement '. Birds fly south but miraculously return, representing the victory of the life impulse. The God of the Hungarians, World-Surveyor-Man, is the libido.

Hilda C. Abraham.

The Appraisal of Intelligence. By A. W. Heim. (London: Methuen, 1954. Pp. 171. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

This work is refreshing and stimulating, and should be read by all who are interested in the psychology of intelligence. The main theme, which is clearly stated throughout, is a plea for ' appraisal ' of intelligence, in contrast to ' measurement ' or ' subjective judgement '. Dr. Heim criticizes the tendency in many testers to supplant older methods of investigation rather than develop them, and rejects the presupposition that there is some one attribute ' intelligence ' which is capable of strictly quantitative measurement. Factor analysis is considered to be sterile when treated as an end in itself, and suggestions are offered for research along non-factorist lines. She asserts that a test may become too ' pure ' and too ' reliable ' to be any longer a valuable instrument. Proposals are made for a new approach to the appraisal of intelligence, based on the indivisibility of the subject's cognitive and orectic processes—a compromise between the formal intelligence test and the comparatively unstructured projective test of personality. However, one feels that the elucidation of the unconscious dynamics of intelligent activity by a psycho-analytic approach would enrich this type of work, which goes so far to perfect the assessment of intelligence for practical purposes.

S. F. Lindsay.

Psychoanalytic Interpretation in Rorschach Testing. By Roy Schafer. (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1954. Pp. 446. $8.75.)

The Rorschach Test has held pride of place among psychological tests for many years, and it is only recently that informed and well-based criticism of it has appeared in psychological journals. As it is conventionally used its validity is, to say the least,

doubtful. It seems probable that the next few years will see a strong swing away from the test, and many clinical psychologists will be in the uncomfortable position of having to seek other activities with which to busy themselves. It is just at this point that Schafer's book appears—perhaps the best book on the test since Rorschach's own.

The factors which have perpetuated the use of the Rorschach test are extremely complex. Its objective usefulness is confined to little more than some cases of suspected organic defect or borderline schizophrenia (and it seems likely that more specialized tests will be devised for these states), but its main function has been to provide a mechanism of defence for the lay psychologist to cope with the anxieties aroused in him by patients and by problems of prestige in relation to his medically-qualified colleagues. It has acted as a magical machine which yields all the answers. Unfortunately the situation in psychiatry is such that there is for the most part no real check on the truth of the conclusions drawn from the test, and it is a sad fact that most Rorschach personality pictures would be applicable to a great variety of patients; and are indeed welcomed by many of the psychiatrists who ask for the test to be made, as apt and informative descriptions. There is no independent arbitration by post-mortem examination. In clinical research too, the Rorschach test has been applied indiscriminately, and resounding conclusions have been drawn on the basis of a few, relatively meaningless, statistical differences in Rorschach scores. Many psychologists working for higher degrees have been tempted to apply the Rorschach test to the comparison of clinical groups as a substitute for the much more difficult task of thinking in terms of psychological theory and devising *ad hoc* experiments to test their hypotheses.

Schafer's book is like a breath of fresh air in a fog-laden atmosphere. He views the test as a psycho-analyst, and discusses those factors in the patient and *in the psychologist* which culminate in the test responses and the Rorschach report. It is, of course, these very irrational factors in the psychologist which have been partly responsible for the maintenance of the test (and also of other tests with even less real validity, such as the Szondi test). This part of his book would be instructive reading for any psychologist, including those whose defences against their own professional anxieties take the form of ultra-scientific ' objective testing '.

The patient's responses to the stimuli of the inkblots are the end products of a whole series of processes, and must be considered as an ego-activity. Schafer goes on to discuss the interpretation of the patient's productions, with special emphasis on the analysis of defence mechanisms. It will appeal to the analyst, for the concepts used will be familiar to him, and in many cases Schafer's formulations will ' ring true '. Certainly the test can yield analytically fruitful material from a patient who might be otherwise uncommunicative. But clearly there is the temptation for non-analysts to indulge in ' wild ' psycho-analysis, and one wonders to what extent the test as used by Schafer can be used by non-analysed psychologists.

This book clearly deserves study by psychoanalysts who are at all interested in techniques of investigation other than that of the armchair and the couch.

Joseph Sandler.

Elements of Rorschach Interpretation. By Robert M. Allen. (New York: International Universities Press, 1954. Pp. 242. $4.00.)

This is a companion volume to the author's *Introduction to the Rorschach Test.* It is an up-to-date account of the conventional processes of evaluating the Rorschach protocol. Recent research has been integrated into the text, and a useful bibliography is given.

This is undoubtedly a good book for any student who wishes to become proficient in the test as it is currently used. One gains the impression that the author is sensitive to the problems of the test's reliability and validity, and his approach is, to some extent, a ' dynamic ' one.

Joseph Sandler.

The Thematic Apperception Test. By Morris I. Stein. (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Press, Inc., 1955. Pp. 365. $7.50.)

This is a second edition of a book reviewed in this journal six years ago.[1] Since then the book has been considerably enlarged, and now includes T.A.T. pictures given to women. Psycho-analysts might be particularly interested in the detailed T.A.T. analysis of a male case before and after psycho-analysis.

Joseph Sandler.

A Rorschach Workbook. By Lucille Hollander Blum, Helen Davidson, and Nina D. Fieldsteel. (New York: International Universities Press, 1954. Pp. 168. $2.00.)

This little book (with a foreword by Bruno Klopfer) is confined to the techniques of administering and scoring the Rorschach test. As its name suggests, it contains exercises (with answers), and the student who works through this book conscientiously will no doubt achieve a fair standard of scoring proficiency. It can be recommended to anyone who wishes to master the Klopfer and Kelley scoring methods.

Joseph Sandler.

Survey of Clinical Practice in Psychology. Edited by Eli A. Rubenstein and Maurice Lorr. (New York: International Universities Press, 1954. Pp. 363. $6.00.)

Sandler, J. Collective Review, *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 1949, **30**, 209.

The title of this book is somewhat misleading, especially to those who use the term ' psychology ' in a fairly broad sense. It is an account of the work carried out by non-medical clinical psychologists in the United States. The first emotion aroused on reading it is one of surprise that there are so many wide and varied fields in which clinical psychologists are working. There are 27 chapters, each written by an expert, describing the work of psychologists in their own institutions or specialities. University and psychiatric clinics, the armed forces, clinics for alcoholics, the aged, and for student counselling; courts and prisons, rehabilitation centres, schools, and clinics for hearing, reading, and speech difficulties are all described. There clearly can be no such thing as a ' general practitioner ' psychologist. He is inevitably a specialist, and must very often reach a high degree of professional competence.

The book gives a useful indication of the immense amount of work—including therapy—undertaken by psychologists in their various fields. Psychoanalysts will be disappointed at the very small amount of analytic training of any sort undergone by psychologists working with clinical material. The wealth of organizational detail given makes the work very useful for anyone who has to organize a department or clinic in any of the specialities discussed.

Joseph Sandler.

Psychological Testing. By Anne Anastasi. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. Pp. 682. $6.75.)

New psychological tests are being produced almost daily, and Professor Anastasi has written a most readable account of the various tests in current use. The varieties considered include intelligence tests, aptitude and achievement tests, and instruments designed to measure personality. In particular, the author has stressed the theoretical principles underlying the tests, and includes references to useful sources of information.

The stress of this book is laid entirely on the tests as such, and there is no discussion of the tester—surely as important a variable as the tests themselves? This work was, as Anastasi herself points out, ' evolved in the classroom ', and precisely because of this may present a rather idealized picture of the whole subject. One may gain the impression that psychological tests are, in general, as effective as biochemical tests used in medical work. In the field of personality at least, this is far from true.

The psycho-analyst who is interested in getting an academic bird's-eye view of psychological tests would be well advised to read this book.

Joseph Sandler.

The Thematic Apperception Test and the Children's Apperception Test in Clinical Use. By Leopold Bellak, M.D. (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1954. Pp. x + 282. $6.75.)

The T.A.T. is a psychological test which should appeal to psycho-analysts. The patient is asked to construct a story about each of 20 pictures, and these stories can be studied in the same way as the material brought by a patient to the analytic session.

Bellak views the T.A.T. stories from the standpoint of psycho-analytical ego-psychology, and provides a detailed scheme of assessment. This is a far more rewarding approach than many which have been attempted, and analysts will find themselves on quite familiar ground. Bellak devotes a special section to the study of character and defences, but rightly points out the difficulty of basing psychiatric diagnoses (e.g. of schizophrenia) on the test. There is also a section on the use of the T.A.T. in psychotherapy.

The Children's Apperception Test (C.A.T.) is a delightful one. Pictures with animal figures are used, and typical conflict-situations are represented. Children, being on the whole more naïve than adults, can produce ego-syntonic stories about the cards which show more clearly than in adults their anxieties, defences, and object-relations.

The C.A.T. is an excellent method for eliciting useful and relevant phantasy material from children and should prove a useful tool. The pictures also have a place alongside the toys in the analyst's playroom, where stories can be produced as part of the process of play, and can be dealt with in the same way.

As with all psychological tests, it is possible to be too enthusiastic, and the danger of ' wild ' interpretations is always present. There is also the fact that the degree of apparent disturbance on the test will often bear little relation to the amount of actual disturbance, although the *nature* of the conflicts may be indicated. Quite normal subjects can produce the most bizarre and ' psychotic ' phantasy material, and it is only too easy for an inexperienced psychologist to be misled.

Joseph Sandler.

ABSTRACTS

Contents:

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, **23**, 1954, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4.
Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, **2**, 1954, Nos. 3 and 4.
Samiksa, **8**, 1954, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4.
Canadian Journal of Psychology, **7**, 1953.
Indian Journal of Psychology, **28**, 1953.

THE PSYCHOANALYTIC QUARTERLY, **23**, 1954, No. 1

Otto Isakower. ' Spoken Words in Dreams. A Preliminary Communication.'

In 1939 the author pointed to the auditory sphere as the nucleus of the superego and hinted that a further investigation of dreams with this idea in mind might be profitable. Here he states what he considers to be the logical conclusion of his argument—that speech elements in the manifest content of dreams are a direct contribution from the superego. From supporting analytic material he suggests that the nearer the sleeper is to wakefulness the clearer become the superego's comments on the dream, as though casting the mental eye on the dream during the waking process assisted in reinstating reality. He then traces adumbrations of his theory in Freud.

Catherine L. Bacon. ' Psycho-Analytic Observations on Cardiac Pain.'

Cardiac pain, frequently radiating down the left arm, has been observed in several patients in analysis during a conflict of receptive and aggressive drives. It is known that oral receptive strivings stimulate the parasympathetic and aggressive strivings the sympathetic nervous systems. The physiology of the heart is such that the combined stimulation of the two could easily result in cardiac anoxia. Now oral receiving often induces a sense of obligation and obligation a sense of defiance. If such a patient revolts against the donor (parent) he feels fearful, if he does not, he feels outraged at the loss of his freedom. In either event, if the conflict is severe and occurs with the patient in the vagal phase, cardiac pain may ensue from this concurrent stimulation of the sympathetic. This is theoretically much less likely to occur if tension can be reduced in either system. Interpretation should therefore be directed (*a*) towards diminishing the patient's oral guilt and anxiety arising from hostility, and (*b*) towards slowing down his reaction-time to oral-receptive stimuli and thus allowing the necessary time for psychic and physical digestion.

H. Robert Blank. ' Depression, Hypomania and Depersonalisation.'

The author tries to interpret these phenomena from his study of a case as related elements in a pattern of defence.

The patient's major attacks of depersonalization were always preceded by hypomanic episodes. They may therefore be regarded as an emergency defence after failure of the hypomanic defence. Since minor episodes of depersonalization occurred without anxiety, while in the major attacks the anxiety developed as the feelings of unreality increased, it is likely that the depersonalization was a defence against anxiety. This anxiety would be most simply explicable as the precipitating anxiety of the attack. Such anxiety could, however, also be regarded as due to the threat of disintegration to the ego implicit in feelings of unreality. Perhaps this second view would be correct where depersonalization precedes schizophrenia.

The author goes on to consider the relationship of depersonalization to confusion, and to the phenomena of normal sleep.

Louis Linn. ' The Discriminating Function of the Ego.'

Perceptual stimuli may be regarded as relatively structured or unstructured according to the complexity of conceptualization which they evoke. But in any conceptualization there is always an element of ambiguity. In effect one perceives not an object but a cluster of related ideas. Because the elements of a cluster vary in importance according to its context, the ego must scan the cluster for the most pertinent meanings. This implies that the ego discriminates reality in two stages.

The author confirms his description of the process by means of examples of its breakdown in patients with brain injuries. He also shows that the mechanisms of the primary process obtrude themselves into the faculty evaluations of reality which follow.

Although the scanning process must operate in the preconscious its effective reverberations must affect the unconscious. Since experimentally a visual stimulus is more quickly recognized if it corresponds to a wish, the author puts forward the hypothesis that the wished-for elements in a cluster are scanned first.

He then uses this theory to explain the phenomenon of *prägnanz* or ' closure ' in Gestalt psychology, and conjectures that the wish on these occasions is the product of the conflict-free sphere of the ego.

Finally he attempts a partial explanation of the

modus operandi of the function in terms of neurophysiology.

Gustav Bychowski. 'The Structure of Homosexual Acting Out.'

The analysis of homosexuals is characterized by alternating phases of working through and acting out. Bychowski suggests the following explanations of the acting out. (1) The prerequisite is an archaic, narcissistic ego-structure. (2) The choice of partners is therefore based on narcissistic projection —it is to this that they owe their high if transient value. (3) The ego cannot bind libidinal excitations sufficiently not to be overwhelmed by discharges along primitive lines. As in the traumatic neurosis the ego is striving not merely for pleasure but for mastery of the libidinal and aggressive impulses and of the archaically cathected objects. (4) The ego is filled with conflicting identifications with parental images. Since each identification is dethroned as soon as it is made, considerable counter-cathexis is required to maintain them. As a result of this further weakening of the ego, object-cathexis comes to be felt as ego-loss. (5) Because of the low potential of free ego libido there is a lack of the neutralized mental energy indispensable for control. Therefore even identification cannot be maintained on a purely intrapsychic level, so that acts of genital and motor discharge become necessary for the un-bound and un-neutralized libidinal energies.

Joseph G. Kepecs. 'Observations on Screens and Barriers in the Mind.'

Mental states described as blankness, or by such phrases as 'There is nothing in my mind', may be investigated by requesting the subject to describe the experience. Often this will arouse memories or associations which indicate that these states contain visual memories which have lost their outlines and distinctness. The memory has become a homogeneous part of the perceptual field. Many of the memories are of the maternal breast. Others are memories of later screens which have served to prevent the child from carrying out some action or satisfying some curiosity. They function as barriers between what is conscious and what is unconscious, and therefore serve the forces leading to repression. They continue to function internally as they once functioned externally, to exclude painful feelings and thoughts from consciousness.

Heinrich Racker. 'Notes on the Theory of Transference.'

Racker adds the following considerations to Freud's formulation of the dynamics of the transference. (1) Free association abrogates the dominance of those ideas which reject impulses. Though superficially rejected ideas may be projected upon the analyst, at base the ideas projected are always the rejecting ones—moral, affective, and instinctive. Feelings of destruction and persecution do not form an exception; they must be regarded as primitive rejecting ideas directed against impulses. This phenomenon is probably a consequence of the identification of the primitive ego with its impulses. Interference originally came from the outside. Thus the rejecting ideas are the surrogates of the early rejecting objects who are one and the same as the first libidinal objects. Racker notes that if it is the giving up of rejection which is responsible for this transference, then it is due not to a resistance, but to the partial relinquishment of a resistance. (2) Since the rejecting objects are also those who are most needed, the more they are projected on to the analyst the more he is needed. Hence an intensification of the need for love already noted by Freud as basic to the transference. (3) A reverse process is also at work. The understanding of the analyst, taken as affection, increases the patient's capacity for loving. But the more the analyst is loved the more the patient's archaic paranoid and depressive anxieties are stimulated. (4) Analytic transference is characterized not only by its intensity but also by its depth. The analysis of the transference of the rejecting superego uncovers the transference of the rejecting internal libidinal objects derived from the genitally frustrating parents of the oedipal phase with whose rejecting action the patient's ego has become linked.

The author next considers what light these considerations throw on the rôle of the transference in therapy.

Freud regarded the negative and sexual transferences both as a resistance to remembering and as the field on which infantile experience could be rectified. The reconciliation of these views has exercised other analysts. But if Racker's view is correct, that the giving up of rejection in free association ultimately threatens the ego with the re-emergence of unbearable object-relations, then it is against this that the resistance must be directed. Their repetition and correction, not the search for memories, must therefore be the aim of treatment. Actually this repetition is memory, since the past is felt as present in the unconscious. In so far as it is felt in the analysis as past, its remembrance is, broadly speaking, a resistance against the present.

Henry P. Laughlin. 'King David's Anger.'

The prophet Nathan recounted to David a parable against a rich man which kindled the king's anger. He then showed David that the rich man was himself. The author brings several examples of patients whose rapid dislike of someone was similarly formed on the perception of a resemblance with a disapproved segment of their own personality. He suggests the hypothesis that 'our attention is selectively directed to those qualities in others over which we have greatest concern or conflict in ourselves'.

John Klauber.

THE PSYCHOANALYTIC QUARTERLY, **23**, 1954, No. 2

Lawrence S. Kubie. 'The Fundamental Nature of the Distinction between Normality and Neurosis.'

This paper is an attempt to formulate more exactly the concept of the essence of neurosis which Kubie has approached in many previous writings. His idea is that a nuclear, as opposed to a holistic, definition is possible. He finds this possibility in the type of determination of any individual act of behaviour or mentation. In so far as the alliance of conscious and preconscious mental systems is dominant the act is normal; in so far as unconscious determination is dominant it is neurotic. This must be so because domination by the conscious-preconscious alliance means the possibility of flexibility of response, whilst domination by unconscious motivation implies domination by unmodifiable repetitive responses. It is just this rigidity of response which characterizes the neurotic process.

Kubie deals in detail with numerous misunderstandings and criticisms of his theory.

Jule Eisenbud. 'Behavioural Correspondences to Normally Unpredictable Future Events.' Part 1.

This is a paper about precognition. Though the author prefers to avoid the word there is no need to do so in a short abstract. He sets out to describe what on the face of it would be a somewhat dubious precognitive experience; only analysis could reveal the numerous coincidences which give it evidential value.

The manifest content of a patient's dream contained what looked like a reference to an event which occurred at least an hour after he had woken up and which was reported in a newspaper on the following day. Eisenbud treats this event as an ordinary day residue—i.e. as though it had occurred on the day before the dream instead of the day after. An intricate relationship to the manifest content of the dream is then revealed. Not only does this enable him to make an efficient dream construction, it also shows reference to a current emotional problem of the analyst—a phenomenon usually regarded as a *sine qua non* of psi-conditioned dreams.

The paper is to be continued.

Ralph R. Greenson. 'About the Sound "Mm . . ."'

A patient in euphoric mood felt as if he were humming the sound 'Mm . . .'. Analysis showed that this stood for the fantasy of being at the mother's breast. 'Mm . . .' is the only sound which it is possible to make while still keeping something safely in the mouth. The word Mama—like many other words for mother and breast—is built round it. The sound also duplicates the pleasant labial sensations associated with the act of nursing.

S. S. Feldman. Motives of "Minor Offence" in Two Dreams.'

'The dreams of two adult male patients contained the expression, "minor offence". (1) The offence was "minor" to the child, but to his parents it was a major offence. (2) The offence took place when the dreamer was a minor. (3) The phrase refers to sexual relations with minors. (4) The "minor" is a disguise for the mother. (5) The offence was felt in childhood to be a major one, but there was a wish to minimize the offence and deny the guilt.' (Author's summary.)

Feldman thinks it probable that this phrase indicates the same latent thoughts in all dreams.

Morris Factor. 'A Woman's Psychological Reaction to Attempted Rape.'

An attempted rape accelerated the eroticization of a woman's behaviour in the transference. The author thinks that (1) the fact of a real attack diminished her guilt over her unconscious complicity; (2) her superego could be appeased by being shown her suffering. But these defences could not prevent a guilt-laden dream when she was confronted with her assailant in court.

John Klauber.

THE PSYCHOANALYTIC QUARTERLY, **23**, 1954, No. 3

Mortimer Ostow. 'A Psychoanalytic Contribution to the Study of Brain Function.'

1. *The Frontal Lobes*

Experimental stimulation and ablation of the premotor frontal regions has indicated that we can assign to them no specific function. Nevertheless human beings and animals deprived of them display a uniform impairment in strength and consistency of motivation. The author attempts to explain strength of motivation as a function of the ability to construct derivatives of instinctual drives and unconscious fantasies and to transfer psychic energy from these to conscious processes. Impairment of consistency of motivation he explains as a consequence of impairment of function of the device that regulates the orderly procession of fantasies so as to maintain continuity of motivation without rigidity. It therefore seems to him reasonable to assign to the premotor frontal region the functions of devising and energizing derivatives of instinctual drives and unconscious fantasies and of regulating the rate and sequence in which unconscious fantasies determine day to day behaviour. He thinks that if one accepts the formulation that neurosis or psychosis is caused by incomplete or unsuccessful repression, then one can understand that damage to the frontal lobe can relieve an individual of neurotic symptoms by depriving him of the power to form them and—what is the same thing—the power to create, express, and enjoy himself as a human being.

(Based on Author's Summary.)

A paper on the temporal lobes and a synthesis are to follow.

Alfred J. Siegman. 'Emotionality—A Hysterical Character Defence.'

Hysterical affects make a qualitatively different impression from other affects. Siegman believes this to be due to their defensive utilization by the ego. Among the defensive operations he notes (1) the offer of 'appropriate' emotions to the super-ego; (2) their use to establish an apparently convincing link with an impulse while the real affect remains unconscious; (3) the smuggling in of hidden libidinal gratifications; (4) the secondary eroticization of the defensive affects; (5) the active seeking out of stimuli by means of which the neurotic gratifications involved in the defence can be repeated. Parallels may be drawn with the obsessional neurosis and moral masochism.

The loud clamour of shallow emotions reminds one of children in the phallic phase hypocritically protesting 'appropriate' emotions to curry favour with their parents. This suggests a fixation at the period when the super-ego has been modified in its original severity but not yet firmly internalized. Fixation at this stage may help to account for the suggestibility of hysterics.

Jule Eisenbud. 'Behavioural Correspondences to Normally Unpredictable Future Events.' Part 2.

The author continues his paper with another example of a dream in which the multiple interrelations of its latent thoughts could be construed as suggesting 'precognitive' and telepathic knowledge. The dream seemed to occur under the stress of intense rivalry with another patient—telepathically intuited—and to refer to it.

Eisenbud does not consider that 'precognition' necessarily implies the existence of hitherto unsuspected dimensions of time. It might imply instead unsuspected dimensions of mind; and these, he indicates, may provide the first steps towards bridging many of the discontinuities in natural scientific theory, such as the conflict between indeterminacy in some fields and determinacy in others.

Jerome Richfield. 'An Analysis of the Concept of Insight.'

No logically successful clarification of the concept of insight exists in psycho-analytic theory which will (1) differentiate between the various uses of the term, and (2) relate these uses theoretically to therapeutic aims. Current definitions of the various types of insight are linguistically confused. The author attempts a clarification by applying Bertrand Russell's concepts of knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance in order to be able to define insights according to the manner in which they were achieved. Both methods are necessary for successful treatment.

Stanley Steinberg and Joseph Weiss. 'The Art of Edvard Munch and Its Function in his Mental Life.'

The character of the work of Edvard Munch changed after a psychotic illness. Before it his pictures were dominated by his fears of object-relationships—of visual over-stimulation, destructive incorporation and loss. After it they became more tranquil. This was possible because his pictures themselves became human objects for him which he treated in such a way as to protect himself against these fears.

John Klauber.

THE PSYCHOANALYTIC QUARTERLY, **23**, 1954, No. 4

Bertram D. Lewin. 'Sleep, Narcissistic Neurosis, and the Analytic Situation.'

Lewin attempts to formulate first ecstasy, hypomania and depression, then the analytic situation, in terms of the metapsychology of the dream.

He has already interpreted both ecstasy and blank dreams in terms of the wish for fusion with the breast of the satiated nursling. Since in Freud's formulation dreaming is the exception to the narcissism of sleep, Lewin argues that the nearer a dream is to a blank dream the fewer are the impurities in the narcissism. Ecstasy and the blank dream may therefore be equated metapsychologically. But the sense of reality in ecstasy is similar to that in dreams in general. Since in ecstasy it comes from the energic cathexis of condensed oral experiences, the origin of the sense of reality in dreams may therefore have been oversimplified by Freud when he attributed it to the cathexis of visual memory-traces; the oldest oral elements may always contribute.

Blank dreams may occur at the conclusion of a period of ecstasy and usher in a period of hypomania. The same narcissistic wish as blank dreams and ecstasy express must therefore persist into hypomania. Hypomania may therefore be likened to that part of the manifest content of a dream which denies the latent thought. The euphoria is in fact derived from the wish, but its cathexis is displaced to later (mainly motor) memory-traces and the regression is disguised in the manifest picture.

In depression the first step is a similar narcissistic regression. This is equally true of toxic and psychogenic depressions, since the toxin induces a state resembling sleep. In depression, however, the manifest picture is one of blatant unpleasure which Lewin equates with painful weaning and waking. The super-ego is the derivative not only of the father, but of all early wakers, such as light and noise. In depression wish for sleep is expressed by the ego which hears the call but fails to respond.

Lewin next turns his attention to the analytic situation. With free-association the patient enters a state of relaxed attention which has affinities with

the wanderings of the mind in bed before going to sleep. Many attitudes of patients indicate the equation of analysis with sleep. Free-association must therefore be regarded as the analytic counterpart of sleep, and just as there can be no dream without the wish to sleep, there can be no analysis without the wish to free-associate. Structuring the analytic situation further in terms of the dream, the background couch of analysis may be regarded as the equivalent of the dream screen. Just as the blank dream represents the earliest memory-traces which can be reproduced in the dream, so the earliest memory which can appear as a manifest element or 'symptom' in analysis is the transference sleep on the 'blank couch.'

Mark Kanzer. 'Observations on Blank Dreams with Orgasms.'

The forgotten dream has been interpreted by Lewin in oral terms as a concrete object which has been lost. Kanzer suggests that the oral elements may sometimes be a defence against phallic and anal sexuality, particularly when the forgetting is associated with blank dreams with orgasm.

He reports two sets of three dreams. In each set the first dream dealt with the upper regions of the body, or world, from which there was a fall, the third with the lower regions. In the middle, and associated with orgasm, was in one case a blank dream and in the other a dream which 'slipped away'. The middle dream clearly referred to the middle, or genital, region of the body. The dream which 'slipped away' was associated both with a severed phallus and with faeces which slipped away. The blank dreams in Kanzer's patient had their origin in adolescent dreams with seminal emission in which both vision and dreaming were arrested at the moment of penetrating the vagina. He suggests that the blankness represented the nothingness of the vagina, and quotes Freud's interpretation of a 'gap' in a dream in the same sense. The interest in the oral zone associated with the complex breast and dream screen may therefore sometimes be due to an upward displacement from the maternal vulva, serving the interests of regression. The breasts may moreover play a rôle in relation to the downward sweep of the eyes towards the blankness of the vulva similar to that which the hair or garment plays with the fetishist. The orgasm of the blank dream is evidence of the repressed voyeuristic impulse and testifies, moreover, to the oedipal basis of these psychic mechanisms; furthermore, by ridding the body of tension, the regression supplements the visual block as a defence against the perpetuation of dangerous instinctual excitement.

The picture of the feeding breast represents a further defence by turning from active to passive, from mother-identification to child-identification, as well as from phallic to oral. This is a pantomime of sexual intercourse, relieving castration anxiety.

It is a momentous crisis which results in such a severe inhibition of both sensory and motor functions (the desire to penetrate) as is attained in the blank dream. Fantasies of death and rebirth adhere to such an extinction of the ego. The orgasm may then represent the ego's convulsive attempt to cling to life. If the ejaculatory spasm becomes isolated from the remainder of the personality, the ego may not dare to relinquish control sufficiently to permit sleep, and the tensions may be carried over into waking states in which identifications and instinctual goals are confused. Such states may usher in a psychosis. The orgasm then becomes conducive not to discharge but to the intensification of anxiety, so that with the failure of the defence sexual fulfilment and castration become increasingly one.

Edward J. Carroll. 'Acting Out and Ego Development.'

The paper deals with acting out in the sense of repetitive compulsive gratification of unconscious impulses as seen in impulse neuroses rather than with the acting out which begins in therapy as a regressive defence. Like Greenacre, Carroll relates it to disturbances in the second year and emphasizes the failure to develop adequate means of linguistic communication.

This failure he attributes to participation in acts of gross duplicity on the part of the parents or guardians, so that the real facts have seemed to the child to differ from what was said about them. An example would be the passive witnessing of sexual scenes in which a nurse is involved and the child rewarded for secrecy. As a result orientation to reality through action and through speech develop independently of one another. The failure to assimilate language as a concise method of conceptualization means that whole dramatic sequences have to be acted out instead of details being selected for symbolic representation. Related to this there is a chasm between reality and fantasy, which cannot be integrated with reality by such means as artistic creativity.

Treatment requires an extensive preliminary period of ego education. Considerable tolerance must be given to the patient's motor behaviour, and the relevance of verbal communication must be constantly checked against it. Standard analytic procedure can only be introduced when the acting out tends to be replaced by psychosomatic anxiety equivalents and verbal communication.

Philip Weissman. 'Ego and Super-Ego in Obsessional Character and Neurosis.'

Weissman differentiates between the operations of the pre-genital, or archaic, and the genital super-ego. The archaic super-ego is formed by the internalization of objects to whom aggressive energy adheres in unneutralized form. These internalizations are more transient than the introjections which form the genital super-ego, and they are undone not so much by modification as by projection. Less

differentiated from the external world and from the id they may be said to form an ' intro-ego ' or ' undifferentiated ego-conscience ' rather than a super-ego. The intro-ego threatens with loss of objects and loss of love rather than with annihilation, castration and loss of self-esteem, as does the mature super-ego.

The particular vicissitude in super-ego formation responsible for the obsessional neurosis is that the archaic internalized objects shift their position in relation to the more mature objects so that they operate alongside them. Retaining their cathexis they have priority in governing phallic and anal-sadistic drives. Weissman examines several classical obsessions to differentiate the influence of the introjects of each stage.

The appearance of obsessional symptoms in latency has been accounted for by the over-rigidity of a newly formed super-ego. While not denying that this plays a part, the author points to the failure in repression of the Oedipus complex as a prominent feature of the disorder. He considers the symptoms of obsessional neurosis, characterized by magic and pseudo-morality, to be the attempt of an immature super-ego to protect against the Oedipal onslaught, expressed in terms of an anal regression. When the regression has occurred after the establishment of a mature super-ego the outcome is not obsessional neurosis at all, nor its equivalent a compulsive character, but a true anal character as described by Freud. Symptoms are minimal, and the super-ego is occupied with problems of self-esteem and of real morality.

Obsessional symptoms occurring in the pre-Oedipal period Weissman similarly relates to the loss of the parents as allies, which leaves the immature ego only able to organize a bewildering world by means of archaic parental identifications. Whether a pre-Oedipal neurosis has always preceded a post-Oedipal one deserves investigation.

Phillip H. Starr. ' Psychoses in Children: Their Origin and Structure.'

Just as the Oedipus complex is nuclear for the neuroses so the ' symbiotic union ' of mother and infant is nuclear for the psychoses. The symbiotic union—a normal phase—is achieved approximately between the ages of six months and a year. It is characterized by healthy give and take between the partners resulting in the satisfactory psycho-physiological regulation of the child. It is preceded by a phase in which the child reaches out for the mother and is resolved at about eighteen months as the ego, after weaning, disengages itself and struggles towards autonomy. The healthy achievement of the symbiotic union depends on the congenital activity type of the infant and on the emotional availability of the mother. Low object seeking potential in the infant favours autism, a low degree of activity parasitism. The resulting disturbances in the development of ego, of object relationship and of affectivity culminate in shaping the symbiotic union and are the true determinants of psychoses and the other more severe psychiatric disturbances in the same way as the infantile sexuality, which shapes the Oedipus complex, is the true determinant of the neuroses.

The paper ends by describing how prognosis and therapeutic technique must be based on an estimate of all these factors. Technique of treating mothers and indications for institutionalization are also discussed.

Don D. Jackson. ' Some Factors Influencing the Oedipus Complex.'

This paper is designed to underline the rôle in shaping the Oedipus complex of the parents' interaction on one another at a critical period of the child's life. The similarities of the clinical picture presented by six women patients are related to a specific type of inter-parental relationship.

The mothers were unloving in early childhood, though they permitted a third person to be tender to the child. As their daughters grew older they manifested strong dependence needs. The fathers on the other hand lost interest as the girls grew older. They behaved in an alienating way, but were also, sporadically, harshly seductive. Both sets of parents used the daughters vicariously to express their hostility to each other without overt quarrels. The fathers deprecated the mothers' sexuality by their acknowledgement of the daughters'; the mothers encouraged the seductive exploitation of the fathers.

The patients were thus trained to feed on triadic involvement. In adult life they had to create triangular situations. Beneath an apparently strong sexual attachment to the father lay an unresolved longing for the mother which prevented genuine relationships with either sex. The overcompensatory attachment to the father made them despise their femininity. Their main devices for escaping their dilemma were pregnancy fantasies and childbearing. Most of them had occupations or activities which enabled them to minister to ' helpless ' women.

John Klauber.

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION

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Charles Fisher. ' Dreams and Perception.'

This paper reports a repetition of Poetzl's work on dreams with the aim of integrating the results into the psycho-analytic theory of dreams. Eighteen patients and six doctors acted as subjects. Each subject was told to fix his eyes on a screen on to which a picture was projected for 1/200 second. The subject was told to describe what he had seen and then to make a drawing of it. He was also instructed to write down any dreams he might have that night. No order to dream was given. If

the patient produced a dream the next day he was asked for free associations and to make a drawing of his dream as far as possible. The investigation confirmed Poetzl's findings that those parts of the picture which were excluded from conscious perception contributed to the manifest content of the dream. Fisher has shown that suggestion is involved in this process of preconscious perception. The selection of sensory impressions whose duration is only 1/200 second in preference to the multitude of other daily sensory percepts is due to transference. Unconscious wishes are mobilized by the experimental situation. The dreams are in fact transference dreams. The results suggest that visual perceptions are dealt with by the dream as are auditory perceptions, and it seems that the dream can no more compose a new visual structure than it can a new speech. The author proposes that Freud's formulation that an unconscious idea cannot enter consciousness unless it is 'screened' by a preconscious day residue should be expanded to include the viewpoint that the memory pictures connected with an unconscious idea cannot enter consciousness unless they are covered by preconscious sensory perceptions associated with the day residue. Memory pictures from the past will not enter the dream unless they are 'screened' by recent sensory percepts. The preconscious visual perceptions revealed by the experiments were incapable of reaching consciousness and they could only be recalled after the subject was reminded of them. While conscious perceptions appeared in the dreams (in contrast to Poetzl's findings) they were not intimately connected with repressed material as the preconscious perceptions appeared to be.

The preconscious visual percepts demonstrated by the experiments were shown to be related to similar perceptual processes to be found in visual agnosias, eidetic imagery, and alcoholic hallucinosis. Poetzl's work suggests that there are at least two levels of perception and that stimuli are first perceived preconsciously. Fisher proposes that preconscious perception is an early stage of the perceptual process and with the maturation of the ego this more primitive mechanism becomes inhibited. This early form of perception is under the control of the drives and the primary process. Preconscious perception may be thought of as 'primary perception' in contrast to 'secondary perception'. It may be that percepts are first registered preconsciously, then reviewed by the ego before being admitted to consciousness. The paper concludes with a statement of how the results of the investigation can be integrated with Freud's theory of dreams.

Martin Wangh. 'Day Residue in Dream and Myth.'

The presence of dwarfs in the manifest content of a dream of a patient whose father-in-law had just died provides the clinical material of this paper. The dream successfully mastered the anxiety, principally arising from oral problems, which the father-in-law's death had aroused. The comforting thought the dream provided was 'You can rest, you don't need to worry, the little people will protect you and work for you.' Squirrels had supplied the day residue for the dream. The author suggests that the myth of the little people so widespread in northern and middle European countries is due to a denial and transformation of the anxiety caused by different varieties of rodents who were a constant danger to the food supply. The myth turns the hated and feared creatures into helpful and friendly little beings. This material alone could not form the myth. While the fear of rodents both in the dream and in the myths formed the preconscious stimulus (the day residue) the unconscious element arises from the ambivalent relationship towards ancestors and children. This conflict was given prominence by the death of the patient's father-in-law.

Victor Calef. 'Colour in Dreams.'

When a patient reports colour in a dream the immediate response is one of surprise and resistance. The latent content consists frequently of elements from the scoptophilic-exhibitionistic life of the patient. The author suggests that the black and white imagery of most dreams is an indication that the resistance has succeeded in camouflaging the latent dream thoughts and wishes. Colour is removed in the service of repression. The threat of the return of the repressed stimulates colour in dreams, particularly if the repressed is connected with exhibitionistic-scoptophilic impulses. Colour in dreams represents a further regression in the direction of pictorial representation calling forth the reproduction of sensory images or symbolic distortions of these images.

Louis Linn. 'Colour in Dreams.'

Visual experiences contribute to the development of the superego in as important a way as auditory impressions. The author quotes Freud's 'non vixit' dream and a dream of one of his own patients to support this theory. While colour in dreams is often associated with exhibitionism and scoptophilia, this is not invariable. Different instinctual strivings may find expression through colour. The colours which appear in dreams can often be traced to specific experiences in the environment rather than to pre-existing colour elements present constitutionally in the physiological visual apparatus.

Alexander Grinstein. 'The Convertible as a Symbol in Dreams.'

This paper discusses the use of a particular model of motor car as a dream element. The speed of a car and the type of journey is often

used to portray the progress of an analysis. More specifically a car may represent the entire body or parts of it. It may represent the genitals or their functioning. The author emphasizes that the car is a bisexual symbol. Five dreams are presented from the analyses of four male patients where the type of car dreamt of was a 'convertible'. This type of car was chosen because it could represent the idea of the patient being converted or transformed into a woman.

Louis S. Lipschutz. 'The Written Dream.'

A patient who wrote down his dreams but did not look at his notes in the analytical session was asked to continue with his associations and then finally to read his written account. Four of these dreams, verbal and written, are compared in this paper. The written dream is a 'much overdetermined typical piece of acting out'. It can have several meanings at different levels. These include a gift of faeces, the wish to have an anal baby, a defence against castration fear. The written dream is always a transference dream designed to please, placate, or confuse the analyst. Greater distortion is possible in the written dream. It should be considered as an expression of resistance and treated as such.

Samuel A. Guttman. 'A Note on Morning Depression.'

This note discusses two points concerning morning depressions. First, a theoretical consideration of depressed affect after waking, and second, affect as a consequence of thoughts and affects while sleeping. In morning depression the affect associated either recalled or unrecalled is carried into the waking state.

George Devereux. 'Primitive Genital Mutilations in a Neurotic's Dream.'

That which is repressed in one culture may be overt in another culture and *vice versa*. This paper reports the dream of a female patient in which occurred all but one of the many phallic mutilations known to anthropologists. The patient's dream and associations is followed by an account of an imaginary ailment encountered in parts of South-East Asia and known as *koro*. The patient fears that his penis will retract into the abdomen. A Dutch psychiatrist has suggested that the practice of inserting a small rod (*ampallang*) into a hole pierced through the glans penis is to prevent the retreat of the penis into the abdomen. The author reports that amongst the Mohave Indians jokes are made about male transvestites who would like to push the penis into the abdomen and so produce a vagina. The feminization phantasy which in Indonesia and South China causes anxiety is turned into a joke by the Mohave Indians. The patient's dream, while referring to other genital mutilations, omitted any reference to the *ampallang*. The author suggests that the patient unconsciously believed that she was already in a state of *koro*. Her penis had already 'withdrawn' into the vagina. This could never have happened if her phantasied penis had been provided with an *ampallang* in the first place. The patient knew of circumcision, subincision, and castration, but knew nothing of other mutilations such as encrustation which did appear in her dream or of the *ampallang* which did not appear in the dream. In this case phantasy material which in certain areas is culturally standardized and implemented by means of formal and traditional acts and emotions appeared in a patient's dream as a purely autistic production.

Robert A. Savitt. 'Extramural Psychoanalytic Treatment of a Case of Narcotic Addiction.'

A nineteen-year-old male patient, addicted to marijuana and heroin, was under analysis for thirty-eight months. A tolerant attitude was maintained towards the addiction and no demand was made on him to give it up in the initial stages of analysis. This enabled him to gain insight into the oral problems behind the addiction. This facilitated a self-imposed weaning process. Acting out set a difficult technical problem. The patient progressed sufficiently to graduate from college, leave his parents' home, and enter work of his own choice.

Don D. Jackson. 'An Episode of Sleepwalking.'

A young man had an episode of sleepwalking a few days before the onset of an acute schizophrenic episode. These events occurred coincidentally with his return home, when he experienced tension in his relations with father and brother and seductive smothering from his mother. The somnambulistic episode and the psychosis had certain common features with regard to the forbidden impulses and the defences against them.

Martin A. Berezin. 'Enuresis and Bisexual Identification.'

The enuretic act is conceived of as both active and passive, masculine and feminine. Enuresis may be a prototype of sexual experience so that later in life it acted in this case as a determinant in the phantasies connected with masturbation and sexual intercourse.

Lawrence J. Friedman. 'Regressive Reaction to the Interpretation of a Dream.'

The patient reacted regressively after the interpretation of a dream. She described feelings and behaviour which reminded her of the feelings and behaviour of a very small baby. This regression had the purpose of avoiding the anxieties associated with the oedipal conflicts.

Thomas Freeman.

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION, **2**, 1954, No. 4.

I. The Widening Scope of Indications for Psychoanalysis.

Arden House Conference, Harrison, New York, May 1954, sponsored by the New York Psychoanalytic Society.

Leo Stone. ' The Widening Scope of Indications for Psychoanalysis.'

Psycho-analysis, thanks to the new knowledge obtained from the character studies of Freud, Jones, and Abraham, and Anna Freud's *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense*, has gradually expanded its fields of interest. To-day in the United States almost any illness which has a significant emotional component in its aetiology has become a possible indication for psycho-analysis. There is an unfortunate tendency amongst the American public to ascribe a magical power to psycho-analysis and a trend amongst medical practitioners to find psychogenic factors when the physical aspects of the disease are more important. Psycho-analysis should not be undertaken for trivial ailments. Mild incipient neuroses need not be an indication for analysis if the personality deviation is minimal. Stone describes the basic elements of the analytical process and discusses the technical alterations which may be required when it comes to applying the method to severe illnesses.

Analysis must be differentiated from other psychotherapies, particularly from interpretative psychotherapies. Some such general concept as ' modified psycho-analysis ' would be useful to distinguish a method which utilizes many of the operational concepts of psycho-analysis. How far can the classical analytic method be modified and still be regarded as psycho-analysis? In Stone's opinion any number and degree of parameters (Eissler, 1953) can be introduced as long as they are directed towards the aims of the analytical effort. The effect of these parameters on the transference can be minimized as long as they are genuinely therapeutic, i.e. that they are actions bound to the immediate reality.

The suitability of psychotic illness for ' psychoanalytic office practice ' depends upon the patient's awareness of his abnormal state. Similar considerations apply to the perversions and addictions. In current practice character disorders are frequently encountered and many of them approximate to psychosis. The ' border-line ' case provides numerous problems for the analyst—whether or not to treat being the most important. This account of therapeutic possibilities is followed by a discussion of narcissism and transference. Stone distinguishes between the transference love of the patient with hysteria and the primitive phenomena of narcissistic transferences. The psychotic patient's transference is liable to engulf his whole personality. The fear of such emotions may be the cause of the patient's extreme detachment. When the transference does break through insatiable demands may be made or amongst other possibilities the transference may be literally narcissistic, i.e. the therapist does become confused with the self or is like the self in all respects. After reviewing some of the methods which have been recommended for the borderline case, Stone expresses his own views on the matter. For him the decisive factor is the capacity to tolerate the powerful and tormenting transference and potential countertransference situations. Looking back on his experience he believes that the best plan with these patients is to encourage a build-up of positive transference in the sense of an actual personal relationship which will stand the strain of hostility. The paper concludes with problems of the diagnosis and prognosis of ' borderline states '.

Edith Jacobson. ' Transference Problems in the Psychoanalytic Treatment of Severely Depressive Patients.'

As analysis proceeds with such patients the analyst becomes the centre of the depressive conflict and the depression may become worse. The patient may fall into states of ego and id regression deeper than ever before. This causes technical difficulties which require special measures. How far and in what way can the analyst deviate from his usual procedure and respond to the needs of the patient for active or even practical help? The analysis of these patients follows a fairly characteristic course. There is an initial spurious transference success followed by a period of hidden negative transference with corresponding negative therapeutic reactions, next a stage of dangerous introjective defences and narcissistic retreat. Finally there is a gradual constructive conflict solution. The case of a patient is presented to illustrate the treatment phases and demonstrate how the special technical problems of the depressive are managed. In Jacobson's opinion these patients require from the analyst a sufficient amount of spontaneity and flexible adjustment to their mood level; frequency and length of sessions is of secondary importance. In periods of threatening narcissistic withdrawal the analyst should show a very active interest in the patient's daily activities. Despite the greatest caution the analyst's attitude and interpretations will be experienced, according to the phase, as a seductive promise, a severe rejection, lack of understanding, etc. All of these may increase the ambivalence and deepen the depression. During the early stages the patient should be warned about the future. The most lasting results occur whenever deep phantasy material (incorporation-projection phantasies) is thoroughly worked out in addition to the analysis of the ego-superego and transference conflicts.

Anna Freud. 'The Widening Scope of Indications for Psychoanalysis: Discussion.'

While it is possible to introduce any number and degree of parameters (i.e. variations of procedure) where they are genuinely necessary to meet special conditions it must be remembered that a large number of the variations of technique to be found are due, not to special conditions in the cases treated, but to a change in the analyst's outlook. The close connection between theory and practice in psycho-analysis has had the consequence of every development in theory resulting in changes in technique. Apart from individual variations in technique there are these variations necessitated by the patient's personality and transferences and the analyst's reactions to them.

The author disagrees with Stone's view that analysis should not be used for mild or incipient or reactive illnesses. Her inclination is towards helping those patients who by virtue of their youth, good prospects in life and mild neuroses can be returned to health. This view does not ignore the knowledge which has come from work with severely ill 'borderline' patients. After reviewing the various types of transference reaction mentioned by Stone in his paper the author gives an account of patients who have difficulty in establishing a transference relationship, not because of narcissistic withdrawal, but because of certain basic defects in emotional development which date back to the patient's earliest years. Such patients sustained an interruption in the mother relationship during the first year of life or soon after and the degree of abnormality depends upon the specific age at which the deprivation occurred. If this happened before the individual reached the stage of object constancy objects only act in a need-satisfying rôle in adult life. They have no love objects in the proper sense of the word. The technical problems which confront the analyst with such patients result from the fact that the transference to the analyst as a need-satisfying object does not lend itself to that relationship which allows the acceptance of interpretations and the development of a transference neurosis.

Incapacity for transference development because of narcissism has drawn attention away from instances where insufficient object love is available for the purpose of analysis. Two patients are described who failed to develop a transference neurosis but instead either transferred their instability, rejection of objects or an ego interest. This section of the paper is followed first by some examples of 'magical, omnipotent' transference attitudes and second by a discussion on Stone's remarks concerning the real personal relationship between analyst and patient in contrast to the true transference reactions. The paper concludes with comments on Stone's views that the decisive factor in the treatment of 'borderline' cases is the analyst's ability to tolerate the strain of a tormented and tormenting transference and on Jacobson's concept of a deliberate supporting counter-attitude.

II. The Traditional Psychoanalytic Technique and its Variations.

Panel sponsored by the American Psychoanalytic Association, New York, December 1952.

Douglas W. Orr. 'Transference and Countertransference: A Historical Survey.'

This paper gives an excellent account of the literature on transference and countertransference. The author has reviewed the concepts from two points of view: first, definition and meaning as developed and used in psycho-analysis, and second, the technical handling during the process of psychoanalytic treatment. There is universal agreement on the crucial importance of transference and countertransference but agreement is far from being unanimous on how these concepts are to be understood and still less on how the phenomena themselves are to be dealt with in psychoanalytic treatment.

Phyllis Greenacre. 'The Rôle of Transference: Practical Considerations in Relation to Psychoanalytic Therapy.'

Three problems are raised for discussion in this paper. First, the essentials of the transference relationship; second, the different points of view regarding the utilization of the transference in treatment; third, practical arrangements as they are determined by the transference. With regard to the first point there is a tendency to disregard and ignore the elementary conditions necessary for analysis on the grounds that they are irrelevant or just so much rigid ritual. The author takes pains to point out that it is just such arrangements, artificial though they may be, which permit the full development of neurotic manifestations in the transference. As regards the utilization of the transference there are two well defined opinions: (*a*) the full development of the transference neurosis is of the greatest importance; (*b*) once a basic positive transference is established it is unnecessary to go beyond this. The former view encourages and utilizes the full transference reaction as a medium of re-experience and interpretation. The latter avoids the intensity of full transference and directs and promotes new experiences as quickly as possible. One is a method of detailed analysis, the other a survey with a general propulsion forward using the aid of the strong suggestion of personal attachment to the therapist.

Analytic rules are but the implementation of principles. Frequent interviews are necessary for a speedy development of a full transference relationship. It is not sufficiently recognized that treatment may be prolonged by spreading of interviews. The more patients and the less sessions per patient puts a greater strain on the therapist in that it is more difficult to retain full details of each case. Another

consideration is that the less frequent the interviews the greater the risk of an inadequate analysis of negative transference. After a brief discussion regarding the value of the prone position the author describes the pitfalls which wait for the analyst. In her opinion the transference can be safeguarded only when the confidences of the patient are strictly maintained and no relationship exists between the analyst and patient other than the analytic one. Both these conditions are discussed in detail.

Franz Alexander. 'Some Quantitative Aspects of Psychoanalytic Technique.'

Alexander recalls his review of Ferenczi and Rank's monograph *The Development of Psycho-Analysis* (1925), in which he pointed out that although the repetition of emotional experiences without recall in the transference was of the greatest importance, nevertheless it had to be recognized that the aim of analysis was also to bring about the recollection of childhood memories. These authors' description of the therapeutic process did not entitle them to stress emotional experience as the real therapeutic goal in contrast to insight. At the time of the monograph's publication both he and the authors quite wrongly were still under the impression that only intellectual insight was important for the achievement of therapeutic results. This indicates that the authors were struggling, not with problems of basic principles, but with problems of technique. This opinion was supported by the second half of the monograph which was devoted to recommendations aimed at provoking emotional experiences in the transference. To-day Alexander believes that the merit of this work was to introduce a healthy spirit into psycho-analytic therapy. He would not be satisfied with the traditional answer which he gave then, i.e. that the development of the transference neurosis occurs spontaneously and the function of the analyst is not to disturb it. He puts a series of questions whose purpose is to demonstrate the large number of unrecognized variables which are at work during psycho-analytic therapy.

More use could be made of countertransference phenomena in therapy. Once the transference neurosis has developed the patient is very susceptible to any alteration in the physician's attitude or behaviour. It is Alexander's opinion that while the therapist's basic attitude should always be objective it is possible for him to introduce into the analysis an emotional climate which in each phase of the treatment should be opposite to that which prevailed in the original situation being repeated in the transference at that particular time. Alexander states that the dependent component of the transference relationship is the least understood in psychoanalytic therapy and constitutes its weakest link. During analysis the patient regresses to a phase beyond the unresolved conflict into a pre-conflictual phase of development—to a state of increasing dependence. For example, in a case of peptic ulcer oedipal material will only be mobilized if the analyst succeeds in frustrating the comfortable oral regression. This frustration can be achieved by reducing the number of interviews. Interpretation of the transference must be made at the same time as the dependent gratifications are limited. The regressive urge is the most powerful form of resistance and Alexander has come to the conclusion that the extreme prolongation of some treatments is due primarily to the fact that this regressive evasion is often misinterpreted as a sign of penetration into depth, instead of as a retreat from unresolved conflicts. He ends the paper with comments on such problems as indications for increased frequency of interviews, advice to patients, utilizing extra-therapeutic experiences, etc.

Edith Weigert. 'The Importance of Flexibility in Psychoanalytic Technique.'

The rules for practical procedures in analysis can never hope to cover the infinite variety of therapeutic situations arising in analysis. All authorities have emphasized the need for flexibility for the following reasons: (1) the spontaneity of the analyst may be destroyed by the rigidity of technique; (2) the variety of clinical syndromes treated; (3) the change in technique arising out of advances in psycho-analytic knowledge. The author discusses the third point at length. Analysis must avoid the pitfalls of stereotyped habit formation on the part of the analyst. Rules may not correspond to the genuine needs of the patient.

III. Psycho-analysis and Dynamic Psychotherapy: Similarities and Differences.

Panel sponsored by the American Psychoanalytic Association, Los Angeles, May 1953.

Frieda Fromm-Reichmann. 'Psychoanalytic and General Dynamic Conceptions of Theory and of Therapy: Differences and Similarities.'

All psycho-analysts and psychodynamically oriented psychiatrists agree on the importance of the concepts of the unconscious, of childhood experience, transference, and resistance as integral aspects of psycho-analytic theory and practice. While Freud regarded childhood development as psychosexual, dynamic psychiatrists conceive of childhood development in terms of the developmental phases of the child's interpersonal relationships. In spite of this difference there are two factors common to both approaches. These are stated by the author and then followed by an account of some of the basic differences. She then passes on to discuss the similarities and differences of the two schools in the concepts of transference and resistance. There is general agreement that the dynamics of transference entail a revival and a repetition in the analysis of important emotional experiences of the past. Differences lie in the con-

ceptions of the transferred material. Dynamic psychiatrists reject the view that the content of the transference is of a sexual nature.

Many dynamic psychiatrists prefer to think of mental content which is temporarily or permanently barred from awareness, i.e. which has been dissociated, rather than consider that the material has become unconscious by repression. This opinion follows from the tendency of dynamic psychiatrists to doubt Freud's concept of a primary, innate unconscious to which mental experiences are added, which have become secondarily unconscious by repression. To-day there is agreement that unearthing repressed material is subsidiary to the investigation of the ego and its defences. This change is due, in the author's opinion, to the fact that fewer cases of hysteria are treated while character abnormalities, obsessional neuroses and borderline cases are more prevalent. The dissociated material of these patients is more easily available to consciousness that that of the hysteric. Freud's later views on anxiety are more acceptable to dynamic psychiatrists than the earlier one. Fromm-Reichmann believes that the most universal source of inner helplessness is found in unresolved fixations to emotional entanglements with parents and parental surrogates in early childhood.

Franz Alexander. ' Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy.'

Because an intuitive knowledge of human nature is common to almost all men, psychotherapy has until recently been a matter of commonsense. Only now is the transition occurring from commonsense psychotherapy to scientific psychotherapy as a medical speciality. This is due to the accumulation of knowledge concerning the human personality and its disturbances. The fact that this knowledge is derived from psycho-analysis has caused much disagreement concerning the relationship between psycho-analytic therapy and other forms of psychotherapy. In spite of the development of psychoanalysis outside the field of medicine and psychiatry it has gradually come to influence psychiatric practice to an increasing extent. To-day psychiatry accepts psycho-analysis as one of its basic sciences. This has resulted in the situation that the identity of psycho-analysis rests almost exclusively on the specific nature of psycho-analytic therapy. While Alexander looks favourably on the tendencies towards unification of psycho-analysis within psychiatry, he recognizes the problems of those who oppose this development. After a brief account of the essentials of psycho-analytic therapy he goes on to distinguish two forms of psychotherapy—supportive and uncovering. The former consists of gratification of dependency needs, abreaction, intellectual guidance, support of neurotic defences and manipulation of life situations. As much skill is required for this work as for other forms of psychotherapy. The uncovering form of psychotherapy is indicated in chronic conditions in which the function of the ego is impaired.

The distinctions made between psycho-analysis and other " uncovering ' procedures are mainly of a quantitative nature. Controversy has centred around such issues as the frequency of interviews, the duration of the treatment, the patient's position, etc. Alexander does not think that these factors are crucial because such considerations as the number of interviews, their frequency, etc., cannot be precisely estimated in the present state of knowledge. The therapist must feel his way in each case, and find the optimal intensity of treatment. This explains why a rigid distinction between different ' uncovering ' methods of psycho-therapy is not possible. Alexander states that the tendency to set up distinctions is not dictated by conceptual needs but mainly by the practical necessity to identify a group of practitioners who have had a specific kind of training. This is one important reason which fosters the opposition to the views of the Chicago Institute.

Leo Rangell. ' Similarities and Differences between Psychoanalysis and Dynamic Psychotherapy.'

It is of interest that the committee set up by the American Psychoanalytic Association to evaluate psycho-analytic therapy was never able to agree as to exactly what constitutes psycho-analysis, psychoanalytic psychotherapy and possibly transitional forms. It is not possible to dismiss the differences between the various theories and techniques by saying that the entire question is a semantic one. The author makes it clear that his presentation is concerned with psycho-analysis as a method of therapy rather than as either a body of facts or a method of investigation. There are two schools of thought. One holds that there is a continuum between psycho-analytic therapy and dynamic psychotherapy and the other believes that the two are separable and distinct entities. The latter view is the one held by the majority of members of the American Psychoanalytic Association.

Rangell defines psycho-analysis as follows: ' Psychoanalysis is a method of therapy whereby conditions are brought about favourable for the development of a transference neurosis, in which the past is restored in the present, in order that, through a systematic interpretative attack on the resistances which oppose it, there occurs a resolution of that neurosis (transference and infantile) to the end of bringing about structural changes in the mental apparatus of the patient to make the latter capable of optimum adaptation to life.' In psychoanalysis the criterion for any action is whether or not it will produce conditions most favourable for the development, understanding and resolution of a transference neurosis. In psychotherapy the activity of the therapist is designed to accomplish a multitude of ends. It may teach, set an example, develop confidence, but it is not directed to the

exposure of transference behaviour mechanisms. Again while psycho-analysis aims at the complete resolution of the transference neurosis by maintaining it under optimum conditions dynamic psychotherapy either from necessity or choice introduces an external influence and brings the developing transference reaction to an end. Rangell gives examples to illustrate this point. He emphasizes, however, that one method is neither better nor worse than the other. There are indications and contra-indications for each and each must be applied on rational grounds. There is a spectrum of patients who require one or the other method and a spectrum of therapists able to do one or both. There is also a borderland of conditions which may at times call for a change of the technical approach in either direction.

Edward Bibring. ' Psychoanalysis and the Dynamic Psychotherapies.'

Bibring utilizes a conceptual scheme which is applicable to all psychotherapies and by which they may be compared. The scheme consists of certain basic concepts of psychotherapy which are called therapeutic principles and procedures. The term techniques refers to any purposive behaviour of the therapist which intends to direct the patient in the direction of the intermediate or final goal of treatment. There are five groups of basic techniques: (*a*) suggestive; (*b*) abreactive; (*c*) manipulative; (*d*) clarifying; and (*e*) interpretative. Bibring distinguishes four major processes or procedures occurring during psychotherapy: (1) the production of material; (2) the utilization of the material; (3) the assimilation by the patient; and (4) the re-orientation and readjustment of the patient. There then follows a discussion which is devoted to the elaboration of the various therapeutic principles. Each of the principles implies a specific goal, for example, suggestion at symptomatic change; abreaction at release of tension; manipulation at rearranging the ' dynamic field ' through experience; clarification aims at a greater self-awareness and interpretation attempts to raise unconscious conflicts to consciousness.

In psycho-analysis all therapeutic principles are employed to a varying degree. Interpretation is the principal agent and all others are practically and theoretically subordinate to it. The rôle each principle plays in psycho-analytic therapy is explained by Bibring in some detail. The relationship between psycho-analysis and the various types of dynamic psychotherapies derived from it is characterized by (1) different selections and combinations of therapeutic agents; (2) a modification of one or more of the four groups of therapeutic procedures; (3) the tendency to shift the emphasis from insight through interpretation towards ' experiental ' manipulation. All these points are gone into at length.

Merton M. Gill. ' Psychoanalysis and Exploratory Psychotherapy.'

This paper begins by clarifying certain obscurities which always arise in discussions concerning the relationship between psycho-analysis and exploratory psychotherapy. The essence of psycho-analytic technique is defined as follows: ' Psycho-analysis is that technique which, employed by a neutral analyst, results in the development of a regressive transference neurosis and the ultimate resolution of this neurosis by techniques of interpretation alone.' Exploratory psychotherapies differ in various ways from this basic approach; for example Alexander's technique is at variance with the psycho-analytic procedure. In the former measures are taken to curtail the transference neurosis—where it is permitted to develop—by the therapist taking up certain attitudes such as limiting interviews to prevent overdependence. In the latter the aim is to bring about an intrapsychic change within the patient by means of interpretation alone by which he will be able to give up his trait of over-dependence. Gill amplifies the important component parts of his definition. For example he details what he means by ' neutral ', by ' regressive transference neurosis ', and by ' techniques of interpretation alone '. He follows on with a summarized version of the techniques of exploratory psychotherapy. He differentiates two types of patient who are usually subjected to this type of treatment: one group who are suitable for psycho-analysis but for some external reason cannot undertake it, and a second group who are theoretically unsuitable for psycho-analytic therapy.

Gill observes that the goals of exploratory psychotherapy are as ambitious as those of psycho-analysis and he notes that there is the tendency to underestimate the results of exploratory psychotherapy where the therapist adopts a less directive rôle, allows the material to emerge spontaneously, and where the treatment can continue for some time. There has always been the inclination to consider psycho-analysis and psychotherapy as qualitative polar opposites and psychotherapy as unable to produce any significant intrapsychic change. What changes did occur were attributed to transference influences. Gill quotes the opinions of several analysts on this question. He believes that the type of exploratory psychotherapy mentioned above where the therapist is relatively inactive can bring about important psychological changes within the patient as well as symptomatic cure. He presents four arguments to support his opinion. While he insists that he is not suggesting that psychotherapy can do what psycho-analysis can achieve, nevertheless he maintains that the results of intensive psychotherapy may not be merely in terms of shifts of defence, but also in terms of other intra-ego alterations. Although a basic conflict remains unsolved the derivatives may become sufficiently autonomous

and exist in a form which permits a relatively firm resolution as a result of psychotherapy of the more intensive and less directive type.

Thomas Freeman.

SAMIKSA,
8, 1954, No. 1

S. W. Ginsburg. ' The Rôle of Work.'

From a sociological investigation into work, two questions are selected for discussion, choice of occupation and the ego-preservative function of work.

T. C. Sinha. ' A Case of Aspermia.'

An outline is given of analytic work done with a medical practitioner suffering from aspermia and difficulties with study and examinations.

Analysis of his feminine wishes towards his father led to resolution of his symptoms, including a change from a nil spermatozoal count to a practically normal count.

M. W. Brody. ' A Psycho-analytical Interpretation of Rapunzel.'

Grimm's fairy-tale ' Rapunzel ' portrays the endless cycle of life to death in relation to Mother Earth. This theme repeats itself in the tale, and, it is suggested, is finally symbolized in the birth of twins.

E. V. Semrad. ' Psychotherapy of the Psychoses.'

The author considers some factors in conducting a therapeutic interview, especially defence mechanisms, transference, the patient's needs of affection and sometimes of activity on the part of the therapist.

H. Racker. ' On the Confusion between Mania and Health.'

The risks in analysis of developing hypomanic defences (the denial of dependence and of guilt feelings) are outlined. These stem from the analyst's encouragement of independence and instinct liberation, based on his own inner anxieties.

SAMIKSA,
8, 1954, No. 2

Edmund Bergler. ' The Infantile and Adult Forms of Reducing to Absurdity.'

From an interview infantile and adult forms of *reductio ad absurdum* are demonstrated, differentiation lying essentially in their purpose and compulsive application. Wit is defensive pseudo-aggression, aimed at proving to the super-ego the ego's activity.

J. M. Dorsey. ' Some Considerations of the Psycho-Analytical Principle and Religious Living.'

The central note of this long paper is that only through development of ' the glorious capacities of self-perception and self-observation ' can integration be achieved. All that is perceived as outside is but part of the self.

These feelings of ' adoration of our all, reverential feelings towards our total human being,' when not repressed relate to the feelings towards divinity. ' To have the highest moral worth, an action must be motivated by fully acknowledged self-interest.'

Numerous religious and other quotations are given.

SAMIKSA,
8, 1954, No. 3

Geza Roheim. ' Wedding Ceremonies in European Folklore.'

This was intended as a chapter in a book on Hungarian folklore published by the author in 1925, but was not then included. Numerous rites are discussed in detail and seen to be fundamentally similar from country to country, but in some of them the meaning, which in essence is the overcoming of the Oedipus complex, is particularly clear.

Jacques Schnier. ' Psycho-Analysis of the Artist.'

Art and science are compared, their objectivity and subjectivity discussed. Art may be viewed as sublimations of pre-genital impulses, as defences, and as restitution for introjected and destroyed objects. The scientist uses the external world for the expression of his repressed impulses. Numerous references are given.

SAMIKSA,
8, 1954, No. 4

Edmund Bergler. ' Contributions to the Psychology of Homosexuals.'

Some conclusions of Somerset Maugham in regard to homosexuals are taken to illustrate the superficial defences which the homosexual presents. The common attitudes either advocating prosecution, or giving them a near-majority status based on the Kinsey report, are both deprecated by the writer, who calls for propaganda that homosexuality is a curable illness.

George Devereux. ' Belief, Superstition and Symptom.'

This paper is offered partly as an addendum to that of Dr. Judd Marmor, ' Some Observations on Superstition in Contemporary Life ', read before the St. Louis, Mo., Annual Meeting of the American Psychiatric Association, May 1954.

Belief, superstition and symptoms are different channels for discharge of anxiety. ' Beliefs, and to a lesser extent superstitions are culturally and socially integrative. By contrast, symptoms are socially divisive.'

This difference and others are examined. It is emphasized that ' the anal component, nowadays so unfashionable in psycho-analysis, is quite conspicuous ' in these problems.

André Michel. ' Bibliography of Psychoanalysis of Music and Musicians.'

About 100 references are given to psycho-analytic writings which have some connection with music. This bibliography is but a small part of a much larger one on the psychology of music, which is in preparation.

A. K. Roychoudhury. ' Sita Myth of the Ramayana.'

After some generalizations about myths and references to some of the literature, the author tells the myth and analyses it under two headings, father-daughter fixation, and unconscious guilt and need for punishment. At a number of points parallels are drawn with more widely known myths.

Gordon Levinson.

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
7, 1953

Noel Mailloux, O.P. ' Psychic Determinism, Freedom, and Personality Development.'

The author studies the problem at the level of ' the conflict-free sphere of the ego '. Freud stated that the striving for ego freedom is inherent in psycho-analysis, but the problem is to see how free will develops from the archaic stages of indeterminacy and infantile automatism. An important first distinction is that indeterminism and not determinism is the alternative to free will.

In the first stage of development, the overcoming of primitive indeterminacy has to be achieved through ' automatization of psychic processes ' which is no more than a rudimentary adaptability. Gradually, this narrow functioning has to give way to the ' autonomous determinism of freedom '. This process implies the continuous temptation to regress to earlier stages of automatism, in order to avoid anxiety, the ' emotion of the possible '. The unconscious, here, is not eliminated but integrated and surpassed.

Psychic determinism is seen as a preliminary condition for freedom. Free activity is a self-determined activity, with the highest capacity for flexibility in adaptation, for rational motivation and creativeness. Finally, neurotic attitudes are analyzed as inability and fear to reach freedom.

A. Lussier.

INDIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
28, 1953

L. C. Bhandari. ' New Horizons in Clinical Psychology.'

The author discusses the meaning and present-day status of this branch of psychology and the issues which face clinical psychologists in a field where their interests clash with those of psychiatrists. He considers that in order to promote further advancement in the methods of diagnosis and treatment in clinical psychology, emphasis should be laid upon the importance of close collaboration between psychiatrists and clinical psychologists in a task which requires their mutual co-operation and goodwill.

Psychosomatic medicine is discussed as representing the latest scientific discipline which has developed in the medical world since World War II. It provides the basic approach in applying facts of psycho-pathology to a number of functional and organic illnesses.

In the therapy of emotional disorders ' brief psychotherapy ' is discussed as a methodological advance which may provide the benefits of psychotherapy for the masses. To serve the wider interests of individual and community mental health, the importance of training in techniques of ' brief psychotherapy ' has been stressed.

Author's Abstract.

INDIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY,
29, 1954, Parts 1–2

Amalendu Bagchi. ' The Sanskritist's Approach to the Mental Theory of Freud.'

The author examines some of the intricate concepts of Yoga, alongside some of Freud's statements on the ego and the id, and finds essential identity between the ancient and modern theories.

Gordon Levinson.

ERRATUM

In this volume, page 363, first column, lines 15 and 16, the following words should be deleted: ' the delegate of the World Health Organization '.

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

(Appearance in this list does not preclude subsequent review.)

Clinical Papers and Essays on Psycho-Analysis. By Karl Abraham. Ed. Hilda C. Abraham. Translated by H. C. Abraham and D. R. Ellison with assistance of Hilda Maas and Anna Hackel. Preface by Ernest Jones. The International Psycho-Analytical Library, No. 49. (London: The Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1955. Pp. 336. 25*s.*)

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CLINICAL ESSAY PRIZE

Members and Associate Members of the International Psycho-Analytical Association are reminded that competitors for the Clinical Essay Prize must send in their work to the Hon. Scientific Secretary of the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 63 New Cavendish Street, London, W.1, by 31 March of the year in which they wish to enter the competition.

The conditions governing the competition are the following:

A prize of (not exceeding) 30 guineas is offered.

Requirements for the Essay

The essay shall consist of a clinical record of a case investigated by psycho-analytical methods. It should illustrate clearly the events and changes in the mental life of the patient and their relation to external environment. In awarding the prize, the Judges will pay attention to acuity of observation and the clarity with which the facts are stated. If the writer wishes to draw theoretical conclusions, he must bear in mind the necessity of making the evidence for such conclusions carry conviction.

It is recommended that the length of the essay should not exceed 20,000 words.

Date of Sending in Essays: Language: Format, etc.

Essays must be submitted on or before the 31st day of March in any year, in the English language. They must be typescript on quarto paper with ample left-hand margin. They must be in triplicate and be sent to the Hon. Scientific Secretary of the Institute. All copies of essays submitted become *ipso facto* the property of the Institute (or its successor) while it has the appointment of the Trustees for the Prize Fund.

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If no essay of merit worthy of a prize is submitted in any year, no award shall be made for that year.

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In the event of the Judges regarding the essays of two or more competitors as of equal merit, they may divide the prize money into equal parts and award it to such competitors jointly.

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The prize shall be given to the writer of the best essay in the opinion of the Judges submitted in any year, but the prize may be awarded to the same person twice, provided that he submits a second essay of sufficient merit in a later competition, and that the prize shall not be awarded more than twice to the same person.

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The competitor to whom the prize is awarded in any year may be called the Clinical Prizeman for that year.

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ILSE HELLMAN
Honorary Scientific Secretary,
Institute of Psycho-Analysis,
63 *New Cavendish Street,*
*London, W.*1.

EDITORIAL

At the conclusion of this, the 36th volume of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS, it should be recorded that in the year 1955 the Journal has changed from a quarterly periodical to one published in six parts, one part succeeding the other at a two-months' interval only. This change was initiated by Dr. W. Clifford M. Scott and agreed upon by the other members of the Editorial Committee as well as by the Board of the Institute of Psycho-Analysis in London, who at the same time did not insist on raising the subscription rate. The Editorial Committee is convinced that the increase of administrative work and responsibility will be outweighed by the more frequent and closer contact with the readers and that by such relationship the quality of our publication can be affected favourably.

The shortening of the interval between publications does not necessarily imply an increase in the number of pages, but this can easily be effected, of course, if the necessary conditions can be met.

It was eventually decided to publish the two parts covering the months July to October as one issue as it was thought the more compact form would facilitate reading during the summer vacation. This need not become a custom, but most probably 'double numbers' will prove necessary from time to time in the future. Readers' and subscribers' comments on that or any other topic will be appreciated.

It should further be put on record that Dr. Charles Rycroft (London) has joined the Editorial Committee as one of the Assistant Editors and has thus filled the vacancy created by Dr. W. Clifford M. Scott's change of domicile from London to Montreal; Dr. Scott in return has filled the vacancy due to the death of Dr. Clarence P. Oberndorf (New York) and together with Dr. Robert P. Knight (Stockbridge) will represent the Editorial Committee in the Western hemisphere.

W. HOFFER.

INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

ANNOUNCEMENT

The Celebration by the International Psycho-Analytical Association of the Freud Centenary will take place in London on May 6th, 1956. In the morning a commemorative plaque put up by the London County Council on the Freud House, 20 Maresfield Gardens, will be unveiled. Following this ceremony, a reception at No. 20 Maresfield Gardens will be held by Miss Anna Freud. In the afternoon Dr. Ernest Jones will address a meeting to which all psycho-analysts present in London at the time will be invited and also representatives of scientific societies of which Freud was a member; space permitting the meeting will be open also to the general public.

We have not been informed of the dates of all the celebrations of the Component Societies of the I.P.A. As for those of the American Association and the British and Dutch Societies, dates have been selected that will allow their members to attend also the celebration of the International Association on May 6th.

I am glad to be authorized by the British Society to tell you that analysts attending our celebration of Freud's birthday will be welcome also as guests of theirs which is to take place on the two preceding days.

DR. RUTH S. EISSLER,
Hon. Secretary.
International Psycho-Analytical
Association.

INDEX

Abraham, Karl, on female castration complex, 100
Acting out, 23, 237, 240
Activity(ies): genital, 286–7; goal-seeking and -changing, 249–53; primary ego, 282–3, 284, 287; and vacations, 177
Aggression: archaic, 284; malignant expressions of, 248; maturation and object-relationships, 92–3; and primary repression, 282–3; and vacations, 179
Aichhorn, August, on transference and social therapy, 256
Aim-inhibition, 270–1, 273, 287; defective, 345
Anal erotism, and male homosexuality, 335–47
Analyst: in analytic setting, 20–1; conflict *re* belief in God, 188–9, 194–6; counter-transference, 25; equipment and survival of, 17; idealization of, 169; reactions to localized regressions, 24; strain on, 24; training (personal) and supervisors, 298–306; ' unmasking ' of, 29, 32–5
Analytic situation (setting and set-up): informative behaviour in, 337–8; regression in, 16–26, 236–40; silence in, 239; ' simultaneous learning ' in, 290–1; telepathic-precognitive dream during, 27–30; wish to control, 336
Announcement, 19th International Psycho-Analytical Congress, 74, 217
Anxiety(ies): ' blathering ', 348–9; castration, 95–104, 146, 147, 151, 154, 337, 339–41; and ego-ideal, 257; in infancy, 162–5; menstrual, 331, 332, 333; ' separation ', 96–8, 101–2, 337; traumatic primary and symptom formation, 172–3; and vacations, 178, 181
Assumptions (propositions) and classification, 198–200
Autoerotism, 279–80

Beethoven, Sterba biography, 111
Belief in God and psychological theory, 187–204
Bender, Morris B., on double simultaneous cutaneous stimulation, 36–8
Bernfeld, Siegfried, on validity of interpretations, 105, 106; and ' gestalt ', 107, 112
Bipolarization, relationship of (Freud-Fliess), 4
' Blathering ', 348–9
Body image: and depersonalization, 381, 382; developmental aspects of, 36–42; and ego-ideal, 257; narcissistically hypercathected, 172
Body-mind theories, 307–19
Brain-fields, 312–19
Breuer, Josef, and Freud, 3, 4, 5
Bulletin of the International Psycho-Analytical Association, Edit., Ruth S. Eissler: 109th Bulletin, 364–8

Candidate (student), in supervisory situation, 298–306
Case histories (clinical illustrations, etc.): ' blatherer ', 348–9; candidate's ' crisis ', 301–2; castration anxiety and phobia (female), 98–9, 99–100, 100–2, 103–4; ' contemptuous ' girl (Anna Freud), 107; ' Cordelia ', 110; depersonalization, 379–80, 383; enema trauma in two-year-old, 19; face-hand fusion, 38–9; female drug addict, 166–73; Freud's O.N., 107, 108, 110–11; Gonzalez' NKVD experience, 58–9; growth inertia and shame, 244–8; inhibited potency and overt homosexuality, 335–47; linkage fantasies, 388–90, 391; three menstrual cycles, 328–33; moon dreamers, 81–4; nail biting, 394–5; object clinger and shunner, 225–6; O.N. memory, 258; oceanic identification, 184; phantasy object loss, 91; psychosomatic illness, 321, 322, 324–6; psychotic regression, 17; ' schizophrenic episode ' (homicide), 43–52; sleeper, 174–6; Smith and fairies, 189–94; Szondi test, 31; telepathic-precognitive dreamer, 27–30; vacation anxieties, 180–1; Vogeler's ' conditioning process ', 56–7; ' Worm-eating Warbler ' Psi experience, 370–4
Cathexis(es): and desexualization and defusion, 382, 383–5; distribution in idealization and disillusion, 84–7
Character formation, 254–9
Claustrophobia, in female drug addict, 170–3
Claws, biting at the, 393, 395
Communication: and concepts (entropy), 289; via dreams, 260–5; and information, 292; precursor of sublimation, 90–1
Confessions, extortion of, 53–60
Conflict: *re* belief in God and fairies, 188–9, 191–204; passive sexual, 338; pathogenic preoedipal, 320, 322
Consciousness, 308–9, 311, 314, 316–17
Constipation, 337
Correspondence: Freud-Fliess, 1–15; -personality, 2, 15; -transference, 2, 5–6, 9, 10, 12–14
Couch, attitudes to, 237–8
Counter transference: and paranormal phenomena, 27–30, 31; and reassurance, 25; and resistance, 8; and shame, 252; in training analysis, 302
Creativeness, 286–7
Criteria, of interpretation, 108–11, 112
Cutaneous stimulation, double simultaneous (Bender's experiments), 36–7

' Death instinct ', 92; and defusion, 382–5
Defence (defence-organization): against ' blathering ', 348; characterological, 248; ' freezing of the failure situation ' and ' false self ' development, 18, 25; Freud's ' physiological ', 8; male homosexual, 342–6; paranormal, 33, 35; psychotic and psychosomatic, 323; regressive *v.* others, 20; understood, 6
Defusion and depersonalization, 383–5
Delusion, ' objectivity ' and integration, 89–90
Dentition, cycle of, 146
Dependence: and belief, 188; and inertia, 249, 251; and paranormal, 32; and pre-verbal research, 229–30, 236; and psychosomatic illness, 320–2; regression to, 20, 21–4
Depression: menstrual, 328, 334; Shakespeare's, 114, 121, 131
Depressive position, 17, 169
Determinism (causality), 350–4; and free will, 355–6
Deutsch, Helene, on her 70th birthday (Kris), 209
Depersonalization, 379–85
Discussion: Editor's introduction. Kenji Ohtsuki, James Clark Moloney, 205–8
Dream(s): asthma, 262; barn and bull, 338; bird shooting and hole in chest, 340; birthday, 337; chase by analyst, 339; communicative function of, 260–6; ' the dream book ' (I. of D.), 12–13; drug addict's, 168, 169–70; flying (floating), 229–32, 261, 277; ' gestalt ', 107; inability to remember, 336; menstrual (duellists, 329; flowers, 331; negroes, 332); moon, 81–4; numbers, 352–3; teeth in, 145–61; telepathic-precognitive, 27–30; wish-fulfilment, 6
Dream screen, 229–32, 261, 265
Drug addiction, notes on a case of, 166–73

' Effective adjustment ', 201–3
Ego (ego-organization): activities, 282–3, 284–5, 287; development (male homosexual), 342–6; -feeling, 230–1; and free will, 355–6; functions, 280–1; homeostatic regulator, 249; -ideal, 91, 254–9; -instincts and sublimation, 272, 273–4, 276–7; integration and defusion, 384–5; maturation, 282; and nail biting, 395; and regression, 18, 19; rôle in vacations, 181–5; ' self exclusion ' and hypnosis, 375–8; and sleep, 260; splitting and depersonalization, 380–1; structure and sublimation, 275–8; -superego battle line, 53; ' syndrome of depletion ', 252
Electroencephalography, 313–4
Eleusinian mysteries, 63–4
Entropy, organization and economy of human relationships, 289–97
Equilibrium (homeostasis) *v.* growth, 248–51
E.S.P. (extrasensory perception), 31–5
Ethological findings, a note on the extrapolation of (René A. Spitz's reply to L. Szekely), 162–5
Expanses, friendly, 225–41
Eyes-nose-forehead stimulus (Spitz *v.* Szekely), 162–5

Face and body image development, 37–41
Failure situation (environmental): freezing of, 18; and idealization, 86; and personal growth, 25
Fairies and belief, 189–94
' Family romance ', 91
Father: and God, 187–8; and male homosexuality, 345–6; motif in Shakespeare's early ' *Errors* ', 126–30
Fear: of death, 169; distinguished from anxiety, 162, 164–5; of loss of faeces, 337; of passivity, 336, 338–42
Fenichel, Otto, on genital character, 88
Ferenczi, Sandor: on flying dreams, 230, 231; on tooth-penis identity, 159; on ' vacation neurosis ', 180
Field-identity and psychosomatic concept, 315–19
Fixation, 18, 19; of addict, 173
Fliess, Wilhelm, Freud's letters to (' the Origins of Psycho-Analysis '), 1–15
' Flowerpot ' symbol, 108, 109
Frame of reference: of biologist, 289; of interpretation, 106–10, 112
Freud, Sigmund: ' The Origins of Psycho-Analysis ' (Erikson's review of Fliess Letters), 1–15; on belief and illusion, 188, 189, 195; on castration anxiety, 95–9; on desexualization, defusion and negation, 382–3; on dream symbols, 145; on ego-feeling, 183–4, 230–1; Fliess dream, 260; on flying dreams, 230; on human suffering and happiness, 177, 178; on nature of mental, 308–9; number dream, 352–3; O.N. interpretations, 107, 108, 110–11; on ' oceanic feeling ', 230–1; on regression in dreams, 147, 159; on social sciences, 267–8; on sublimation, 269–71, 272–3, 275–7; on superego, 254, 255; on superstition, 135; technique, 20–1; on tooth symbolism, 157
Freudian theory and belief in God, 187–204
Fun fair thrills, 226–9
Fusion(s): face-hand, 38–9; of imagos, 85; regressive, 41

Genital: and body image, 37; female, discovery of, 95–6
Genital character, philosophical speculations about, 88–94
Genital impulses and sublimation, 270–2, 286–7
Gestalt(en): brain-fields, 312–14; interpretive, 107, 110–12; psycho-physical isomorphism, 311–12
Glover, Edward: on hearsay reports, 302; on residual transference, 300; on validity of interpretation, 105, 111, 112
God: belief in and psycho-analysis, 187–204; and science, 350–1
Gonzalez, Valentin, NKVD experiences, 58–9
Growth inertia and shame, 242–53
Growth, psychological, 289–91

Hand: in body image and primitive ego development, 36–41; and oral sadism, 283, 393
Healing: parapsychological, 31–5; via regression, 16
Health and vacations, 178
Hoffer, W.: on hand and ' mouth ego ', 36, 40, 41; to Sylvia May Payne, 369
Homicide during ' schizophrenic episode ', 43–52
Homosexuality: in female drug addict, 168, 173; male, 335–47; and Rorschach test, 109; sublimated as intellectual friendship, 2, 6, 13
Human relationships: economy of, 289–97; motivation of, 267–88
Hypnosis, and ego-psychological theory of, 375–8

Idealization: of analyst, 169; illusion and disillusion, 81–7; and paranormal, 33, 35
Identification(s): and defusion, 384; ' oceanic ', 183–4; post-oedipal, 254–5; and symbolism, 146; unconscious feminine, 337, 346; and union, 387–8
Illusion: and belief, 188; disillusion and idealization, 81–7
Imago(s), hallucinated and ' real ', 85–7
Information, concept of, 292
Insomnia (and hypnosis), 377
Inspiration, 53–5
Instinct(s): component, 285; sequences, 281–2; theories and sublimation, 272–5
Institute (Training) and supervisory situation, 299, 300, 301, 302, 304
Integration, delusion and personal myth, 90, 91
Integrative process, the, and nail biting, 393–5
Interpretation, psycho-analytic: of linkage fantasies, 390; negation and defusion, 384–5; scientific validation in, 105–13; and sleep during psycho-analysis, 175–6
Introjection: a continuum, 255; and re-projection in idealization, 85–6; and sleep, 261; superego a functional pattern of, 258
Isomorphism, psycho-physical, 311–12

Japanese psycho-analysis, misunderstanding of (discussion of Ohtsuki *v.* Moloney), 205–8
Jones, Ernest: on Fliess' letters, 1, 2; on Freud's ' Project ', 7; on superego, 255, 256–7; on symbol formation, 146

Kris, Ernst: to Helene Deutsch, 209; on Freud's letters to Fliess, 1, 2; on ' self-exclusion ', 375

Learning and growth, 290–1
Leopardi, Giacomo, moon poem, 81–3
Lewin, Bertram, on tooth symbolism, 158–9
Linkage fantasies and representations, 387–92
Lourdes, 33–4

Management and technique, 16–17
Marxian Trinity, 188
Masturbation: and castration anxiety, 97, 98, 99, 100, 102, 103; in drug addict, 166–7; in male homosexuals, 339–41; and tooth symbolism, 146, 147, 150–1
Maturity (maturation), 88, 93; development to, 187–8; ego, 282
Memories and character development, 258
Memory-traces and brain-fields, 314–15
Menstruation, 100, 328–34; and sublimation, 271
Metapsychology: choice of term, 12; and field-identity theory, 317–18
Mindszenty, Cardinal, 55–6
Moon dreams and symbolism, 81–3
Mother: -child field, 242, 246; -child relationship in psychosomatic illness, 320–2, 323, 383; child's sexual object, 281, 283–4; and ego-superego battle line, 53; -father unit, 93; fixation (pre-oedipal) in male homosexuality, 335, 342; identification and union with, 387–8, 392; -infant relation and self-realization, 86,

Mother—*continued*
and faith, 89, 90, 93; motif in *Comedy of Errors*, 123–6; phantasied control of, 372
Mothering: early, 20, 86; lack of, 168; technique, 21
Motivation of human relationships, 267–88
Mouth-hand co-ordination and biting-clawing, 393
Moxa-therapy, 207–8

Nail biting and the integrative process, 393–5
Narcissism, 280, 283; male homosexual, 342–6; and sleep, 261, 265
Nationality and individuality, 206
Need satisfaction, 294–6
Negation and depersonalization, 384–5
Neurosis, theory of, 8–9
Neutralization, 278, 282
News, Notes and Comments, 143–4, 363
Night-terrors and 8-months anxiety, 165
Norse Sagas, slips of tongue in, 134–5
Numbers, significance of, 352–4

Objectivity and delusion, 89–93
Object-loss and defusion, 384–5
Object-relationship(s): and aggression, 93; archaic, 383–5; assimilation *v.* fascination, 333; and auto-erotism, 279–80; in dreams, 261; economy of, 294–6; normal and idealized, 83–7; ocnophilic and philobatic, 228, 231, 232–40; psychosomatic-psychotic, 323
Ocnophilia and philobatism, 227–41
Oedipal conflict (complex): and castration anxiety, 95–104; as ' frame of reference ', 106, 108; Freud-Fliess, 5; in Japan, 206; and latency depersonalizations, 385; and menstruation, 334; recognized, 9
Omnipotence, illusion of, 86, 87; and Psi ' miracle ', 372

Parapsychology: and dream material, 28–9; and healing, 31–5
Payne, Sylvia May, on her 75th birthday (W. Hoffer), 369
Perception: and body-mind problem, 310–12, 314; limitations of, 351
Personal myth, 91
Personality: case grouping and development of, 17; correspondence-, 2, 15; organization, 257; primary core of, 243–4; structural changes, 254
Phallic phase: and castration anxiety, 96–7, 99; and phobias, 102
Philobatism and ocnophilia, 227–41
Phobia: castration, 98–103; Freud's ' railroad ', 11–12; sleep, 169
Pleasure principle: and sublimation, 272–3; and vacations, 178–9, 181, 185
Precognition, 28–9, 31–5
Pregenital impulses and sublimation, 270–2
' Primal scene ' motif in Shakespeare's early *Errors*, 127–8
Primary love, 235–6, 240; object-love, 280
Primary narcissism, 19, 21; and primary object-love, 280; and sleep, 261, 265; and tooth dreams, 160
Primary process: and body image, 41; and paranormal material, 27
Probability, laws of, 351–2, 354
' Professional hypocrisy ', 32, 33, 35
Progress (progression) and regression, 18, 21, 235–6
Projection: male homosexual, 344–6; and paranormal, 33, 35
Psi hypothesis, use of in psycho-analysis, 370–4
Psycho-analysis: applied, 111–12; and belief in God, 187–204; and body-mind problem, 307–19; and character disorders, 254; criteria of validity, 110–12; and determinism, 350–4; and entropy concept, 289–97; Japanese, 205–8; of literature, 12; ocnophilic bias of, 240–1; origins of, 1–15; personal myth and ' reality ', 90–1; Psi hypothesis in, 370–4; sleep during, 174–6; and social sciences, 267–8; telepathic-precognitive dream during, 27–30; term joins vocabulary, 8
Psycho-economics, 293–4
Psychogenesis, 307–8
Psychological complexity (organization) and entropy, 291–4
Psychological theory and belief in God, 187–204
' Psychology for Neurologists ' (' the Project '), 6–7
Psychosis(es): and addiction, 172; dental themes in, 158–9; and environmental failure, 21; and health, 20; organized or chaotic, 22; and psychosomatic illness, 320–7
Psychosomatic: concept and unconscious mental processes, 307–19; illness and psychosis, 320–7
Publications received, 436–8

Questions, children's, 350

Reaction formations, paranormal, 35
Reality principle and sublimation, 272–3
Reality testing, philobatic and ocnophilic, 228, 232–6
Reassurance and regression, 25
Reconciling talk (science and belief), 197–204
Regression: in analytic situation, 236–40, 243; and belief in God, 187–8; and defusion, 382; in dreams, 145, 147, 159–60; and hypnosis, 375, 378; metapsychological and clinical aspects of, 16–26; paranoid, 173; and philobatism and ocnophilia, 234–6; in vacations, 181–5
' Rejection ' and psychosis, 321
Representations and linkage fantasies, 387–92
Repression, primary, 282–3, 284, 287
Resistance(s): and counter-transference, 18; and dreams, 262; Freud's, 8; to new concepts (Psi), 370, 373–4; psychosomatic, 324; transference, 169
Rest and vacations, 177
Restitution and nail biting, 395
Ritual drama, primal crime and puberty rites, 62–4
Rome and Freud, 11, 14
Rorschach tests and homosexuality, 109

Sanity, flight to, 22
Schilder, Paul, on body-image, 39, 41
Schizophrenic: homicide during ' episode ', 43–52; insight, 55; linkage fantasies, 390–1
Scientific method, linguistic analytic discussion of, 198–203
' Secondary gain ', 13
Self: -abandon and extortion of confessions, 53–60; -analysis (Freud's), 9–10, 12, 13 (counter-transference), 18; awareness, 39–40; -exclusion, 375–8; ' false ', 17, 18, 21, 22, 25; observer, 23; perceptual, 316; -realization, 86; sense of, 89, 93
Shakespeare's early *Errors* (*Comedy of Errors*), 114–33; *Titus Andronicus*, ritual origin of, 61–5
Shame, 242–53
Sherrington, Sir Charles, on mind and energy, 289
Silence in analytic situation, 239
Skill(s), 233–6, 283
Sleep: during psycho-analysis, 174–6; and dream, 260–1, 265; and ' self-exclusion ', 375, 376; and vacations, 177, 185
Slips of the tongue, in Norse Sagas, 134–5
Smiling response (Spitz *v.* Szekely), 162–5
Smoking, Freud's, 5, 6, 13
Solidarity, national, 207
Spaces, horrid empty, 225–41
Sperling, Otto: on controlled delusions, 89; on parasitic superego, 58, 60
Splitting: of day residue in sleep induction, 261; in depersonalization, 380–1; of introjected object imagos, 85–7
Sublimation: and assimilation of internal objects, 333; and communication, 90–1; and ego-ideal, 259; and motivation of human relationships, 267–88
Suicide, psychosomatic, 323

Superego: appeasement, 322; and character formation, 354–9; mother-patterned and self-abandon, 53–60; parasitic, 58, 60; phylogenetic, 281, 284, 285; and shame, 251; symbols, 206–7; and vacations, 179–81
Superstition and belief, 190–1, 192, 194, 196, 204
Supervision, social context of, 298–306
Symbolism: and sublimation, 285–6; teeth in dreams, 145–61; verbal, differential significance of, 198
Szekely, L., René Spitz's criticism of anxiety hypotheses, 162–5
Szondi test, 31

Technique(s): changes in, 242–3; in drug addiction, 172–3; and ego-ideals, 257–9; Freud's, 20–1; hearsay reports, 302; Japanese, 206, 207–8; and management, 16–17; mothering, 21; ocnophilic bias of, 240–1; problems and dangers, 251; and reassurance, 25; and residual transference, 300–2; of union and separation (linkage), 387, 390–2; Zen Buddhist training and communist ' conditioning ', 53–5, 58
Teeth, dream symbolism, 145–61
Telepathy and precognition, 27–35
Theophany and self-abandon, 53–60
Thrills, fun fair, etc., 226–9
Thumb-sucking, 279–80, 283–4, 286, 394, 395
Timelessness, sense of, 183
Titus Andronicus, ritual origin of Shakespeare's, 61–5
Tongue ' blathering ', 348–9
Transference: appraisal of maturity, 93; and blathering, 348–9; correspondence-, 2, 5–6, 9, 10, 12–14; -counter transference (and paranormal phenomena), 27–30, 31–5 (in supervision), 300; and depersonalization, 383–5; in male homosexual and impaired potency, 336–7, 338, 342–6; -neurosis, 262; overdetermined, 239; psychotic, 324, 325; reversal of relations, 262; and shame, 252; and social therapy, 256; unresolved (residual), 300–2
Transitional communities and belief, 192–4
Truth and causes, 195–6

Umbilical cord and linkage fantasies, 391–2
' Uncanniness ' and menstruation, 329, 334
Unconscious mental processes and the psychosomatic concept, 307–19
' Unjust divorce ' and ' twins ' motif (Shakespeare's early *Errors*), 115–21

Vacations, a psycho-analytic study, 177–86
Vagina dentata, 153–5
Validation: intellectual, of determinism, 355; scientific, in interpretation, 105–13
Verification, methods of, 109–10
Vogeler, Robert, prison experiences and self-surrender, 56–8

Walking, 282
Wish-fulfilment: and belief, 188; established as core of dream life, 6
Words in dreams, 263–5
Word-usage and relevance of proof or disproof, 191–5

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